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The Chinese stock market is characterised by a high proportion of state-owned enterprises 
(hereafter called SOEs). To improve their performance and competitiveness, the Chinese 
government has implemented a series of SOE reforms since 1978. One of the main tasks of 
the SOE reforms has been to create a modern enterprise system. However, the existing 
literature provides limited and mixed evidence on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms among listed SOEs (e.g. Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012; Ke et al., 
2012; Reddy and Yu, 2014; Liu et al., 2015).  
The listed central enterprises (hereafter called listed CEs) are the leading enterprises among 
listed SOEs, as they are generally large in size and in important or monopoly industries 
related to the national security of the country. In addition, they are more politically sensitive, 
as they are ultimately controlled by the central enterprises that are solely owned by the 
central government. In other words, the central government is the ultimate owner of listed 
CEs. In this thesis, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms among listed CEs 
is investigated, with the focus being on three aspects: the affiliated directors that are 
nominated from the central enterprise or its affiliations, the independent directors on the 
corporate board, and the supervisory board. 
After controlling for the potential endogeneity issue and conducting multiple robustness 
checks, first it is found that the significant deviation of the control and cash-flow rights 
motivates central enterprises to appoint more affiliated directors on the corporate board in 
the next period. Also, the proportion of affiliated directors has an inverse U-shaped relation 
to the subsequent firm value of listed CEs. This result implies that too many affiliated 
directors on the corporate board lead to lower firm value in the next period among listed 
CEs. This research also involves examining the contemporaneous relationship between 
affiliated directors and firm value in listed CEs and it is concluded that these two factors 




Second, it emerges that the independent director system is an effective mechanism for 
improving the investment efficiency of listed CEs, i.e. when more than 47.3% of directors on 
the corporate board are independent. In addition, it is elicited that the U-shaped 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and investment efficiency is a 
unique phenomenon among listed CEs by conducting a PSM (propensity score matching) 
approach. This study also involves extending the test into over- and under-investment 
scenarios and the result is that the aforementioned relationship is only presented in listed 
CEs with over-investment issues. This indicates that the independent director system plays a 
more efficient role in reducing investment inefficiency caused by over-investment problems.  
Last, this research identifies that a large supervisory board, older supervisors, and more 
than three female supervisors on the supervisory board can improve the financial reporting 
quality of listed CEs. Affiliated supervisors from the central enterprise or its affiliations and 
significant age diversity of the supervisory team have a negative effect on financial reporting 
quality among listed CEs. Moreover, employee representatives on the supervisory board 
and the average compensation of the supervisory board have no significant impact on the 
financial reporting quality of listed CEs.  
The findings are important in the context of the existing literature. This research is one of 
the few contemporary studies examining the influence of the central government as the 
ultimate owner and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms among a 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The Chinese stock market is characterised by a high proportion of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) (Wang and Xiao, 2009; Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011; Leung and Cheng, 2013), which 
have played an important role in the development of the country. SOEs in China have 
experienced significant reforms since 1978. Creating a modern enterprise system has been 
one of the main tasks of SOE reforms, as the government believes that advanced and 
efficient corporate governance mechanisms can improve their performance and 
competitiveness (Chen and Lau, 2000; Huang, 2018). The effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms in listed SOEs has been widely debated in recent years, with mixed 
related empirical evidence. For instance, Liu et al. (2015) document that board 
independence can improve firm operating performance in listed SOEs. However, Ke et al. 
(2012) find that the effect of independent directors on improving investment efficiency is 
less significant than that in listed non-SOEs. Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) argue that 
directors affiliated with the ultimate owner enlarge the minority-investor expropriation 
(measured by related-party transactions) among listed SOEs. The listed central enterprises 
(listed CEs) are a special kind of listed SOE, which have a closer political connection with the 
central government. This is because the listed CEs are ultimately controlled by the central 
enterprises that are wholly owned by the central government and administered by the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), a ministry of the 
central government. In addition, the listed CEs generally are concentrated in important or 
monopoly sectors that the central government would like to keep under its absolute control, 
such as defence, energy, and the shipping industries.  
The performance of corporate governance mechanisms is considered to be different in 




motivations and take different actions in managing them1 (Wang and Xiao, 2009; Cheung et 
al., 2010; Leung and Cheng, 2013; Reddy and Yu, 2014). However, there is little study of 
listed CEs and the influence of the central government as the ultimate owner. This makes 
exploring the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms among listed CEs and 
investigating the impact and the power of the ultimate owner to listed CEs a worthwhile 
endeavour. Accordingly, this thesis conducts three independent empirical studies related to 
the corporate governance mechanisms of listed CEs: (1) the determinants of affiliated 
directors from the central enterprise or its affiliations on the corporate board and their 
economic consequences, (2) the relationship between independent directors on the 
corporate board and investment efficiency, and (3) the relationship between the 
characteristics of the supervisory board and financial reporting quality.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 1.2 introduces 
the objectives of this thesis and defines the scope of the investigation. Section 1.3 discusses 
the significance and contributions to the literature. Section 1.4 outlines the structure of this 
thesis.  
1.2 Research scope and objectives 
The first objective of this thesis is to investigate the influence of the ultimate owner (the 
central government) on the board structure measured by the proportion of affiliated 
directors on the corporate board. Besides the ownership structure, the board of directors is 
an important channel for ultimate owners to control the listed firms. For listed CEs, the 
central enterprises may appoint affiliated directors on the corporate board due to different 
incentives. The first study discusses explicitly how the central enterprises affect the board 
composition of listed CEs through the ownership (i.e. the control rights and the cash-flow 
rights owned by the central government). In addition, the literature suggests that the 
                                                                
1 See Reddy and Yu (2014), which provides a detailed discussion about the difference in incentives and actions 
between the central and local governments for managing SOEs. For instance, the central government cares 
more about enhancing its own objectives by providing a helping hand to listed CEs (e.g. policy support) 
(Cheung et al., 2010). However, listed local SOEs are the instrument for generating revenue (Mattlin, 2009). 
Local governments have a strong incentive to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders when they have 




characteristics of the corporate board may influence the proportion of affiliated directors as 
well. Hence, this research controls for a range of factors relating to the board characteristics. 
Moreover, this study investigates the economic consequences of affiliated directors, 
especially their impact on the firm value of listed CEs.  In line with the literature, Tobin’s Q is 
the proxy for the firm value of listed CEs. Also, this study involves examining whether other 
corporate governance mechanisms (the external audit and the foreign investor) influence 
the relationship between affiliated directors and firm value as well as the effect of the 
excess board seats controlled by the ultimate owner on the firm value of listed CEs.  
The second objective of this thesis is to examine the function of independent directors 
among listed CEs. The Chinese government introduced the independent director system in 
2001 and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) holds that the primary duty of 
independent directors is to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Given that a high 
proportion of the state shares is involved among listed CEs, there is a significant conflict of 
interest between the controlling shareholders (i.e. the central enterprises on behalf of the 
central government) and individual investors. The social and political goals of the 
government potentially lead to inefficient investments that may impact negatively on the 
wealth of the minority shareholders. The board of directors takes the decision-making role. 
The independent directors can participate in the investment decisions of listed CEs, so that 
they can protect the interests of minority shareholders directly. Hence, the second study 
examines whether a higher proportion of independent directors can improve the 
investment efficiency of listed CEs. Besides the proportion of independent directors on the 
corporate board, there is further investigation into whether the board attendance as well as 
the gender and age diversity of independent directors are drivers for improving investment 
efficiency. Last, this study examines whether extra control from the ultimate owner (i.e. the 
central enterprises on behalf of the central government) affects the relationship between 
independent directors and investment efficiency. 
The last objective of this thesis is to investigate the effect of the supervisory board among 
listed CEs. There are two systems that have the monitoring function in the Chinese 




other is the supervisory board. Compared with independent directors, the supervisors focus 
on monitoring the financial affairs of firms rather than participating in the decision-making 
process. Hence, the third study investigates how the supervisory board affects the financial 
reporting quality of listed CEs. Particularly, this study examines the effect of supervisory 
board size, board composition (affiliated supervisors and employee representatives), 
supervisor characteristics (average age and diversity of gender and age), and board 
incentives on financial reporting quality, respectively. In addition, the influence of the 
ultimate owner and the size effect on the relationship between affiliated supervisors 
(employee representatives) on financial reporting quality, are considered, respectively.   
1.3 Significance and contributions 
This thesis investigates the corporate governance mechanisms among listed CEs that are 
under an environment with a close connection to the Chinese central government. 
Additional empirical evidence on this special type of SOE is provided. Whilst, Chinese listed 
firms share many similarities, there is sufficient heterogeneity to warrant the analysis of 
Chinese listed firms with different types of the ultimate owner. The following are the main 
contributions to the literature delivered through this work. 
It first contributes to the literature on the determinants of affiliated directors. Study 1 builds 
a model of the expected relation between affiliated directors and ownership structure with 
board characteristics. Given the potential conflicting incentives between the ultimate owner 
and minority shareholders, it is crucial to understand how the former (i.e. the central 
government) influences the composition of the board of directors through the ownership 
structure.  
Second, it contributes to the emerging market literature that documents a significant 
relationship between affiliated directors and firm values (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Yeh, 2005; 
Chen et al., 2014a). Study 1 subsequently involves investigating the economic consequences 




value of listed CEs. It sheds light on how the central government impacts on the listed CEs 
through the board of directors. 
Third, this work contributes to the literature on independent directors and investment 
efficiency. Following the existing literature (Richardson, 2006; Shen et al., 2015; Chen et al., 
2016), Study 2 constructs an investment model and uses the absolute value of its residuals 
as the proxy for investment efficiency. In addition to the linear relation, Study 2 also 
examines the potential non-linear relationship between independent directors and 
investment efficiency. Given widespread investment problems among listed CEs, it is 
important to probe whether the independent director system is an effective corporate 
governance mechanism that can improve the investment efficiency of listed CEs. 
Fourth, the thesis outcomes add new evidence to the existing literature that documents a 
significant relationship between the supervisory board and financial reporting quality (Ran 
et al., 2015). Study 3 investigates the function of the supervisory board according to various 
dimensions, including supervisory board size, board composition, board characteristics, and 
board incentives. It provides detailed evidence on the aspects of the supervisory board that 
may have significant effects on financial reporting quality, which thus includes the reform 
direction that could lead to more effective supervisory boards of listed CEs. 
Last, this thesis has political implications for SOE reforms. The three empirical studies are all 
related to corporate governance mechanisms among listed CEs, each empirically examining 
the achievements of the SOE reform and shedding light on where further reform should be 
directed. In addition, it provides robust evidence that allows for making recommendations 
as to how the policymakers should amend the relevant regulations to strengthen the 





1.4 The organisation of this thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of this work, whilst 
Chapter 2 introduces the research background relating to Chinese SOEs. There are three 
specific research questions following the theme that involves investigating the effectiveness 
of corporate governance mechanisms in listed CEs. In Chapter 3 (Study 1) identifies the 
determinants of affiliated directors from the central enterprise or its affiliations, with an 
examination of the effect of these directors on firm value. Chapter 4 (Study 2) addresses the 
research question as to whether the independent director system is an effective corporate 
governance mechanism for improving investment efficiency in listed CEs. Chapter 5 (Study 3) 
investigates the relationship between the supervisory board and financial reporting quality, 
whilst Chapter 6 summarises the thesis. 
Chapter 1 has introduced the research theme, scope, and objectives. This chapter also has 
discussed the contributions of this thesis to the corporate governance literature and the 
structure of the work. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of Chinese SOEs. This chapter first reviews the process of 
SOE reforms from 1978 to the current and, then, gives the classification of SOEs with their 
recent years’ performance. Next, this chapter explains what central enterprises are, and 
provides the definition of listed CEs employed in this thesis. Lastly, this chapter discusses 
the special governance environment of listed CEs. 
Chapter 3 (Study 1) provides a complete study on the determinants of affiliated directors 
from the central enterprises and their effect on firm value. It starts with an introduction to 
this research topic, followed by a review of the literature about ultimate owner incentives, 
affiliated directors and firm value, which leads to the development of related hypotheses. 
The empirical model and data are introduced, followed by the empirical results with 
robustness checks being provided and some related additional tests are reported on. Finally, 




affiliated directors and their effect on firm value, with consideration of the consequent 
implications from the analysis outcomes. 
Chapter 4 (Study 2) provides an independent study relating to the relationship between 
independent directors and investment efficiency in listed CEs. It first provides an overview 
of the research question, followed by a review of the literature on independent directors 
and investment efficiency as well as the existing empirical evidence on the relation between 
these two factors. The related hypotheses are developed subsequently. Next, Study 2 
establishes the employed regression models, describes data, and reports the empirical 
results with sensitive checks. Furthermore, this study conducts extended tests relating to 
the performance and characteristics of independent directors as well as the effect of the 
ultimate owner on the relation between these two factors. Lastly, this study concludes with 
a discussion regarding main findings for the relationship between independent directors and 
investment efficiency and thus, subsequently providing political suggestions from this 
analysis.  
Chapter 5 (Study 3) presents an integrated study on the relationship between the 
supervisory board and financial reporting quality. It starts with an overview of this research 
topic, followed by a review of the literature on the supervisory board and financial reporting 
quality, as well as the existing empirical evidence about them. The research hypotheses are 
developed from four aspects of the supervisory board. Next, the research design and data 
are presented, followed by the empirical results with robustness checks. This study also 
conducts related additional tests. Lastly, there is a summary of the main findings regarding 
the relationship between the supervisory board and financial reporting quality, with the 
political implications from this analysis being subsequently discussed.  
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. This chapter contains a summary of the main results, 
presents recommendations and implications, discusses the limitations, and provides 




Chapter 2 Chinese Central Enterprises 
2.1 Introduction 
The reform of SOEs has been regarded as an important link in China’s economic reform. 
Most SOEs in China have experienced corporatisation2 and shareholding reforms aimed at 
creating a modern enterprise system with an improved governance structure. This has the 
purpose of transforming SOEs from traditional state-run enterprises under a planned 
economy into “new SOEs” under a market economy (Huang, 2018). The listed central 
enterprises (listed CEs) ultimately owned by the central government are the leading 
enterprises in this ongoing reform, as they are more politically sensitive than other firms, 
with most of them being in important or monopoly sectors, such as defence, utilities, oil and 
gas. In order to understand Chinese central enterprises and their listed CEs, it is necessary to 
start by introducing the SOE reform.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the process of the SOE 
reform. Section 2.3 introduces the classification of SOEs in China and their financial 
performance. Section 2.4 and 2.5 provide the definition of the central enterprises and listed 
central enterprises (listed CEs), respectively. Section 2.6 discusses the special governance 
environment among listed CEs. 
  
                                                                
2  Corporatisation is the process of transforming state assets, government agencies and/or municipal 
organisations into corporations. It involves restructuring the government and public organisations into joint-




2.2 The Chinese SOE reform 
In the development process of the economy in China, one of the prominent features is the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that dominate the whole economy. In order to improve the 
separation of government from management in SOEs and to convert the centrally-planned 
economy3 into a socialist market economy4, the government carried out the SOE reform in 
the 1980s. Since then, SOEs have experienced significant structural changes. 
There are four stages of the process of the SOE reform: expanding the autonomy of 
management among SOEs during 1978 to 1992; creating a modern enterprise system from 
1993 to 2002; establishing a new system for the administration of state assets during 2003 
to 2012; and further reform based on a new classification introduced in 2013 (Hu, 2018; 
Huang, 2018). Table 2-1 summarises the actions during these four phases of SOE reform.  
Table 2-1 Summary of the process of SOE reforms 
 
Stage  Main tasks  Key documents 
1978-1992  
The Period of 
Decentralisation and 
Interest Concessions 
 The primary task of the reform in this stage 
was to give the autonomy of management to 
SOEs, in order to separate government from 
business. Before that, SOEs were under the 
highly centralised planned economic system 
and completely relied on government 
planning and administrative allocations, such 
as human, financial and material resources, 
as well as production and sales activities. 
It was to help SOEs escape from the fetters 
of obsolete concepts and behaviours under 
the planned economic system, adapt to a 
commodity-based business environment, 
and complete the corporatisation reform. 
The period of expanding autonomy in SOEs 
can be further divided into the following 
three phases:  
1978-1984 the increase of autonomy; 
 The State Council announced Several 
Provisions on Expanding the Autonomy 
of State-owned Enterprises in July 1979. 
                                                                
3 A centrally-planned economy is an economic system where investment and the allocation of capital goods 
are planned by the central government in advance (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). 
4 A socialist market economy is the economic model employed by China, which is based on the dominance of 
the state-owned sector and an open-market economy. It is a mixed product of free competition and 




1985-1989 implementations of the contract 
responsibility system; 
1990-1992 the reform of the corporate 
operation mechanism. 
1993-2002 
The Period of 
Institutional 
Innovation 
 The first task of the reform in this stage was 
to restructure major enterprises and to relax 
the control over small ones. Big enterprises 
were encouraged to transform into groups or 
to establish partnerships with each other. 
Small public enterprises were reformed 
flexibly following the demands of the 
market, such as becoming shareholding 
businesses, transacting mergers and making 
acquisitions or contracting managing rights 
to individuals. 
The second task of the reform in this stage 
was to establish a modern enterprise system 
characterised by clear property rights, well-
defined authority and responsibilities, the 
separation between government and 
business, and scientific management.  
 The Decision of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China on 
Major Issues Concerning the Reform 
and Development of State-owned 
Enterprises was adopted at the Fourth 
Plenum of the 15th Communist Party of 
China (CPC) Central Committee on 
September 22, 1999. 
2003-2012 
The Period of SASAC 
Administration 
 The State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) was 
established by the State Council in 2003. This 
single authority (i.e. SASAC) ended the 
situation that multiple inefficient 
bureaucracies administrated the state-
owned assets. The preliminary supervision 
and administration system of state-owned 
assets was established. 
 The State Council issued Interim 
Measures for the Supervision and 
Administration of State-owned Assets 
of the Enterprises in May 2003. These 
were revised in 2011 and 2019. 
The Standing Committee of the 11th 
National People’ Congress approved 
Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on the State-owned Assets of 
Enterprise. It has been effective since 
May 1, 2009. 
2013-ongoing 
The Period of the 
Classified Reform 
 This period is described as a 
comprehensively deepening phase of the 
SOE reform. In 2015, the government 
classified SOEs into three categories: public-
interest SOEs, commercial SOEs with the 
primary business in fully competitive sectors 
and commercial SOEs with the primary 
business in important and critical sectors. 
According to the characteristics of different 
types of SOEs, they will be subject to 
different mechanisms and assessments for 
the supervision of state assets, mixed 
ownership reform schemes, corporate 
governance mechanisms and the strategic 
adjustment of the state sector of the 
economy. 
 The Decisions on Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms was adopted at the 
18th CPC Central Committee on 
November 12, 2013. 
The State Council issued Guiding 
Opinions of the CPC Central Committee 
and the State Council on Deepening the 
Reform of State-owned Enterprises in 
August 2015. This and supporting 
documents formed a “1+ N” policy 
system. Appendix 1 shows the details 
about the supporting documents. 




Huang (2018) argues that the SOE reform has made significant achievements, such as 64 
SOEs being ranked as Global 500 companies in 2017. However, he also points out that these 
large enterprises still have not met the criteria to be the world-class enterprises and hence, 
they need further reform in order to meet the requirements of the socialist market 
economy. In addition, Hu (2018) argues that the significant loss of state-owned assets 
during the SOE reforms should be noted as well. During the SOE restructuring, foreign and 
domestic private capital were involved through the transfer of the ownership of state shares 
or state assets. However, a lot of state-owned assets were deliberately underestimated 
during this process. Furthermore, given the weak legal supervision, some executives of SOEs 
sold state assets to their relatives at very low prices in order to achieve great private 
benefits. This kind of behaviour can be regarded as an alternative format of corruption. In 
sum, the literature suggests that the central government should continue the 





2.3 The classification of SOEs and their performance 
SOEs can be classified according to the institutions that the state assets are managed by. 
Figure 2-1 displays the administration relationship among the government institutions that 
have the responsibility of managing state assets. The top level is the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and below that is the State Council. Under this organisational structure, the 
administrators of state assets are divided into two branches. Central enterprises are 
administrated and monitored by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), whilst the relevant local governments manage the local state assets. In 
this study, the focus is on the central enterprises and their listed subsidiaries (listed CEs) 
that are controlled and supervised by SASAC, which is the left branch in Figure 2-1. 
Figure 2-1 State-owned asset management system in China 
 
Source: this research 
SASAC discloses the information regarding SOEs’ performance annually and Table 2-3 shows 
the detailed financial information for recent years. The total realised profit of all SOEs in 
2012 was 2,195.96 billion RMB, which increased to 2,476.54 billion RMB in 2014, whilst in 
















2-2 shows the importance of SOEs in the economy of China, as in the period 2012 to 2016, 
the average ratio of total annual turnover of SOEs to GDP was 71.86%. Figure 2-3 displays 
the contributions of the central enterprises and local SOEs to the total annual turnover of all 
SOEs and Figure2-4 shows the contributions of these two kinds of SOEs to total realised 
profit. It is clear that the central enterprises are important in the state assets economy, as 
on average around 60% of total revenue and about 68% of the total profit are from them. 
However, their performance has not been as good as that of local SOEs. The average growth 
rate of profit from 2012 to 2016 was 3.73% in local SOEs and 0.597% in central enterprises. 
A study conducted by Guo (2011) reported that the performance of listed CEs was the worst 
when compared to both other listed SOEs and listed non-SOEs in a period of 2007 to 2009. 
Hence, the inefficient development of the central enterprises should be noted. 
Table 2-2 The financial performance of SOEs for 2012 to 2016 (unit: billion RMB) 
 
Year Type Total annual turnover  Total cost  Total realized profit  Total tax payable 
2012         
 CEs 26,055.85    1,504.54  2,525.07 
 local SOEs 16,321.11    691.42  824.56 
 total SOEs 42,376.96  40,657.03  2,195.96  3,349.63 
2013         
 CEs 28,440.71  27,215.13  1,665.28  2,803.02 
 local SOEs 18,034.21  17,681.85  739.77  878.18 
 total SOEs 46,474.92  44,896.98  2,405.05  3,681.20 
2014         
 CEs 29,379.03  28,172.77  1,728.02  2,916.99 
 local SOEs 18,684.61  18,487.77  748.52  869.09 
 total SOEs 48,063.64  46,660.54  2,476.54  3,786.06 
2015         
 CEs 27,169.40  26,240.76  1,614.89  2,973.14 
 local SOEs 18,301.01  18,278.85  687.86  886.73 
 total SOEs 45,470.41  44,519.61  2,302.75  3,859.87 
2016         
 CEs 27,678.36  26,803.99  1,525.91  2,915.30 
 local SOEs 18,219.44  18,184.51  789.87  892.31 
 total SOEs 45,897.80  44,988.50  2,315.78  3,807.61 
Note: This table reports the financial performance of central enterprises, local SOEs and total SOEs. SASAC did 






Figure 2-2 GDP and total annual turnover of total SOEs 
 
Source: SASAC, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Figure 2-3 The total annual turnover of central enterprises, local SOEs and total SOEs  
 
Source: SASAC 
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Figure 2-4 The total realised profit of central enterprises, local SOEs and total SOEs 
 
Source: SASAC 
2.4 Chinese central enterprises  
The Interim Measures for the Administration of State-owned Equity of Corporations (1994) 
define state shares as being those held by the central government, local governments, or 
solely government-owned enterprises. Hence, a central enterprise, here defined as a solely 
government-owned enterprise, equates to a government institution. The narrow definition 
of a central enterprise in China is that the conglomerate has been solely raised and is owned 
by the central government, being administrated directly by the State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). When SASAC was established in 2003, China had 196 
central enterprises. Then, the central government conducted their annexation and 
recombination. By doing so, the central enterprises could achieve resource integration that 
optimised allocation and it reduced disorderly competition of being competitors with their 
subsidiaries in the same sector. By the end of 2018, the number of central enterprises had 
decreased to 96. Among the 100 disappeared ones, 53 were wholly absorbed by relevant 
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industrial groups, 19 enterprises were horizontally reconstructed, and 18 experienced 
upstream and/or downstream5 integration.  
The number of central enterprises ranked as amongst the Global 500 companies was six in 
2003, when SASAC had just been established and then it increased to 48 in 2017. Figure 2-5 
shows the capital structure of central enterprises in the period 2013 to 2016. The increase 
of total assets of central enterprises from 48,317.80 billion RMB to 69,478.87 billion RMB 
indicates that they have experienced fast expansion. “Be stronger and larger” is the major 
goal of the central enterprise reform; however, whilst the rapid expansion of central 
enterprises had made them larger, this had not led to their being stronger. This is because a 
significant increase in total liabilities has accompanied the expansion of their size.  
In Figure 2-5, the total liabilities increased from 31,751.94 billion RMB in 2013 to 47,652.60 
billion RMB in 2016 and average debt to total assets ratio was 67% in the period from 2013 
to 2016. This relatively high average leverage ratio of SOEs got the attention of the 
government. Subsequently, SASAC regulated the red lines of the leverage ratio for central 
enterprises in 2018, in order to mitigate their inefficient development due to the blind 
expansion and heavy pressure of debts. Specifically, the government has set the warning 
line at 70% in the manufacturing industry, 75% in the non-manufacturing industry, and 65% 
in the technology industry. Moreover, Leutert (2016) points out that the lack of an 
information-sharing system, weak oversight, frequently overlooked politics, and enduring 
cadre culture are intra-firm obstacles to central enterprise reform as well6.  
                                                                
5 The recombination of central enterprises has been different to other SOEs regarding commercial merger and 
acquisitions, as one central enterprise is wholly transferred to another without consideration.  




Figure 2-5 The capital structure of central enterprises  
 
Source: SASAC 
As aforementioned, the central enterprises are concentrated in sectors considered 
important by the state. In particular, they are in those closely related to state security and 
the national economy, such as defence, utilities, oil and gas, telecommunications, coal, civil 
aviation and shipping, among others. The central government keeps absolute control power 
in order to avoid potential threats to state assets. Also, the central enterprises are never 
allowed to go public directly, for doing so would lead to the dilution of the controlling power 
from the central government. 
2.5 Chinese listed central enterprises 
In the Chinese market, SOEs are playing a leading role in advancing modernisation and 
safeguarding public interests. China’s central authorities issued guidelines (2015) 7  to 
promote SOE reform, the purposes of which being to improve SOEs’ international 
competitiveness, innovation and international influence. The partial privatisation8 (mixed-
                                                                
7 Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-
owned Enterprises issued by the State Council in August 2015. 
8 Partially privatisation means that part of a firm’s assets is privatised, and the control rights have been 





























Capital structure of central enterprises




ownership) has been the most significant reform, which has increased corporate 
governance and financial performance of SOEs (Sam, 2011). The guidelines state that SOEs 
should bring in multiple types of investors and the government should encourage them to 
go public. By doing so, this promotes the separation of government from management, 
thereby turning them fully into business entities. In contrast, the central enterprises are 
fully controlled by SASAC. One way that they may participate in the market economy is to 
list their subsidiaries publicly or to invest through the acquisition of already listed firms. 
These publicly listed firms that are ultimately controlled by the central enterprises are 
defined as listed central enterprises (listed CEs).  
There are several ways for determining that a central enterprise ultimately controls a 
publicly listed firm, including: (1) the voting rights of the shares solely controlled by the 
central enterprise, or jointly with its affiliates, exceed those of non-government shareholder 
with the biggest stake of shares; (2) the central enterprise controls a firm’s share with its 
voting rights reaching or exceeding 30%; (3) the central enterprise has the power to appoint 
half of the directors on the corporate board through single or jointly controlled voting rights; 
or (4) the central enterprise can control a firm’s financial and business strategies, thereby 
gaining profits from this firm’s operating activities. If a central enterprise matches any of 
these conditions9, then it is called the ultimate controller (largest shareholder) of this listed 
firm. 
2.6 The governance environment among listed CEs 
In the typical Chinese corporate governance structure (Figure 2-6), the general shareholder 
meeting is the highest institution in a listed firm. At this meeting, shareholders elect the 
board of directors and the board of supervisors. The board of directors is in charge of the 
decision-making of the firm, monitoring its performance and assessing that of the 
                                                                
9 The Administrative Rules on Acquisition of Listed Companies, the Rules for the Listing Stocks set by the 
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Guidelines of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the Conduct of 
Controlling Shareholders, and the Guidelines for the Standardised Operation of Companies Listed on the Small 




management. It comprises executive directors (e.g. the managerial executives), affiliated 
directors (e.g. the representatives from the large shareholders), and independent directors.  
In 2001, CSRC issued the Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed 
Companies Guiding Opinion, which marks the official introduction of the independent 
director system in China. This guiding opinion points out the qualifications of independent 
directors to make sure that the independent directors can exercise their functions and 
powers. Additionally, in order to demonstrate the “independence” of independent director, 
the guiding opinion lists seven conditions (Appendix 2) that the person who follows those 
conditions may not hold the position of the independent director. The guiding opinion also 
clarifies the duties and responsibilities of independent directors and regulates the process of 
nomination, election, and replacement of independent directors. What is more critical, CSRC 
rules the proportion of independent directors on the corporate board. By 30 June 2003, at 
least one-third of the members of the board of directors should be independent directors. 
The board of supervisors takes the responsibility of supervising the behaviour of both the 
directors and executives, comprising inside supervisors (e.g. the employees of the firm), 
affiliated supervisors (e.g. the representatives from the large shareholders) and 
independent supervisors. Whilst independent directors and the supervisory board share a 
similar function of monitoring, the former can participate in the decision-making process 
and the latter focuses on monitoring the quality of a firm’s financial information. The 
revised Company Law (2015) regulates that the supervisory board has the right to give 
advice on appointing or dismissing executives, rather than making this decision directly. This 
shows that, in China, the board of directors and the board of supervisors are parallel 




Figure 2-6 The corporate governance structure in China  
 
Source: this research 
Although the Chinese government has implemented a series of reforms to accelerate the 
separation of government from management, the listed CEs are still significantly influenced 
by their parent firms (i.e. the central enterprises). 
Similar to other listed SOEs, the listed CEs have a relatively complicated principal-agent 
relationship (Qiang, 2003). The multilayer principal-agent mechanism shows a vertical 
relationship chain (Figure 2-1) starting from the NPC (National People’s Congress) at the top, 
follow by SASAC, central enterprises, and finally, listed CEs at the bottom. This long 
relationship chain reduces the efficiency of corporate governance in such listed firms. There 
is a principal-agent at each level apart from the top and bottom ones shown in Figure 2-1, 
which means that these principals in the middle levels lack any enthusiasm to monitor what 
they perceive as an inferior accompanying agent (Rodríguez et al., 2007). As has been noted, 
SASAC acts as the owner of state assets on behalf of the state. Meanwhile, it takes on the 
direct responsibilities of supervising and administrating the state assets as a governmental 
















shareholder) of SASAC conflicted with its regulatory role (i.e. as a supervisor and 
administrator). In which case, SASAC could not perform well as the owner of state assets 
and hence, the absence of the owner problem among listed CEs still existed even after its 
establishment. Furthermore, if the supervision from SASAC is insufficient, the residual rights 
of listed CEs may be allocated to the management of central enterprises, which could lead 
to a higher possibility of self-interest behaviours of the management team, such as the 
abuse of the authority to graft. 
The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2013 Amendment) specifies, “The 
member of the board of directors in a wholly state-owned company shall be appointed by 
the state-owned assets supervision and administration institution (SASAC).” and “Upon 
consent of the state-owned assets supervision and administration institution (SASAC), the 
director may concurrently hold the position as a manager”. Under the condition introduced, 
the directors and top executives of central enterprises are appointed by SASAC, which 
brings a strong political connection into them. Meanwhile, article 69 of the Company Law 
specifies that “None of the chairman, deputy chairman, directors and senior managers of a 
wholly state-owned company may concurrently take up a position in any other limited 
liability company, joint stock limited company or other economic organisations unless 
gaining the consent of the state-owned assets supervision and administration institution 
(SASAC)”. In other words, the top management of a central enterprise can concurrently hold 
a position in listed CEs under the consent of SASAC. By having this situation, the listed CEs 
have more significant political influence than do other listed SOEs. 
As a part of central enterprises, listed CEs are under the administration of SASAC, whilst at 
the same time, being supervised by CSRC providing they are listed. Under the dual 
supervision, when, for example, the listed CEs plan to conduct material assets 
reorganisation or to issue bonds, the first step is getting the consent from SASAC. Then, the 
arrangement is discussed at a general meeting, whilst finally, the decision is reported to 
CSRC for approval. In sum, compared with other listed firms, the listed CEs spend much 




As creating a modern enterprise system is one of the main tasks of the SOE reform, more 
and more corporate governance mechanisms are introduced into Chinese SOEs. Given the 
above discussion, the corporate governance environment of listed CEs is more complicated. 
Hence, this thesis aims to examine whether the corporate governance mechanisms do play 
an effective role among listed CEs under such a complicated governance environment. 
Specifically, three independent studies are conducted to explore: the determinants of 
affiliated directors from the central enterprise or its affiliations and their economic 
consequences; the effect of independent directors on investment efficiency; and the impact 





Chapter 3 (Study1) Ultimate Owner, Affiliated Directors, and Firm Value 
3.1 Introduction 
The effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership on firm value has been widely 
discussed in countries with concentrated ownership (e.g. Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et 
al., 2002; Yeh, 2005; Liu and Tian, 2012; Su et al., 2016; Hooy et al., 2019). For instance, 
Claessens et al. (2002) document that listed firms with higher cash-flow rights from the 
controlling shareholder have higher firm value and that a significant wedge between control 
and cash-flow rights reduces this value. They identify this positive effect from the higher 
cash-flow rights as the incentive alignment effect that enhances firm value. Also, they term 
the negative effect from the divergence of control and cash-flow rights the entrenchment 
effect, which deteriorates firm value.  
Besides the ownership structure, in fact, the corporate board is also an important channel 
for the ultimate owner (i.e. controlling shareholders) exercising control in listed firms. This is 
because that the board of directors has a crucial position in the corporate governance 
structure, in that it takes the role of important decision-making, strategy setting and 
monitoring the behaviours of the executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Butler, 
1985). Furthermore, appointing a sufficient proportion of affiliated representatives is the 
common way for the ultimate owner to enhance control power on the corporate board of 
listed firms. That is, the directors who are affiliated with the ultimate owner or its 
affiliations may influence the decision making of the operating activities on the corporate 
board of listed firms.  
Other studies have focused on the functions of independent directors on the corporate 
board. The determinants of independent directors and their economic consequences have 
been extensively examined around the world (e.g. Mak and Li, 2001; Prevost et al., 2002; 
Erickson et al., 2005; Linck et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2016). In contrast, affiliated directors, 
especially those related to the ultimate owner, have not received much attention. Hence, 




board by placing affiliated representatives on it and the economic effect of these affiliated 
directors on firm value.  
Chinese corporations are characterised as having a concentrated ownership structure. Wang 
and Xiao (2009) report that central or local governments or their agencies ultimately control 
70% of Chinese listed firms. The listed central enterprises (listed CEs) are firms ultimately 
controlled by the central government, hence having strong political ties with it and being 
more sensitive to its influences. Whilst the central government ultimately owns the listed 
CEs, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) authorises 
the appropriate central enterprises10 to exercise daily control and management of these 
listed CEs. Hence, the central enterprises may appoint more affiliated directors onto the 
corporate board to strengthen their control power in listed CEs. Alternatively, the central 
enterprises may place fewer affiliated directors on the corporate board, thus providing 
more board space for directors with professional or management skills of the firms or 
independent directors11. By doing so, the corporate governance of listed CEs can be 
improved. This is in line with one of the main tasks of the SOE reform that was aimed at 
creating a modern corporate system with these companies. The existing evidence (e.g., 
Wang et al., 2006; Bhabra and Li, 2011; Liu et al., 2015) supports the positive function of 
board independence, in particular, giving more board positions to independent directors 
can improve corporate performance. Finally, the central enterprises can benefit from an 
increase in the firm value of listed CEs when there is strong corporate governance. In order 
to determine the effect of government intervention on the corporate board of listed CEs, 
and to provide evidence for the direction in which to reform them further, this study 
examines the potential influencing factors that motivate central enterprises on behalf of the 
central government to place a certain number of affiliated representatives on corporate 
                                                                
10 The central enterprises are state-owned enterprises that are wholly funded and administrated by SASAC. As 
the central enterprise is solely owned by the central government, it is generally regarded as a “state unit” (Yeo, 
2013). The central government holds the absolute control power in these enterprises.  
11 Affiliated directors mean the directors have a close tie to the ultimate owner. In the case of listed CEs, the 
affiliated directors are someone who concurrently hold a position in the central enterprise or its affiliations. 
The directors with expertise mean that the directors have working experience in the related industry or 
professional management skills. There may be overlap between affiliated directors and directors with 
expertise, which means some affiliated directors may also have management expertise. However, in listed CEs, 
most affiliated directors from the central enterprises generally lack professional management skills, as they are 




boards of listed CEs. In addition, the economic effect of these affiliated directors on 
corporation value is examined.  
There are two parts to this study. First, there is an examination of the determinants of the 
proportion of affiliated directors on the corporate board of listed CEs, specifically the 
potential influencing factors coming from the ultimate owner (i.e. the central government). 
Yeh and Woidtke (2005) argue that controlling shareholders are likely to increase 
shareholder wealth by selecting professionals to serve as directors based on their expertise 
rather than affiliation. In particular, when the cash-flow investment is high, the benefit that 
controlling shareholders derive from increasing shareholder wealth outweighs their loss 
from limiting expropriation. Hence, this study hypothesises that the ownership (i.e. the 
cash-flow rights) owned by the central government is negatively associated with the 
proportion of affiliated directors. It is also proposed that the wedge between control and 
ownership (i.e. the divergence of the voting and cash-flow rights) is positively associated 
with the proportion of affiliated directors, i.e. more affiliated directors on the corporate 
board is helpful for central enterprises in gaining control of listed CEs. Moreover, when this 
is the case, it is easier for the central enterprises to engage in the expropriation of minority 
shareholders.  
Next, this study examines the relationship between affiliated directors and the firm value of 
listed CEs. It is hypothesised that there is a non-linear relationship between affiliated 
directors and the firm value of listed CEs, whereby the effect of these directors on firm value 
is positive or negative depending on the proportion of board that they occupy. Affiliated 
directors act on behalf of central enterprises, taking responsibility for protecting the interest 
of the central government and hence, they are likely to play a positive role in improving the 
firm value of listed CEs. Correspondingly, the central government can benefit from the 
increase of the wealth of listed CEs. However, too many affiliated directors may lead to 
board inefficiency, which is negatively associated with firm value, as they generally lack 
professional management skills. For the second hypothesis, it is proposed that the 
entrenchment effect may motivate central enterprises to place more affiliated directors on 




many affiliated directors on the corporate board may have a negative effect on firm value. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesised that there is an optimal proportion of affiliated directors on 
the corporate board leading to the highest corporation value of listed CEs. Specifically, it is 
proposed that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between affiliated directors and 
firm value. This study conducts related extended tests, including the effect of external 
mechanisms on the relation between affiliated directors and firm value as well as the effect 
of excess board seats control (i.e. the divergence of the affiliated director ratio and the cash-
flow rights) on firm value. 
This study employs a sample of 942 firm-year observations consisting of 225 unique listed 
non-financial A-share CEs from 2012 to 2016. An affiliated director is defined a person that 
concurrently has a position in the central enterprise or its affiliations. It is mandatory for 
listed CEs to disclose the positions concurrently held by their directors in other places, so 
this information, which is available in annual reports of listed CEs, has to be collected 
manually. Other corporate governance and financial information is obtained from the 
Chinese Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). The main findings are as 
follows. 
In order to avoid the causality issue, this study applies the lead/lag relation between 
dependent and independent variables. First, there is no significant evidence that the cash-
flow rights owned by the central government influence the next period appointment of 
affiliated directors. However, the divergence of the voting and cash-flow rights would 
appear to motivate central enterprises to place more affiliated directors on the corporate 
board in the next period. Second, it emerges that the affiliated directors have an inverse U-
shaped relationship with the subsequent firm value of listed CEs. This means that more 
affiliated directors on the corporate board increase the subsequent firm value of listed CEs, 
so long as their proportion does not reach the turning point. That is, the affiliated directors 
start to play a negative role on subsequent firm value, when their ratio exceeds the turning 
point. This curvilinear relation between affiliated directors and the subsequent firm value of 
listed CEs is robust under the piecewise linear regression model. This study also applies the 




between affiliated directors and the firm value of listed CEs. The results show that the 
contemporaneous affiliated directors and firm value jointly affect each other.  
Third, this study investigates the external mechanisms that may affect the relation between 
affiliated directors and the firm value of listed CEs through regression analysis. The results 
indicate that better quality of the external audit can mitigate the negative effect of too 
many affiliated directors on firm value, as the coefficient of the affiliated director ratio is 
positively significant, and the quadratic term of this ratio is insignificant in the group that 
are clients of the big four accounting firms. However, there is no significant effect of the 
presence of foreign institutional investors on the relation between affiliated directors and 
the firm value of listed CEs. Last, following Yeh and Woidtke (2005) and Young et al. (2007), 
an alternative measure of the separation of control and ownership ( i.e. the affiliated 
director ratio and cash-flow rights) is deployed to examine whether this excess board seats 
control affects the valuation of listed CEs. There is a negative effect of excess board seats 
control on the firm value of listed CEs. This result is robust under three measures of excess 
board seats control (ratio, difference and dummy). In addition, it is elicited that the external 
mechanisms (the external audit and foreign institutional investors) can mitigate the 
negative influence of excess board seats control on firm value in listed CEs. 
This study contributes to the literature on board composition. First, it offers new insights on 
the determinants of board composition from an ultimate owner perspective, finding that 
the separation of control and ownership motivates the ultimate owner to place more 
affiliated directors on board. Overall, the ultimate owner has a significant influence on the 
corporate governance of listed firms. Second, the outcomes confirm the effect of affiliated 
directors on firm value, which enriches the literature on the functions of different kinds of 
directors on the corporate board. In particular, there is a non-linear relation between 
affiliated directors and firm value. Third, this study focuses on listed CEs, the ultimate owner 
of which is central government. The discussions about how the central enterprises acting on 
behalf of the central government affect the corporate board structure of listed CEs have 
implications for further central enterprise reform in China. Whilst the reform continues 




participates in the management of listed CEs by placing affiliated directors on their 
corporate boards. It cannot be denied that, the central government must hold certain 
control of listed CEs, as they are important state assets, but what is the appropriate level of 
governmental control? The government and academics are still seeking the answer to this 
question. The suggestion to central government arising from the findings of this study is to 
control the proportion of affiliated directors on the corporate board at a certain level, 
especially in situations where the central enterprises place too many such directors on the 
corporate board of listed CEs, with a small equity stake.  
The rest of the study proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the related literature and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 3.3 provides the details of research methodology and data. 
Section 3.4 reports the main empirical findings and sensitivity tests. Section 3.5 presents the 





3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
It is widely documented that ownership in developing countries is highly concentrated (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). Under a concentrated ownership structure, 
conflict of interest between the agent and the principal in publicly traded firms is not 
between managers and shareholders, but between ultimate controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. The expropriation of minority shareholders is more common in the 
developing countries, as La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) find that the 
ultimate shareholders typically have more control rights than their cash-flow rights. The 
deviation of cash-flow from control rights motivates the ultimate controlling shareholder to 
divert private benefits and consequently, reduces the firm value of a listed firm. This is 
because the willingness to expropriate value is less restrained by the equity ownership 
owned by the controlling shareholders (Young et al., 2007).  
Moreover, another motivation for controlling shareholders to extract the value of listed 
firms is that the protection of minority shareholders is relatively weak in developing 
countries (La Porta et al., 2002). Claessens et al. (2002) employ the cash-flow rights and the 
divergence of control (voting) and cash-flow rights to examine the incentive alignment and 
entrenchment effects of controlling shareholders, using a sample of 1,301 listed firms from 
eight East Asian economies in 1996. Their empirical results show that the cash-flow rights of 
controlling shareholders have a positive incentive effect on firm value. In contrast, the 
wedge between control and ownership from controlling shareholders has a negative effect 
on firm value. La Porta et al. (2002) put forward a similar argument that listed firms with 
higher cash-flow rights being owned by the ultimate controlling shareholder have higher 
corporation value, using evidence from 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. The 
incentive alignment and entrenchment effects of the ultimate owner also affect the 
indicators of a firm’s corporate governance level, such as accounting information quality 
(Fan and Wong, 2002; Haw et al., 2004; Young et al., 2007; Bozec, 2008), dividend policy 
(Faccio et al., 2001; Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006; Ramli, 2010), external financing cost 




The work of La Porta et al. (1999,2002), Claessens et al. (2000,2002) and Faccio and Lang 
(2002) show the patterns of corporate ownership around the world, and the presence of a 
concentrated ownership structure in developing economies. However, none of the work 
pertains to the economy of mainland China, which is one of the largest developing countries 
in the world. Similar to the evidence found in other Asian economies, the capital market in 
China has a concentrated ownership structure. Also, it is dominated by state shares (Xu and 
Wang, 1999; Wang and Xiao, 2009). The effect of these shares on firm performance in China 
has been widely discussed and the results are mixed. For instance, Xu and Wang (1999) 
report that the proportion of state shares has no relation with firm profitability, but it has a 
negative effect on labour productivity. In contrast, Tian and Estrin (2008) find that the state 
shareholding has a U-shaped relation with firm value, using a large sample of Chinese listed 
firms in the period from 1994 to 2004. They argue that the government can actually 
improve the value of listed firms when its shareholding is relatively large. Yu (2013) confirms 
the U-shaped relation between state ownership and firm performance with a sample of 
Chinese listed firms during 2003 to 2010. The author also holds that a concentrated state 
ownership structure is better than a dispersed ownership one due to the benefits of 
government support and political connections.  
However, few studies have investigated the effect of the government as the ultimate owner 
of listed firms. Yu and Zheng (2014) examine the relationship between the ultimate owner 
and board independence, using Chinese listed firms for a period from 1997 to 2008. They 
employ a dummy variable to distinguish whether the local or central government ultimately 
owns a listed firm. Their empirical results show that the listed firms ultimately controlled by 
the government are negatively related to the independence of the corporate board. The 
listed SOEs prefer politically connected directors without professional backgrounds12, while, 
the listed non-SOEs are more likely to choose independent directors or politically connected 
directors with professional business backgrounds. Despite the study by Yu and Zheng (2014) 
concluding that the government has a different incentive to select board members, it does 
not further distinguish between the local and central government as the ultimate owner or 
                                                                
12 Yu and Zheng (2014) define politically connected directors without professional backgrounds as those 
directors who are current or former government bureaucrats without professional business or academic 
backgrounds (i.e. professors, CPAs, lawyers, or other professional with experience working in a financial 




identify the specific factors that may influence the government in appointing directors onto 
the corporate board. Therefore, this study is focused on the central government, 
investigating how it affects listed firms as the ultimate owner. To this end, in this study, the 
ownership structure of the central government is examined to determine its effects on the 
appointment of directors on the corporate board of listed CEs. Furthermore, this study 
investigates the economic consequences of affiliated directors to firm value for listed CEs.  
3.2.1 The effect of the ultimate owner on the appointment of directors 
The board of directors is the key internal corporate governance mechanism in listed firms 
for mitigating the agency problem due to the separation of management and ownership 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1983). Under firms with concentrated ownership, as 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue, the board of directors has a crucial role in restraining the 
intervention from the controlling shareholders on the important decision-making of listed 
firms, which may dampen the potential expropriation of minority shareholder’s wealth. 
However, Yeh and Woidtke (2005) contend that in such instances, board composition is 
likely to be affected by the controlling shareholders as well. The general shareholder 
meeting elects the board of directors and thus, the shareholders with substantial voting 
rights have a significant influence on board composition. For instance, they can appoint 
more representatives on the corporate board, if they so wish. Correspondingly, they can 
exercise control over listed firms through the corporate board. Yeh and Woidtke (2005) 
examine Taiwanese listed firms and find that the proportion of directors affiliated with the 
ultimate controlling shareholder can be an indicator as to whether that entity intends to 
enhance the quality of corporate governance or transfer the resources away from the listed 
firms. They elicit that the separation of voting and cash-flow rights increases the proportion 
of affiliated directors on the board. This implies that the ultimate controlling shareholder 
increases his/her power on the corporate board and makes it easier to divert corporate 
resources away from listed firms. On the other hand, they find that higher cash-flow rights 
from controlling shareholders reduce the proportion of affiliated directors on the board in 
listed family-controlled firms, as the ultimate owner has the incentive to add more 




incentive alignment or entrenchment effect that the ultimate owner would like to exercise 
determines the corporate board structure of listed firms with a concentrated ownership 
structure.  
For listed CEs, the central enterprises take the role of the ultimate owner. On behalf of the 
central government, they have a significant influence on the election of directors on the 
corporate board even with a relatively small ownership stake. The purpose of the incentive 
alignment or entrenchment effect from the ultimate owner with such high political 
connections becomes more complicated. When central enterprises hold relatively high cash-
flow rights of listed CEs, they are more likely to improve the performance of listed CEs. 
Hence, the central enterprises may prefer the corporate board to have more professionals 
with experienced management skills instead of their own representatives. However, the 
political and social goals may motivate them to transfer the resources from the listed CEs to 
other affiliations in the business group, especially when the cost of diversion is relatively low. 
In this case, the central enterprises may put more affiliates on the corporate board of listed 
CEs to realise tunnelling activities. Based on the previous literature, this study proposes two 
hypotheses regarding the effect of the ultimate owner on the board composition of listed 
CEs. 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the ownership (cash-flow rights) held by the central government is 
negatively related to the proportion of affiliated directors in listed CEs. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the separation of control and ownership (the deviation of voting and 
cash-flow rights) held by the central government is positively related to the proportion of 
affiliated directors in listed CEs. 
3.2.2 The economic consequences of affiliated directors 
Few studies have examined the performance of directors affiliated with the ultimate owner 
and the outcomes of the existing empirical evidence are mixed. Yeh and Woidtke (2005) 




shareholders, using a sample of 251 Taiwanese firms in 1998. They find that higher board 
affiliation leads to lower firm value, especially in family-controlled firms. Yeh (2005) also 
elicits that the listed firm has a relatively lower corporation valuation, when more than half 
of corporate board members are from the controlling shareholder. Jameson et al. (2014) 
confirm the negative effect of controlling shareholder board membership with a sample of 
1,796 Indian firms and discover that the controlling shareholder holding the key position on 
the corporate board (e.g. CEO) has a negative effect on firm performance (measured by 
Tobin’s Q). These studies agree that the effect of the affiliation with the ultimate controlling 
shareholders on firm value is negative. The developed hypothesis for this study holds that 
the benefit of expropriating the resources of listed firms outweighs that of improving the 
wealth of listed firms, when the ultimate owner has a significant wedge between control 
and ownership. In this situation, the ultimate owner prefers that the corporate board 
contains more directors who would make decisions in his/her favour instead of the most 
suitable person. Accordingly, more affiliated directors from the ultimate owner may lead to 
a negative effect on firm value. For instance, Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) use the sample 
of Chinese non-financial firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2005, and 
document that directors appointed by the controlling shareholders are positively associated 
with minority-investor expropriation, as measured by related-party transactions.  
On the other hand, the representatives from the ultimate controlling shareholders also take 
the role of directors with the function of monitoring. The affiliated directors have the 
responsibility to monitor the behaviours of the executives that may reduce firm value due to 
their private benefits, so that they can protect the interest of the ultimate controlling 
shareholders and the wealth of listed firms. Chen et al. (2014a) confirm this argument with a 
sample of Chinese A-share listed firms in a period from 2005 to 2011 and provide related 
evidence that a greater presence of board affiliation with block shareholders can reduce a 
company’s pay gap13. They further distinguish board affiliation with and without pay14 as 
well as the affiliated directors from controlling shareholders. The salaried affiliated directors 
                                                                
13 Chen et al. (2014a) measure the company pay gap by using the relative pay between executives and 
employees as well as the relative pay gap between the highest paid top executive and the other top executives. 
14 Board affiliation with pay refers to the affiliated directors receiving compensation from the listed firm. In 
contrast, board affiliation without pay means the affiliated directors do not receive compensation from the 




from controlling shareholders are positively associated with the pay gap. In contrast, the 
non-salaried affiliated ones have a significant effect on easing the agency problem and 
lowering this gap. The possible reason for this is that board affiliation without pay gives 
more independence from the executives and thus, affiliates play a better monitoring role for 
ultimate controlling shareholders.  
The problem becomes more serious when it comes to listed CEs, where it is crucial to 
monitor the executives to avoid the potential loss of state assets due to their self-dealings15. 
The affiliated directors from the central enterprises take on this duty, as they are the 
representative of the owner of these state assets. In addition, in listed CEs, most non-
executive directors affiliated with central enterprises are non-salaried (i.e. without pay from 
listed CEs). Hence, these directors have less intervention from the executives and can play a 
better role in representing the interest of central enterprises (even the attention of the 
central government). Consequently, the affiliated directors from the central enterprises may 
improve the firm value of listed CEs. Furthermore, according to the resource dependence 
theory proposed by Hillman et al. (2009), the affiliated directors may bring business group 
internal resources and political benefits to listed CEs, which can lead to a positive effect of 
increasing the valuation of listed CEs.  
The potential negative and positive effects on firm value caused by the affiliated directors 
are accepted here and thus, it is believed that having an appropriate number of affiliated 
directors on the corporate board will be beneficial to listed CEs. Hence, this study proposes 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between affiliated directors and corporate value in listed 
CEs and predicts that there should be a balanced structure of the corporate board in listed 
CEs. The hypothesis about the economic consequences of affiliated directors from the 
central enterprises is that: 
H3: the proportion of affiliated directors appointed by central enterprises on behalf of the 
central government has an inverse U-shaped relationship with the firm value of listed CEs.   
                                                                
15 For instance, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection disclosed that 64 executives of CEs were 




3.3 Research design and data 
3.3.1 Methodology and variables 
(1) Determinants of affiliated directors from the ultimate owner perspective 
This study first aims at examining how the central government as the ultimate owner affects 
the appointment of directors on the corporate board of listed CEs. As the hypotheses have 
developed, the cash-flow rights and the deviation of voting and cash-flow rights owned by 
the central government are considered key influencing factors that may affect the 
proportion of affiliated directors on the corporate board. Meanwhile, it is necessary to 
control for the other board characteristics that may have an influence on the fraction of 
affiliated directors on the corporate board. Also, this study controls for several firm 
characteristics that may be related to the appointment of affiliated directors. The modelling 
framework is as follows: 
𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                       (3.1)                                                                                                                                                        
where the dependent variable (Affiliated_directors) is the proportion of affiliated directors 
from the central enterprises or its affiliations, which is measured by their number on the 
corporate board scaled by the total number of board members. As the dependent variable 
in this study is a fraction in the range between 0 and 1, this study employs the fractional 
probit regression16 to estimate the model. Ownership is the major independent variable, 
represented by the cash-flow rights owned by the central government. Another 
independent variable is Separation, showing the deviation of cash-flow from voting rights 
owned by the central government. Separation is derived from the ratio of voting and cash-
                                                                




flow rights17 owned by the central government. Both independent variables are one-year 
lagged so that this can partially avoid the potential causality issue.  
The existing literature shows that other board characteristics may affect the board structure 
as well (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Dahya et al., 2008; Chou et al., 2018). The first control 
variable is the size of the board of directors (Boardsize), which is the total number of 
directors on the corporate board. As Yeh and Woidtke (2005) find that board affiliation 
decreases with an increase in the number of directors on the corporate board, this study 
predicts that the sign of Boardsize is negative. The proportion of independent directors 
(Independent_directors) is measured by their number scaled by the total number of 
directors on the corporate board. The primary responsibility of independent directors in 
China is to avoid the wealth of minority shareholders being expropriated by controlling 
shareholders (CSRC, August,2001). Since the affiliated directors represent the interest of the 
ultimate controlling shareholders, these two kinds of director generally belong to opposite 
parties. Hence, the proportion of independent directors is added to control for their 
potential influence on the appointment of affiliated directors. When the CEO takes the 
position of the chairman on the corporate board, that person’s power in the board selection 
process is promoted. In this case, it will motivate the CEO to place more “friendly faces” on 
the corporate board (Klein, 1998). This study predicts there is a significant relationship 
between Ceo_duality and Affiliated_directors. Ceo_duality is an indicator variable as to 
whether the CEO concurrently holds the position of chairman of the corporate board. It 
equals one when the chairman of the corporate board and the CEO are the same person 
and zero, otherwise. When the chairman on the corporate board is from central enterprises, 
then he/she is likely to welcome more affiliated directors from that entity or its affiliations. 
This chairman is much more likely to form an alliance to carry out the work and less likely to 
face opposition in such a working environment. In order to capture this potential effect on 
the fraction of affiliated directors, a dummy variable (Affiliated_chairman) is employed, 
which equals 1, if the chairman of the corporate board is appointed by the central 
                                                                
17 The method used to calculate the voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner is from La Porta et al. 
(1999) and Claessens et al. (2000). The control of the ultimate owner is represented by the voting rights, which 
are the sum of the weakest links in the chain of control. The ownership of the ultimate owner is represented 
by the cash-flow rights, which are the sum of the products of the ownership stakes along the controlling chains. 




enterprise and 0, otherwise. As it may take time for governance related variables to reflect 
their influence, all corporate board related control variables are one-year lagged.  
This study also controls for potential influences from firm characteristics. Erickson et al. 
(2005) use evidence from Canada and document that board composition (i.e., the fraction of 
outside directors on the corporate board) harms firm value, and the low corporation value 
leads to a change of board structure in subsequent periods. In contrast,  Dahya et al. (2008) 
use a cross-country sample and find that firm value does not affect the board structure; 
however, board composition (i.e. the proportion of independent directors18) does impact on 
firm value. Prevost et al. (2002) use a simulation equations approach with evidence from 
New Zealand listed firms, and report that board composition (i.e. the proportion of 
outsiders on the board) and firm value positively and jointly impact on each other. Hence, 
there is no consistent result in the relation between board composition and firm value. For 
this study, Tobin’s Q is the proxy of firm value, which is calculated from the market value of 
equity and net debt over total assets. In order to control for the potential causality issue 
between affiliated directors and firm value as discussed in the existing literature, Tobin’s Q 
is one-year lagged. The other firm characteristics controlled for in this study are: Firmsize, 
which is the natural logarithm of total assets of listed CEs. Leverage is calculated by total 
debts over total assets. Listexg is an indicator variable that shows the specific stock 
exchange that the listed CE come under. It equals 1, if they went public on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and, 0 if listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. These other firm 
characteristic variables are in the same period with the dependent variable. 19 This study 
also controls for the fixed effects of industry and year in the regression model. As the listed 
CEs are concentrated in certain industries, this study divides them into four industries based 
on the Guidance for Industry Classification of Listed Companies (1999) released by CSRC: 
Utilities, Conglomerates, Industrials, and Commerce.  
  
                                                                
18 Dahya et al. (2008) define the proportion of independent directors as the number of non-affiliated directors 
divided by the size of the corporate board. 
19 In this study also, the firm characteristics related variables are replaced with one-year lagged ones and a 




(2) The effect of affiliated directors on firm value 
For the second part of this study, whether affiliated directors have an impact on the 
subsequent firm value of listed CEs is investigated. As discussed in the previous section, the 
relation between affiliated directors and firm value may be non-linear. Here, the quadratic 
term of the proportion of affiliated directors is utilised to examine this potential curvilinear 
relation. In this part, this study also controls for the possible effects of the corporate board 
and firm related characteristics. The regression model is as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 +
𝛽10𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 + +𝛽11𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1                                                                                  (3.2)       
where the dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) is the firm value of the listed CEs, which has the 
same definition in Equation (3.1). Affiliated_directors is the independent variable in this 
regression specification, which is measured by the proportion of affiliated directors from the 
central enterprise or its affiliations. Affiliated_square is the quadratic term of the fraction of 
affiliated directors on the corporate board. According to the developed hypothesis, this 
study expects a positive coefficient of Affiliated_directors and a negative coefficient of 
Affiliated_square, which represents an inverse U-shaped relation between affiliated 
directors and subsequent firm value for listed CEs.  
The right-hand side variables in Equation (3.1) are used as the control variables in Equation 
(3.2), as it is widely considered that they have a relationship with firm value as well. For 
instance, Claessens et al. (2002) find that Ownership has a positive relationship with firm 
value, whilst Separation is negatively related to corporation value, which indicates the 
incentive alignment and entrenchment effects to firm performance, respectively. Erickson et 
al. (2005) find that large board size leads to lower firm value, using evidence from Canadian 
listed firms. In contrast, Leong et al. (2015) document Boardsize as being positively 




proportion of independent directors on the corporate board (Independent_directors) is 
negatively related to firm value. Bai et al. (2004) find that the CEO concurrently holding the 
position of the chairman on the corporate board reduces firm value, which is indicated by a 
sample of Chinese listed firms in a period from 1999 to 2001. In addition to the existing firm 
characteristics related control variables, Firmage and Growth are utilised to control for their 
effects on firm value (e.g. Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Chou et al., 2018). Firmage is the number 
of years since the listed CE went public and Growth is growth opportunities, represented by 
the sales growth rate. The sales growth rate is calculated by the difference of the annual 
sales in this year and last year, scaled by the total sales in the last year. In line with Equation 
(3.1), Equation (3.2) shows a lead/lag relation to avoid the potential causality issue. In 
addition, in Equation (3.2), the dependent variable and firm characteristics related control 
variables are in year t+1, leading independent variables and corporate board related control 
variables by one year. In this regression model, the fixed effects of industry and year are 
controlled for as well. Table 3-1 provides a concise summary of each variable employed in 
Equations (3.1) and (3.2). 
3.3.2 Data and sample selection 
This study examines the willingness of the ultimate owner to place affiliated directors on the 
corporate board and the effect of these affiliated directors on firm value among listed CEs, 
with all the related information of all listed CEs being collected for the main research focal 
period from 2012 to 2016. As the main regressions apply a lead/lag relationship for 
dependent/independent variables, this study collected the data in year 2011 and 2017 of 
some variables as well. First, this study screened out the listed CEs according to the nature 
of the ultimate owner of listed firms. In 2001, CSRC regulated that it is mandatory for listed 
firms to disclose their ultimate owner and the ownership relation to other firms. Instead of 
using the threshold suggested by La Porta et al. (1999)20, a listed firm is classified as a listed 
CE, if the top of the ownership tree of a listed firm is SASAC or a central enterprise and this 
was checked manually.  
                                                                
20 La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that a firm has an ultimate owner when the direct or indirect voting rights held 




The affiliated director is the key variable used, and there is no consistent definition of what 
kind of directors on the corporate board are “affiliated”. That is, studies related to different 
topics have their concept of affiliated directors21. The affiliated director in this study is the 
director on the corporate board affiliated with the ultimate owner, who concurrently has a 
position in the central enterprise or its affiliations, as shown on the ownership tree.22 The 
number of affiliated directors of each listed CE was manually collected from the annual 
reports. The financial and other corporate board related information was obtained from the 
Chinese Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. This study dropped 
the listed CEs in finance and real estate industries as well as observations with negative 
equity. Also, this study excluded the listed CEs that go public in the current year, as CSMAR 
does not provide pre-IPO related financial information. Finally, there are 942 firm-year 
observations by 225 unique listed CEs for the main regressions. 
Table 3-2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables related to ownership structure, 
corporate board, and firm characteristics of listed CEs. The central government holds, on 
average 40%, of the cash-flow rights of listed CEs on the stock market, whilst the average 
voting rights owned by the central government is 45.5%. This provides evidence that the 
ownership of Chinese listed CEs is highly concentrated and held by the central government. 
Furthermore, the average voting rights exceed cash-flow rights owned by the central 
government, which is in line with the argument of La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. 
(2000), that the ultimate shareholders typically have more control rights than cash-flow 
rights. As the minimum values of the cash-flow rights and voting rights are 7.65% and 12.2%, 
respectively, the definition of the ultimate owner using the 20% of the votes rule, as 
recommended by La Porta et al. (1999), may not be a suitable criterion in this case. Also, 
these low values show that even, if the central government has a very small percentage of 
                                                                
21 For instance, Klein (1998) examines the efficiency of affiliated directors, and defines them as former 
employees, relative of CEOs or those who have significant transactions and/or business relationships with the 
firm, or seat on an interlocking board. Dahya et al. (2008) discuss the effect of the dominant shareholder(s) on 
the corporate board, and list seven criteria to define the directors affiliated with the dominant shareholder(s). 
Arosa et al. (2010) test the relation between outside directors and firm performance, defining affiliated 
directors as those with potential or existing business relationships to the firm and who are not full-time 
employees. 
22 For instance, Sinopec Limited (a listed CE) is ultimately controlled by China Petrochemical Corporation Group 
(a CE). Sinopec Group has 71.32% ownership of its listed subsidiary. In 2016, four directors on the corporate 
board of Sinopec Limited concurrently have a position in Sinopec Group, therefore those four directors are 




the capital of listed firms, it still has a significant influence on the strategies and decision-
making of listed firms and is disclosed by listed firms in the annual reports as the ultimate 
owner.  
The average divergence of control and ownership is 1.256, which means the voting rights 
held by the central government are 1.256 times its cash-flow rights. The median value is 1, 
showing that less than half of listed CEs deviate their voting and cash-flow rights. On 
average, the listed CEs have ten members on the corporate board, 37.1% of which are 
independent and 37.7% are affiliated with central enterprises. Only around 6% of listed CEs 
have the same person in the role of the chairman and CEO; however, most listed CEs have a 
chairman appointed by central enterprises. For firm characteristics, listed CEs have an 
average Tobin’s Q value of 1.98 and a leverage ratio of 52.9%, calculated by total debts over 
total assets. The size of the listed CEs varies from 0.31 to 2405.27 billion RMB. In addition, 
around 70% of listed CEs are on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The average number of years 
that listed CEs have been on the stock exchange is 14, with the average sales growth rate 
being 11.3%. 
Table 3-3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix, which is an intuitive check for 
multicollinearity23. Panel A of Table 3-3 is the correlation matrix of the proportion of 
affiliated directors, its potential determinant variables and the control variables. In Panel A, 
Table 3-3, the correlation coefficient between Ownership and Control is 0.854, which 
exceeds 0.7 and thus, may indicate the presence of the multicollinearity problem. However, 
Control is not a key variable included in the main regressions. The correlation coefficients 
among all the other variables do not have an absolute value higher than 0.7. Panel B of 
Table 3-3 shows the correlation matrix of variables about examining the relationship 
between affiliated directors and firm value in listed CEs. The absolute value of the 
correlation coefficients among the variables in this panel also does not exceed 0.7. Hence, 
                                                                
23 Multicollinearity occurs when the correlation between or among independent variables is very high. The 
multicollinearity issue leads to unstable and unreliable regression estimates. Pearson correlation matrix 
provides the correlation coefficient among independent variables, which show the presence of 
multicollinearity. If the absolute value of correlation coefficient between two independent variables is over 0.7, 








3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 The impact of the ultimate owner on board composition 
(1) Univariate analysis 
In the sample, the median of cash-flow rights held by the central government is 41.3%. This 
study divides the listed CEs into two groups by using 41.3% as the cut-off point. The high 
cash-flow group is that the listed CEs with over 41.3% cash-flow rights owned by the central 
government, whilst those no more than 41.3% owned by the central government are in the 
low ownership group. Table 3-4, Panel A shows the mean of the affiliated director ratio, the 
cash-flow rights as well as the wedge between control and ownership in these two groups 
and the difference in means. The low and high ownership groups have a similar proportion 
of affiliated directors on the corporate board, as the difference of the mean of affiliated 
directors in these two groups is not significant. Specifically, in the low ownership group, 
there are 38.2% of directors in the listed CEs are affiliated with central enterprises, whilst 
37.2% of directors in listed CEs with high ownership are from the central enterprise or its 
affiliations.  
The significant difference in voting rights (Control) in these two groups indicates that high 
ownership generally comes with a high degree of control. The difference of Separation in 
these two groups is significant at the level of 1%, which shows that the low ownership group 
has an average higher deviation of cash-flow from voting rights. Similar results are obtained, 
when 40% (the mean value of cash-flow rights) or 50%24 of cash-flow rights is utilised as the 
alternative criterion to distinguish low and high ownership. 
Table 3-4, Panel B shows the comparison of Affiliated_directors, Control and Ownership in 
the listed CEs, with and without a divergence of control and ownership. It emerges that 
listed CEs with a deviation of voting and cash-flow rights have more affiliated directors on 
                                                                
24 50% is the boundary of “absolute control”, which means the shareholder can absolutely control this firm due 
to the shares he/ she owns. 
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the corporate board than those without such deviation. The significant evidence supports 
H2 that the separation of control and ownership held by the central government is 
positively related to the proportion of affiliated directors on the corporate board. Also, the 
significant difference of Ownership in these two groups further indicates that listed CEs with 
a divergence of control and ownership have relatively lower cash-flow rights of the central 
government. 
As the univariate analysis does not control for control variables and the differences in 
industry and year, this study conducts multivariate tests and provides the related empirical 
results in the next subsection. 
(2) Multivariate analysis 
Table 3-5 reports the regression results testing how the central government affects board 
composition through the ownership structure. Column (1) indicates the relationship 
between cash-flow rights and the proportion of affiliated directors from the central 
enterprises and Column (2) displays the marginal effect of variables. The coefficient of 
Ownership is negative, but not significantly different from zero. That is, this study fails to 
find significant evidence that the ownership motivates the central enterprises to place 
fewer affiliated directors on the corporate board of listed CEs and hence, it is concluded that 
the cash-flow rights owned by the central government is not a significant factor that 
influences board affiliation in listed CEs. Column (3) displays the regression result with the 
deviation of cash-flow from voting rights and Column (4) reports the marginal effect of 
variables. The coefficient of Separation is positively significant at the 5% level, which implies 
the significant positive relationship between the divergence of voting and cashflow rights 
and the proportion of affiliated directors.  The marginal effect of Separation is 3.86 percent, 
illustrating that a 1 percent increase in the separation of voting and cash-flow rights owned 
by the central government leads to a 3.86 percentage point increase in the proportion of 
affiliated directors on the corporate board of listed CEs. The result supports H2 that the 
separation of control and ownership is positively related to the proportion of affiliated 
directors in listed CEs. Also, this finding is in line with Yeh and Woidtke (2005) that the 
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wedge between control and ownership motivates the ultimate controlling shareholders to 
elect more affiliated directors onto the corporate board of listed firms.  
For the control variables, the proportion of independent directors has a negative relation 
with that of affiliated directors from the central enterprise or its affiliations at the 1% level. 
The affiliated chairman is positively associated with the fraction of affiliated directors, as the 
coefficient of Affiliated_chairman is positively significant at the level of 1%. This indicates 
that if the chairman is from the central enterprise, he/she prefers more directors also being 
appointed by that enterprise. In addition, large listed CEs have more affiliated directors from 
central enterprises, being confirmed by the positive and significant relationship between 
firm size and the proportion of affiliated directors. A plausible reason for this, is that large 
listed CEs generally are in important industries and more affiliated directors are needed to 
ensure the effective control on these important state assets. Last, there is significant 
evidence that the listed CEs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange have more affiliated directors 
from the central enterprises.  
3.4.2 The effect of affiliated directors on firm value 
Table 3-6 shows the regression results examining the economic consequences of affiliated 
directors, especially their effect on the firm value of listed CEs. The first two columns test 
the potential linear relationship between affiliated directors and the corporation value of 
listed CEs. The insignificant coefficient of Affiliated_directors in Columns (1) and (2) indicates 
that there is no linear relationship between the proportion of such directors and firm value 
in listed CEs. Columns (3) and (4) illustrate the potential curvilinear relationship between 
affiliated directors and firm value by adding the square term of the affiliated director ratio 
(Affiliated_square) into the regressions. The coefficient of Affiliated_directors and 
Affiliated_square is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, thus indicating a 
curvilinear relationship between the affiliated director ratio and firm value in listed CEs. 
Meanwhile, the positive coefficient of Affiliated_directors and the negative coefficient of 
Affiliated_square show that this non-linear relationship between these two factors has an 
inverse U-shape. Hence, the significant evidence in this study supports H3. The average 
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turning point of the affiliated director ratio is 0.4225, which provides an optimal proportion 
of affiliated directors that leads to the highest firm value of listed CEs in this case. In detail, 
more directors affiliated with the central enterprises increase the firm value of listed CEs in 
the subsequent period, up until the proportion of such directors on the board reaches 42%. 
If it exceeds the turning point, the effect of affiliated directors becomes negative, which 
reduces the firm value of listed CEs. This implies that too many affiliated directors on the 
board may not help these listed CEs perform well. 
In Column (3) of Table 3-6, the coefficient of Ownership is positively related to firm value 
and significant at the 1% level, which indicates the incentive alignment effect from the 
ultimate owner. This supports the literature that the ultimate owner with higher cash-flow 
rights has an incentive effect similar to the minority shareholders and hence, is willing to 
increase the value of the listed firm. On the other hand, Column (4) shows that the negative 
coefficient of Separation is significantly related to firm value at the 1% level, which confirms 
the entrenchment effect from the ultimate owner. This indicates that the ultimate owner 
expropriates the benefits from minority shareholders, as they find that the private benefits 
that they can get from the expropriation are higher than the benefits of increasing firm 
value. The significant evidence in listed CEs supports the argument proposed by Claessens et 
al. (2002) that, under concentrated ownership, large cash-flow rights from the ultimate 
owner increase firm value. Moreover, when its separation of voting and cash-flow rights is 
significant, the firm value decreases.  
For other control variables, the coefficient of Firmsize is negatively associated with firm 
value and significant at the 1% level, which illustrates that larger listed CEs have lower firm 
value. This result supports Chen and Ho (2000) and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2007), who 
state that the firm size has a negative influence on Tobin’s Q. Also, it is found that Leverage 
has a significant negative effect on firm value, which is consistent with Erickson et al. (2005), 
who elicit that a higher debt to assets ratio leads to lower firm value. 
  
                                                                




3.4.3 The contemporaneous relation between affiliated directors and firm value 
To reduce the endogeneity problem, in the previous subsection, the lead/lag relation model 
is employed to examine the relationship between affiliated directors and firm value in listed 
CEs. It emerges that firm value measured by Tobin’s Q has no significant effect on the 
proportion of affiliated directors of listed CEs in the next period. In contrast, these affiliated 
directors have an inverse U-shaped relationship with the subsequent firm value of listed CEs. 
Following Durnev and Kim (2005) and Lins (2003), the simultaneous equations approach 
estimated by a 3SLS (three-stage least squares) method is adopted to examine the 
contemporaneous relation between affiliated directors and firm value. This estimation 
method allows for endogeneity between contemporaneous affiliated directors and firm 
value. However, it is necessary to figure out some exogenous variables that are only related 
to one of these two factors, but not have effects on both. For instance, the factors that only 
have effects on the proportion of affiliated directors, but not on firm value, need to be 
identified. As Durnev and Kim (2005) argue that it is difficult to identify the truly exogenous 
variables and hence, the related regression results must be interpreted with caution.  
There are two equations in the simultaneous system. One uses the proportion of affiliated 
directors as the dependent variable, whilst this variable in the other equation is the 
corporation value of listed CEs, as measured by Tobin’ Q.  
The board affiliation equation is the same as Equation (3.1), excluding Leverage. This is 
because the result of the main regressions in Tables 3-5 and 3-6 show that Leverage is not 
related to the proportion of affiliated directors, but it is significantly associated with firm 
value. Tobin’s Q is involved in this equation as a simultaneously determined variable. In 
addition, the board affiliation equation controls for the market risk measured by Beta. The 
values of Beta are derived from CSMAR, estimated by the capital assets pricing model 
(CAPM), with the information within the recent one year. This is in line with Durnev and Kim 
(2005), Lins (2003), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), who argue that the controlling 
shareholders have better opportunities to profit from inside information, when the market 
risk is higher. In the listed CEs, this may motivate central enterprises to place more affiliated 
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directors on the corporate board of listed CEs, which makes it easier for the central 
enterprises to obtain inside information.  
In the firm value equation, Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable, and Affiliated_directors and 
Affiliated_square are the simultaneously determined variables. Compared with Equation 
(3.2), the firm value equation drops the corporate board related variables (Boardsize, 
Independent_directors, Ceo_duality and Affiliated_chairman), as they have no significant 
effect on firm value (Table 3-6 shows the detailed results). However, the corporate board 
related variables such as Independent_directors and Affiliated_chairman have a significant 
impact on the proportion of affiliated directors (Table 3-5 addresses the related results). So, 
this study assumes that the corporate board related variables are more correlated to 
affiliated directors rather than firm value. The specification of the simultaneous equations 
set is that: 
Board affiliation equation: 
𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0+𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑔𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Firm value equation:                                                                                                                                       (3.3)     
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡(𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + +𝛽7𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑔𝑖,𝑡




Table 3-7 reports the 3SLS estimation results for the contemporaneous relation between 
affiliated directors and firm value among listed CEs. This study obtains a relatively larger 
sample of 978 firm-year observations by 229 unique listed CEs due to less missing data. In 
the board affiliation equation, the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is positively significant at the level 
of 5%, thus indicating the positive effect of firm value on the appointment of affiliated 
directors. In the firm value equation, the coefficient of both Affiliated_directors and 
Affiliated_square is significant at the level of 1%. The positive coefficient of 
Affiliated_directors and the negative coefficient of Affiliated_square confirm the inverse U-
shaped relation between affiliated directors and firm value. This result is consistent with 
that in the main regressions. Overall, there is a relation between the contemporaneous 
affiliated director ratio and firm value, but not necessarily causation, as the 
contemporaneous proportion of affiliated directors and firm value in listed CEs jointly affect 
each other. 
In addition, in the board affiliation equation, the coefficient of Ownership estimated by 3SLS 
method in Column (1) is negatively significant at the 1% level. This implies that the central 
enterprises prefer appointing directors based on their expertise rather than affiliation when 
the central government owns higher cash-flow rights of listed CEs. This result is consistent 
with what H1 proposes. As expected, the coefficient of Beta in Column (1) and (2) is 
positively significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the central enterprises are likely to 
place more affiliated representatives on the corporate board to get inside information more 




3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
As this study finds a non-linear relationship between affiliated directors and firm value in 
listed CEs as well as an optimal proportion of affiliated directors that leads to the highest 
firm value, an alternative regression model (i.e. the piecewise regression model) is applied 
to examine the presence of this curvilinear relationship between affiliated directors and firm 
value. This study splits the proportion of affiliated directors into two piecewise variables, 
according to the turning point (0.42) found in the main regression. Affiliated_directors 
(under 0.42) equals the fraction of affiliated directors on the corporate board, when it is 
under 0.42. It equals 0.42 when the proportion of affiliated directors is more than 0.42. 
Affiliated_directors (above 0.42) equals 0, when the proportion of independent directors is 
under 0.42. It equals the affiliated director ratio minus 0.42 when the proportion of 
affiliated directors exceeds 0.42. If the segmented regression model can indicate the non-
linear relation between affiliated directors and firm value, the coefficient of both variables 
should be significant at least at the level of 10%. 
Table 3-8 reports the regression result of the alternative regression model testing the non-
linear relationship between affiliated directors and firm value. As expected, the coefficients 
of these two variables are significant at least at the level of 5%. The positive coefficient of 
Affiliated_directors (under 0.42) confirms the positive effect of affiliated directors on firm 
value in listed CEs before their proportion reaches the turning point. The negative 
coefficient of Affiliated_directors (above 0.42) supports the negative effect of affiliated 
directors on firm value, when there are more than 42% of directors affiliated with the 
central enterprises. 
Following Verbeek (2008), 3SLS provides more efficient estimates than 2SLS (two-stage least 
squares) does in the case that there is no misspecification in the simultaneous equations 
system. In order to examine the exogeneity requirement and the efficiency of the 
exogenous variables identified in board affiliation and firm value equations, this study 
adopts the 2SLS approach, with a series of related tests also being conducted. In the 2SLS 
estimation, the defined exogenous variables in the equation set are treated as instruments 
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for their dependent variable. For instance, Leverage, Firmage, and Growth are the 
exogenous variables in the firm value equation, as they have been identified as affecting 
firm value, but not the proportion of affiliated directors. Correspondingly, in the 2SLS 
approach, they are employed as the instruments of Tobin’s Q. 
Table 3-9 reports the results of the simultaneous equations system estimated by 2SLS. To be 
specific, Columns (1) and (2) show the regression results of the board affiliation equation. 
Columns (3) and (4) display the regression results for the firm value equation. Overall, the 
finding derived from the 2SLS approach is similar to that shown in Table 3-7, whereby the 
contemporaneous proportion of affiliated directors and firm value jointly affect each other. 
In addition, the result of Hansen’s J test (overidentification test) in all columns is 
insignificant at the 10% level, which indicates the identified exogenous variables in the 
equation are uncorrelated with the error term. This confirms that the exogenous variables 
defined as instruments meet the exogeneity requirement. This study employs the Anderson-
Rubin Wald test and Stock-Wright LM test to examine whether the identified exogenous 
variables are weak instruments. As shown in Table 3-9, the value of the 2 of these two tests 
in each column is at least significant at the 5% level, thus illustrating sufficient correlation of 
the defined exogenous variables with the identified endogenous variable. Hence, the 2SLS 
approach confirms the appropriate identification of the exogeneous variables in the 





3.5 Extended tests 
3.5.1 The effect of external mechanisms on affiliated directors and firm value 
In the main regressions, it is found that a significant separation of control and ownership 
motivates the central enterprises to place more affiliated directors on the corporate board 
in the next period. Furthermore, too many of affiliated directors on the corporate board (for 
example, in this research sample, more than 42% of directors are affiliated with the central 
enterprises) is negatively associated with the subsequent corporation value of listed CEs. 
This section conducts additional tests to examine the potential external mechanisms that 
affect the relationship between affiliated directors and firm value in listed CEs.  
The first potential influencing factor is the quality of external auditors. Fan and Wong (2005) 
examine the governance role of external auditors in eight East Asian economies with 
concentrated ownership for the period from 1994 to 1996. They find that listed firms with 
the agency problem due to the ownership structure26 are more likely to choose the external 
auditor from the big five accounting firms27 and this relation is evident among firms that 
raise capital equity frequently. The appointment of the big five auditors marginally mitigates 
the stock price discount associated with agency problems induced by the ownership 
structure. They conclude that the external auditor is an effective mechanism to reduce 
agency theory problems due to the ownership structure in emerging markets. Zerni et al. 
(2010) confirm that high quality audit can mitigate the negative entrenchment effect of 
controlling shareholders on firm value, using evidence from Sweden. Also, Eshleman and 
Guo (2014) find that the big four accounting firms do provide better audit quality, after 
controlling for the endogenous choice of auditors. Hence, this study divides the listed CEs 
into two groups based on whether they are the client of the big four. The regression model 
                                                                
26 In the study of Fan and Wong (2005), they use the wedge between control and ownership owned by the 
controlling shareholder as an indicator of the agency conflict between the controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. 
27 There were the big five accounting firms during the research period of the study conducted by Fan and 
Wong (2005), which were EY, Deloitte, Arthur Andersen, KPMG, and PWC. However, Arthur Andersen was 
bankrupted in 2002 due to the 2001 Enron scandal. 
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(Equation (3.2)) is enlisted to examine the relation between affiliated directors and firm 
value of listed CEs again.  
Table 3-10 shows the results. It emerges that 17.52% of observations are the client of the 
big four accounting firms, whilst 82.28% of them choose non-big four (such as local 
accounting firms) as their external auditor. It shows that most listed CEs are more likely to 
select non-big four or even local accounting firms, which is probably due to the relatively 
higher costs of the big four. Columns (1) and (2) display the relationship between affiliated 
directors and firm value in the group that does not hire the big four as its external auditor. 
The results are consistent with those in the main regressions that affiliated directors have 
an inverse U-shaped relation with the subsequent corporation value of listed CEs. The 
average turning point of affiliated directors is 0.43, which is similar to that (0.42) found in 
Table 3-5. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the group with the big four as their 
external auditor. The coefficient of Affiliated_square in both columns is insignificant, while 
the coefficient of Affiliated_directors in Column (3) is close to the significant marginal level 
and that in Column (4) is significant at the level of 10%. It means that in the group with the 
big four, the affiliated directors from the central enterprises do not have a significant and 
negative effect on firm value in listed CEs. The big four accounting firms generally care more 
about their reputation in the market and have better quality auditors. They bring more 
pressures on listed CEs, which constrains the behaviours of affiliated directors. Under the 
external monitoring from the big four, they are less likely to engage in expropriation from 
the listed firm even though they dominant the corporate board. This result provides further 
evidence that the external auditor plays an active governance role in mitigating the negative 
entrenchment effect from the ultimate owner. 
The second potential influencing factor is the presence of foreign institutional shareholders. 
Gillan and Starks (2003) argue that foreign institutional investors have the crucial role of 
improving the corporate governance of listed firms. Ferreira and Matos (2008) investigate 
the role of institutional investors around the world for the year 2000 through to 2005. They 
find that the listed firms with higher ownership held by foreign institutions have higher 
corporation value. Aggarwal et al. (2011) also employ a worldwide sample consisting of 23 
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countries in a period from 2003 to 2008 and document that firm-level governance is 
positively associated with the foreign institutional shareholdings. Chen et al. (2017) discuss 
the function of foreign institutional investors on the investment efficiency of newly 
privatised firms from 64 countries. They find that the foreign institutional shareholdings 
have a positive effect on improving the investment efficiency of listed firms, which is 
different from state ownership, where a negative impact is found. Huang and Zhu (2015) 
use evidence from China under its split-share structure reform that floats non-tradable 
shares28  and they report that the participation of foreign institutional investors can 
significantly reduce the expropriation conducted by controlling shareholders in emerging 
markets. Accordingly, in this study, whether the presence of foreign institutional 
shareholdings affects the relationship between affiliated directors and the firm value of 
listed CEs is investigated. This study divides observations into two groups according to the 
listed CEs having a foreign institutional investor or not and then, the main regression 
(Equation (3.2)) is repeated for each group separately. 
Table 3-11 displays the results that examine the effect of the presence of foreign 
institutional investors on the relationship between affiliated directors and firm value in 
listed CEs. It shows that 14.65% of observations have foreign institutional investors, whilst 
the rest do not. It shows that foreign institutional ownership is still not common among 
listed CEs. As expected, the results in Columns (1) and (2) are consistent with those in the 
main regressions that affiliated directors have an inverse U-shaped relation with the 
subsequent corporation value of listed CEs. However, there is no significant evidence of the 
effect of the presence of foreign institutional shareholdings in listed CEs, as an inverse U-
shaped relation between affiliated directors and firm value is found in the group with 
foreign institutional shareholdings as well. This is indicated by the positive coefficient of 
Affiliated_directors and the negative coefficient of Affiliated_square in both Columns (3) and 
(4) being significant at the level of 5%. Hence, the foreign institutional shareholdings have 
no impact on the relation between affiliated directors and the subsequent firm value of 
listed CEs. 
                                                                
28 The Chinese government launched sustained reform to transform non-tradable shares into tradable A-
shares in 2005. 
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3.5.2 Excess board seats control and firm value 
Many studies use the voting rights as a proxy for the control power from the ultimate owner 
(e.g. Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; and Yeh, 2005). Young et al. (2007) suggest 
an alternative proxy, which is the board seats control rights. They argue that selecting 
affiliated directors for the corporate board is an essential method for the ultimate owner to 
strengthen the control over a listed firm, who achieves operating control of listed firms 
through these affiliated members. Some literature highlights that the excess control of the 
ultimate owner measured by the divergence of voting and cash-flow rights is negatively 
related to corporation value (Claessens et al., 2002; Yeh, 2005). In line with this, Young et al. 
(2007) find a negative effect of excess control through the corporate board as well. In their 
study, the excess board seats control is defined as the difference of the board seats control 
rights and cash-flow rights (i.e. the proportion of affiliated directors on the corporate board 
minus the cash-flow rights held by the controlling shareholders). They provide significant 
evidence that higher excess board seats control leads to a higher possibility of financial 
restatements, using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms for a period from 1996 to 2004. Tsai 
et al. (2010) also use evidence from Taiwan and find that excess board seats control has a 
negative impact on the market value of corporate diversification. Hence, this alternative 
measure of the excess control of the ultimate owner is utilised to examine the effect of the 
excess board seats control on firm value in listed CEs. The regression model used to test the 
related issue is specified below: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠_𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 + +𝛽9𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1                                                                                  (3.4)                                                                                                          
where Excess_board_seats_control represents the divergence of board seats control and 
ownership, with three measures of this variable being employed. Similar to Young et al. 
(2007) and Tsai et al. (2010), the excess board seats control is calculated by the proportion 
of affiliated directors minus the cash-flow rights held by the central government and other 
two alternative measures are employed. One is using the ratio of board affiliation and 
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ownership, which is calculated by the proportion of affiliated directors divided by the cash-
flow rights. Another is a dummy variable that distinguishes the presence of excess board 
seats control on listed CEs. It equals 1, if the proportion of directors affiliated with central 
enterprises exceeds the cash-flow rights owned by the central government and 0, otherwise. 
Similar to Equation (3.2), the independent variable and other corporate board related 
control variables are one-year lagged of the firm value of listed CEs. While, the firm 
characteristic related variables are contemporaneous with the dependent variable (Tobin’s 
Q). This regression model also controls for the fixed effects of industry and year. 
Table 3-12 shows the regression results. The measures of the excess board seats control 
from the central enterprises provide consistent significant evidence that the excess control 
of these enterprises through the corporate board is negatively associated with the firm 
value of listed CEs. This is indicated by the coefficient of Excess_board_seats_control in all 
the columns being negative and significant at the 5% level. This implies that, in addition to 
too many affiliated directors on the corporate board, the proportion of affiliated directors 
exceeding the equity stake owned by the central government brings a negative effect on 
firm value. Hence, the central government needs to continue the central enterprise reform 
by further expanding the autonomy of management among listed CEs. 
This study also examines whether the quality of external auditors and the presence of 
foreign institutional investors have an influence on the relation between the excess board 
seats control and firm value in listed CEs. Following the same approach employed in 
subsection 3.5.1, this study divides observations into groups with or without the big four 
accounting firms as their external auditor. Then, the regression is repeated regarding the 
relationship between the excess board seats control and firm value (Equation (3.4)) in these 
two groups separately. The presence of foreign institutional investors is dealt with in the 
same way.  
Table 3-13 reports the empirical results. In Panel A, the excess board seats control in listed 
CEs that are the client of the big four accounting companies is positively related to firm 
value. While the excess board seats control is negatively associated with the firm value in 
 
57 
the group without the big four as the external auditor, which is consistent with the result 
found in Table 3-10. This implies that the quality of the external auditor does affect 
improving corporate governance in listed CEs, as it mitigates the negative effect of the 
proportion of affiliated directors exceeding the cash-flow rights owned by the central 
government. In addition, a similar result emerges for the presence of foreign institutional 
shareholdings, which is displayed in Panel B of Table 3-13. The coefficient of 
Excess_board_seats_control in the group without foreign investors is negative and 
significant, at least at the 5% level. However, in the group with the presence of foreign 
investors, the coefficient of Excess_board_seats_control is positive and insignificant. It 
shows that, whilst the foreign institutional shareholdings have no impact on the negative 
effect of too many affiliated directors on firm value, it can mitigate the negative effect of 




This study examines the board structure from the ultimate owner perspective as well as the 
effect of the board structure on the firm value of listed CEs, by using a sample of Chinese 
non-financial A-share listed CEs for the years 2012 through to 2016. The proportion of 
affiliated directors is the measure of the corporate board structure, as the directors 
affiliated with central enterprises can reflect the effect of the ultimate owner directly. The 
results show that ownership (cash-flow rights) held by the central government has no 
significant impact as a determinant of the proportion of affiliated directors on the corporate 
board. While the separation of control and ownership motivates the central enterprises to 
place more affiliated directors on the corporate board in the next period. For the economic 
consequences of affiliated directors, there is an inverse U-shaped relation between affiliated 
directors and the subsequent firm value of listed CEs. This means that having more affiliated 
directors on the board is positively associated with the subsequent firm value of listed CEs, 
when the proportion of affiliated directors on the board does not exceed the moderate level. 
However, when more than the moderate proportion of directors on the corporate board are 
from the central enterprise or its affiliations, having additional ones brings a negative effect 
to firm value in the next period. This study tests the contemporaneous relation between 
affiliated directors and firm value in listed CEs, using the 3SLS approach. The 
contemporaneous affiliated directors and firm value jointly affect each other. Hence, the 
contemporaneous relation between these two factors is not causation.  
This study also conducts two related additional tests and it has been discovered that the 
external auditor is an effective mechanism that can constrain the negative effect of too 
many affiliated directors on firm value, while the presence of foreign institutional investors 
does not influence the relation between affiliated directors and the firm value of listed CEs. 
Finally, by using the excess board seats control as a proxy for the separation of control and 
ownership by the ultimate owner, this study has found that the excess board seats control 
reduces the next period firm value of listed CEs. Moreover, it has emerged that external 
audit and the presence of foreign institutional investors could mitigate the negative effect of 
the excess control power from the central enterprises on firm value among listed CEs.  
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This study has provided new insights on the determinants of board structures from the 
ultimate owner perspective. The affiliated directors do have benefits on firm value of listed 
CEs, but too many on the corporate board lead to lower firm value. A moderate proportion 
of affiliated directors on the corporate board of listed CEs has implications for the state and 
policy-makers in terms of improving the corporate governance structure in listed CEs and 
even in all Chinese listed firms. To separate the central government from businesses, it is 
necessary to limit the board seats owned by the central enterprise or its affiliations, and to 
control the proportion of affiliated directors to a certain level. Also, the restriction of the 
proportion of affiliated directors could provide more board space for directors from other 
parties, which would lead to better corporate governance in listed CEs. In such an 
environment, the listed CEs could run more efficiently and profitably. Overall, this study 





Table 3-1 Summary of variable definitions 
 
  Variables  Variable description 
Ownership variables 
 Ownership  The cash-flow rights owned by the central government. 
 Control  The voting rights held by the central government. 
 Separation  The divergence of control and ownership = the voting rights / 
cash-flow rights owned by the central government. 
Board variables 
 Affiliated_directors  The ratio of directors concurrently having a position in the 
central enterprise or its affiliations to the total number of 
directors. 
 Affiliated_square  The quadratic term of the proportion of affiliated directors on 
the corporate board. 
 Boardsize  Total number of directors on the corporate board. 
 Independent_directors  The ratio of independent directors to the total number of 
directors on the corporate board. 
 Ceo_duality  A dummy variable that equals 1, if the CEO also holds the 
position of the chairman of the corporate board and 0, 
otherwise. 
 Affiliated_chairman  An indicator variable that equals 1, when the chairman of listed 




 Tobin’s Q  The firm value of listed CEs, the market value of equity and net 
debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
 Firmsize  The natural logarithm of total assets. 
 Leverage  The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 Listexg  An indicator variable that equals 1, if the listed CE is on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and equals 0, if it is listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
 Firmage  The number of years since the listed CE went on public. 
 Growth  Growth opportunities, the sales growth rate. The sales growth 
rate is calculated by the difference of the annual sales in this 
year and last year, scaled by the total sales in the last year. 
This table shows the definition of variables employed in the main regressions. The data on affiliated directors 
is manually collected from the annual reports of listed CEs, whilst other governance, ownership and accounting 





Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Median Max 
       
Ownership structure 
Ownership 942 0.400 0.160 0.0765 0.413 0.865 
Control 942 0.455 0.136 0.122 0.462 0.865 
Separation 942 1.256 0.513 1 1 4.782 
       
Board of directors 
Affiliated_directors 942 0.377 0.144 0 0.375 0.692 
Boardsize 942 9.400 1.934 5 9 16 
Independent_directors 942 0.371 0.0604 0.231 0.333 0.714 
Ceo_duality 942 0.0605 0.239 0 0 1 
Affiliated_chairman 942 0.854 0.354 0 1 1 
       
Firm characteristics 
Tobin’s Q 942 1.983 1.239 0.219 1.586 11.423 
Firmsize (billion/RMB) 942 56.630 209.809 0.307 8.597 2405.265 
Leverage 942 0.529 0.195 0.0188 0.548 0.979 
Listexg 942 0.702 0.458 0 1 1 
Firmage 942 14.206 4.628 1 15 24 
Growth 942 0.113 0.590 -0.776 0.039456 7.161 





Table 3-3 Correlation matrix  
Panel A: Correlation matrix of variables in the regression about determinants of affiliated directors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Affiliated_directors 1            
2 Ownership 0.003 1           
3 Control 0.076** 0.854*** 1          
4 Separation 0.114*** -0.582*** -0.152*** 1         
5 Boardsize 0.059* 0.096*** 0.124*** -0.041 1        
6 Independent_directors -0.152*** 0.143*** 0.081** -0.118*** -0.293*** 1       
7 Ceo_duality -0.133*** -0.032 -0.038 -0.033 -0.099*** 0.173*** 1      
8 Affiliated_chairman 0.293*** 0.049 0.102*** 0.076** 0.026 -0.096*** -0.272*** 1     
9 Tobin’s Q -0.002 -0.088*** -0.149*** -0.057* -0.166*** -0.056* -0.018 0.004 1    
10 Firmsize 0.064** 0.415*** 0.439*** -0.091*** 0.322*** 0.153*** -0.086*** 0.064* -0.513*** 1   
11 Leverage -0.043 0.044 0.033 -0.016 0.192*** 0.008 0.001 -0.026 -0.531*** 0.438*** 1  
12 Listexg 0.083** 0.255*** 0.221*** -0.134*** 0.169*** -0.051 0.003 -0.019 -0.006 0.152*** 0.058* 1 
 N 942            
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix of variables in the regression about affiliated directors and firm value 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Tobin's Q 1             
2 Affiliated_directors 0.025 1            
3 Ownership -0.093*** 0.013 1           
4 Separation -0.065** 0.094*** -0.582*** 1          
5 Boardsize -0.164*** 0.046 0.084*** -0.042 1         
6 Independent_directors -0.073** -0.153*** 0.144*** -0.122*** -0.321*** 1        
7 Ceo_duality -0.012 -0.128*** -0.078** -0.015 -0.101*** 0.158*** 1       
8 Affiliated_chairman 0.015 0.376*** 0.047 0.072** 0.036 -0.066** -0.247*** 1      
9 Firmage 0.087*** 0.003 -0.354*** 0.179*** -0.138*** -0.116*** -0.003 -0.032 1     
10 Firmsize -0.595*** 0.066** 0.409*** -0.099*** 0.313*** 0.133*** -0.076** 0.076** -0.192*** 1    
11 Leverage -0.426*** -0.059* 0.041 -0.042 0.207*** 0.001 0.006 -0.036 -0.014 0.431*** 1   
12 Growth -0.032 0.023 -0.043 0.005 -0.014 0.045 0.018 -0.030 0.060* 0.029 0.015 1  
13 Listexg -0.00095 0.083** 0.258*** -0.136*** 0.175*** -0.063* -0.049 -0.014 -0.396*** 0.155*** 0.048 -0.021 1 
 N 942 





Table 3-4 Univariate analysis 
Panel A: Comparison between listed CEs with low and high ownership owned by the central government  
VARIABLES Low ownership  High ownership  Difference in means 
 Mean  Mean   
 (Stand. Dev.)  (Stand. Dev.)   
 N=471  N=471   
Affiliated_directors 0.382  0.372                        0.001 
 (0.144)  (0.145)   
Control 0.364  0.546  -0.182*** 
 (0.109)  (0.092)   
Separation 1.485  1.027  0.458*** 
 (0.645)  (0.082)   
      
Panel B: Comparison between listed CEs with and without a wedge between control and ownership from the central 
government 
VARIABLES Separation_dummy=0  Separation_dummy=1  Difference in means 
 Mean  Mean   
 (Stand. Dev.)  (Stand. Dev.)   
 N=563  N=379   
Affiliated_directors 0.368  0.39  -0.021*** 
 (0.149)  (0.136)   
Control 0.456  0.454                         0.003 
 (0.146)  (0.120)   
Ownership 0.456  0.318  0.139*** 
 (0.149)  (0.143)   
Panel A shows the measures of affiliated directors, ownership, and the separation of control and ownership, 
respectively, for listed CEs with low and high ownership held by the central government. Low ownership shows 
the central government has 41.3% or less cash-flow rights of listed CEs, while, High ownership indicates that it 
holds more than 41.3% cash-flow rights of listed CEs. 
Panel B reports the measures of affiliated directors, ownership and control for listed CEs with or without the 
voting rights being different from the cash-flow rights held by the central government. Separation_dummy 
equals 1, if the central government has different voting and cash-flow rights to listed CEs and equals 0, 
otherwise.  
For a description of the variables, please refer to Table 3-1. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-5 The impact of the central government on the appointment of affiliated directors 
 
  Dependent variable (Affiliated_directors) 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
 Coefficient Marginal effect  Coefficient Marginal effect 
          
Ownership -0.146 -0.0221    
 (0.137) 
 
   
Separation 
  
 0.082** 0.0386 
 
  
 (0.039)  
Boardsize -0.007 -0.0254  -0.006 -0.0211 
 (0.012) 
 
 (0.012)  
Independent_directors -0.908*** -0.126  -0.866*** -0.120 
 (0.302) 
 
 (0.301)  
Ceo_duality -0.063 -0.00131  -0.062 -0.00129 
 (0.084) 
 
 (0.086)  
Affiliated_chairman 0.322*** 0.109  0.311*** 0.105 
 (0.058) 
 
 (0.060)  
Tobin’s Q 0.013 0.00696  0.016 0.00847 
 (0.015) 
 
 (0.015)  
Firmsize 0.039** 0.0686  0.034** 0.0606 
 (0.017) 
 
 (0.017)  
Leverage -0.158 -0.0314  -0.138 -0.0274 
 (0.119) 
 
 (0.119)  
Listexg 0.078* 0.0207  0.078* 0.0207 
 (0.044) 
 
 (0.042)  
Constant -0.292 -0.0221  -0.462** 0.0386 
 (0.207) 
 
 (0.209)  
      
Industry FE YES   YES  
Year FE YES   YES  
Observations 942   942  
Wald Chi-squared Test 94.64***   101.3***  
Log Pseudolikelihood -618.6   -618.2  
Pseudo R-squared 0.009   0.010  
Cluster Firm   Firm  
The table reports fractional probit regression results with the fixed effect of industry and year.  
For a description of the variables, please refer to Table 3-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 





Table 3-6 The effect of affiliated directors on firm value 
 
  Dependent variable (Tobin's Q) 
 Linear relationship   Non-linear relationship  
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
Affiliated_directors 0.296 0.340  2.907*** 3.059*** 
 (0.284) (0.288)  (1.057) (1.068) 
Affiliated_square    -3.470*** -3.614*** 
    (1.318) (1.330) 
Ownership 1.170***   1.154***  
 (0.335)   (0.333)  
Separation  -0.303***   -0.303*** 
  (0.093)   (0.092) 
Boardsize 0.038 0.030  0.034 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.025)  (0.025) (0.025) 
Independent_directors 0.628 0.542  0.558 0.466 
 (0.672) (0.684)  (0.675) (0.681) 
Ceo_duality -0.177 -0.210  -0.174 -0.206 
 (0.142) (0.145)  (0.140) (0.141) 
Affiliated_chairman 0.093 0.118  0.053 0.077 
 (0.126) (0.128)  (0.126) (0.129) 
Firmage 0.009 0.004  0.009 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) 
Firmsize -0.495*** -0.451***  -0.488*** -0.445*** 
 (0.044) (0.042)  (0.044) (0.041) 
Leverage -1.088*** -1.216***  -1.086*** -1.211*** 
 (0.302) (0.291)  (0.300) (0.288) 
Growth 0.023 0.011  0.018 0.006 
 (0.047) (0.047)  (0.046) (0.045) 
Listexg 0.178 0.197  0.188 0.208 
 (0.129) (0.131)  (0.128) (0.130) 
Constant 3.472*** 4.316***  3.124*** 3.947*** 
 (0.558) (0.572)  (0.526) (0.537) 
      
      
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 942 942  942 942 
Adjusted R-squared 0.470 0.468 0.474 0.473 
Cluster Firm Firm   Firm Firm 
The table reports OLS regression results with the fixed effect of industry and year.  
For a description of the other variables, please refer to Table 3-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3-7 The contemporaneous relation estimated by 3SLS 
 
 




VARIABLES  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
Affiliated_directors     26.41*** 26.17*** 
     (9.126) (9.060) 
Affiliated_square     -37.11*** -36.43*** 
     (13.280) (13.250) 
Tobin’s Q  0.075** 0.063**    
  (0.030) (0.026)    
Ownership  -0.109**   0.772**  
  (0.048)   (0.331)  
Separation   0.044***   -0.235** 
   (0.012)   (0.093) 
Boardsize  -0.007** -0.005*    
  (0.003) (0.003)    
Independent_directors  -0.414*** -0.378***    
  (0.090) (0.086)    
Ceo_duality  -0.000238 -0.000291    
  (0.022) (0.021)    
Affiliated_chairman  0.130*** 0.126***    
  (0.015) (0.015)    
Beta  0.056*** 0.053***    
  (0.021) (0.020)    
Firmsize  0.051*** 0.041***  -0.425*** -0.400*** 
  (0.018) (0.014)  (0.043) (0.038) 
Listexg  0.015 0.018  0.354*** 0.351*** 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.125) (0.124) 
Firmage     0.002 -0.000391 
     (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage     -0.886*** -0.950*** 
     (0.248) (0.243) 
Growth     -0.011 -0.005 
     (0.070) (0.070) 
Constant  0.097 0.042  -0.654 -0.116 
  (0.117) (0.121)  (1.479) (1.533) 
       
       
Industry FE  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations  978 978  978 978 
2 statistics  173.59 461.75  194.97 413.86 
Table reports the results of the relation between affiliated directors and firm value of listed CEs, estimated by 
the three-stage least square (3SLS) regression model. The dependent variable of Columns (1) and (2) is the 
proportion of affiliated directors (Affiliated_directors). The dependent variable of Columns (3) and (4) is the 
corporation value of listed CEs represented by Tobin’s Q. Beta is the market risk, derived from CSMAR. It is 
estimated by the CAPM model with the recent 1-year data.  
For a description of other variables, please refer to Table 3-1. 
R2 is not reported, as it has no statistical meaning in the case of 3SLS estimation method. 
The standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-8 The non-linear relationship examined by the alternative regression model  
 
  Dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) 
VARIABLES (1)   (2) 
        
Affiliated_directors (under 0.42) 1.317**  1.415*** 
 (0.526)  (0.532) 
Affiliated_directors (above 0.42) -1.402**  -1.449** 
 (0.640)  (0.646) 
Ownership 1.131***   
 (0.330)   
Separation   -0.300*** 
   (0.091) 
Boardsize 0.034  0.026 
 (0.024)  (0.025) 
Independent_directors 0.548  0.454 
 (0.672)  (0.678) 
Ceo_duality -0.161  -0.192 
 (0.138)  (0.140) 
Affiliated_chairman 0.057  0.080 
 (0.125)  (0.128) 
Firmage 0.0088  0.004 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Firmsize -0.486***  -0.443*** 
 (0.043)  (0.040) 
Leverage -1.085***  -1.208*** 
 (0.298)  (0.286) 
Growth 0.017  0.005 
 (0.045)  (0.045) 
Listexg 0.193  0.211 
 (0.127)  (0.128) 
Constant 3.260***  4.074*** 
 (0.528)  (0.536) 
    
Industry FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Observations 942  942 
Adjusted R-squared 0.476 0.475 
Cluster Firm   Firm 
This table reports OLS results of the piecewise linear regression model with fixed effects of industry and year.  
Affiliated_directors (under 0.42) equals the proportion of affiliated directors, when it is under 0.42, and it 
equals 0.42, when otherwise. Affiliated_directors (above 0.42) equals 0, when it is under 0.42, and equals the 
proportion of affiliated directors minus 0.42, when it is over 0.42. 
For a description of the other variables, please refer to Table 3-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm, which is shown in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-9 The contemporaneous relation examined by 2SLS 
 
 




VARIABLES  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
Affiliated_directors     26.14*** 25.91*** 
     (8.589) (8.587) 
Affiliated_square     -36.71*** -36.04*** 
     (12.320) (12.360) 
Tobin’s Q  0.075** 0.063**    
  (0.031) (0.026)    
Ownership  -0.109**   0.759**  
  (0.048)   (0.312)  
Separation   0.044***   -0.234*** 
   (0.013)   (0.087) 
Boardsize  -0.007** -0.005*    
  (0.003) (0.003)    
Independent_directors  -0.403*** -0.369***    
  (0.082) (0.080)    
Ceo_duality  0.005 0.004    
  (0.023) (0.023)    
Affiliated_chairman  0.131*** 0.127***    
  (0.015) (0.015)    
Beta  0.061** 0.057**    
  (0.025) (0.024)    
Firmsize  0.052*** 0.042***  -0.426*** -0.402*** 
  (0.018) (0.015)  (0.039) (0.035) 
Listexg  0.015 0.018  0.343*** 0.340*** 
  (0.012) (0.011)  (0.123) (0.122) 
Firmage     -0.00053 -0.003 
     (0.011) (0.011) 
Leverage     -0.889*** -0.948*** 
     (0.273) (0.271) 
Growth     -0.009 -0.002 
     (0.068) (0.066) 
Constant  0.082 0.028  -0.567 -0.039 
  (0.120) (0.124)  (1.408) (1.464) 
       
       
Industry FE  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations  978 978  978 978 
Hansen J statistics (2)  1.363 1.598  5.543 6.205 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test  9.60 8.98  27 30.11 
Stock-Wright LM test  9.91 9.25  41.34 43.95 
The table reports the results of the relation between affiliated directors and firm value in listed CEs, estimated 
by the two-stage least square (2SLS) regression model. The dependent variable of Columns (1) and (2) is the 
proportion of affiliated directors (Affiliated_directors). Also, the dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is 
the corporation value of listed CEs represented by Tobin’s Q. Beta is the market risk, derived from the CSMAR. 
It is estimated by the CAPM model with the recent 1-year data.  
For a description of the other variables, please refer to Table 3-1. 
R2 is not reported, as it has no statistical meaning in the case of 2SLS/IV estimation method. 
The robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
69 
Table 3-10 The relation between affiliated directors and firm value in groups with and without the 
big 4 
 
 Dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) 
 Big 4=0  Big 4=1 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            
Affiliated_directors 2.779** 3.007***  2.393 2.768* 
 (1.141) (1.152)  (1.447) (1.385) 
Affiliated_square -3.195** -3.477**  -2.475 -3.112 
 (1.434) (1.444)  (1.969) (1.895) 
Ownership 1.225***   -1.225*  
 (0.346)   (0.657)  
Separation  -0.364***   0.197 
  (0.099)   (0.161) 
Boardsize 0.031 0.020  0.037* 0.046** 
 (0.032) (0.033)  (0.020) (0.017) 
Independent_directors 0.515 0.388  1.067 1.017 
 (0.745) (0.757)  (0.834) (0.839) 
Ceo_duality -0.224 -0.275*  0.157 0.200 
 (0.164) (0.164)  (0.195) (0.180) 
Affiliated_chairman 0.048 0.0777  -0.104 -0.175 
 (0.137) (0.141)  (0.200) (0.206) 
Firmage 0.013 0.006  -0.007 -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Firmsize -0.589*** -0.549***  -0.108 -0.184*** 
 (0.056) (0.054)  (0.068) (0.050) 
Leverage -0.870*** -0.949***  -1.381*** -1.122*** 
 (0.329) (0.314)  (0.449) (0.371) 
Growth 0.010 -0.003  0.151 0.180* 
 (0.047) (0.047)  (0.098) (0.104) 
Listexg 0.192 0.207  0.111 -0.000519 
 (0.137) (0.137)  (0.241) (0.217) 
Constant 3.396*** 4.368***  2.233*** 1.857*** 
 (0.594) (0.610)  (0.604) (0.637) 
      
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 777 777  165 165 
Adjusted R-squared 0.477 0.478 0.516 0.503 
Cluster Firm Firm   Firm Firm 
Table reports OLS results of the relation between affiliated directors and firm value of listed CEs in groups with 
and without the big 4.  
Big 4 is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if the listed CEs hire the big 4 as their external auditor, and 0 if 
otherwise.  
For a description of other variables, please refer to Table 3-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
70 
Table 3-11 The relation between affiliated directors and firm value in groups with or without foreign 
institutional investors 
 
 Dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) 
 Foreign_investor=0  Foreign_investor=1 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            
Affiliated_directors 2.704** 2.894***  5.302** 5.326** 
 (1.091) (1.113)  (2.099) (2.144) 
Affiliated_square -3.207** -3.375**  -6.368** -6.393** 
 (1.388) (1.410)  (2.615) (2.659) 
Ownership 1.193***   0.074  
 (0.339)   (0.643)  
Separation  -0.337***   0.002 
  (0.098)   (0.147) 
Boardsize 0.047* 0.037  0.015 0.016 
 (0.026) (0.026)  (0.038) (0.038) 
Independent_directors 0.563 0.469  0.713 0.737 
 (0.747) (0.762)  (0.820) (0.821) 
Ceo_duality -0.185 -0.217  0.094 0.093 
 (0.151) (0.153)  (0.208) (0.210) 
Affiliated_chairman 0.064 0.094  -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.134) (0.137)  (0.231) (0.236) 
Firmage 0.015 0.009  -0.050** -0.051** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.020) (0.020) 
Firmsize -0.519*** -0.482***  -0.331*** -0.327*** 
 (0.047) (0.045)  (0.067) (0.046) 
Leverage -1.022*** -1.119***  -1.431*** -1.442*** 
 (0.322) (0.307)  (0.472) (0.401) 
Growth 0.013 0.000585  0.327 0.322 
 (0.047) (0.046)  (0.200) (0.198) 
Listexg 0.179 0.189  0.197 0.204 
 (0.139) (0.138)  (0.166) (0.174) 
Constant 3.035*** 3.943***  3.496*** 3.503*** 
 (0.563) (0.583)  (0.836) (0.852) 
      
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 804 804  137 137 
Adjusted R-squared 0.479 0.480 0.459 0.458 
Cluster Firm Firm   Firm Firm 
Table reports OLS results of the relation between affiliated directors and the firm value of listed CEs in groups 
with and without foreign institutional investors. Foreign_investor is an indicator variable that, it equals 1 if the 
listed CEs have foreign institutional investors, and 0 if otherwise. The description of other variables refers to 
Table 3-1. One singleton observation in the group with foreign institutional investors is dropped (Correia, 
2015). 
For a description of other variables, please refer to Table 3-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 





 Table 3-12 The effect of excess board seats control on firm value 
 
 Dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) 
VARIABLES (1)   (2)   (3) 
            
Excess_board_seats_control_ratio -0.117**     
 (0.049)     
Excess_board_seats_control_difference   -0.456**   
   (0.212)   
Excess_board_seats_control_dummy     -0.264** 
     (0.106) 
Boardsize 0.030  0.033  0.034 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Independent_directors 0.539  0.495  0.622 
 (0.677)  (0.687)  (0.677) 
Ceo_duality -0.226  -0.208  -0.224 
 (0.138)  (0.137)  (0.139) 
Affiliated_chairman 0.192  0.200  0.194 
 (0.128)  (0.130)  (0.127) 
Firmage 0.005  0.005  0.005 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Firmsize -0.454***  -0.459***  -0.462*** 
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.043) 
Leverage -1.228***  -1.212***  -1.256*** 
 (0.300)  (0.299)  (0.297) 
Growth 0.0213  0.023  0.024 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Listexg 0.226*  0.232*  0.235* 
 (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.134) 
Constant 4.127***  3.966***  4.081*** 
 (0.555)  (0.557)  (0.552) 
      
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES 
Observations 942  942  942 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460  0.459  0.464 
Cluster Firm   Firm   Firm 
The table reports the OLS result of the relation between excess board seats control and firm value of listed 
CEs, absorbing the fixed effect of industry and year. 
Excess_board_seats_control is measured by three alternative methods. In Column (1), it is calculated by the 
proportion of affiliated directors divided by cash-flow rights owned by the central government. In Column (2), 
it is calculated by the affiliated director ratio minus cash-flow rights. In Column (3), it is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the proportion of affiliated directors exceeds the cash-flow rights, otherwise equals 0.  
For a description of the other variables, please refer to Table 3-1. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-13 The effect of external mechanisms on excess board seats control and firm value 
Panel A: The effect of the external auditor on the relation between excess board seats control and firm value 
 Big 4=0  Big 4=1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
Excess_board_seats_control_ratio -0.148*** 
(0.045) 












      
Excess_board_seats_control_dummy   -0.283** 
(0.117) 
   0.182 
(0.162)       
        
Control variables YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 777 777 777  165 165 165 
Adjusted R-squared 0.466 0.462 0.468  0.558 0.506 0.486 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm  Firm Firm Firm 
        
Panel B: The effect of the foreign investor on the relation between excess board seats control and firm value 
 Foreign_investor=0  Foreign_investor=1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
Excess_board_seats_control_ratio -0.131*** 
(0.047) 












      
Excess_board_seats_control_dummy   -0.297*** 
(0.113) 
   0.076 
(0.142)       
        
Control variables YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 804 804 804  137 137 137 
Adjusted R-squared 0.467 0.465 0.471  0.446 0.445 0.447 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm  Firm Firm Firm 
Panel A reports the OLS results of the relation between excess board seats control and firm value in groups 
with and without the big 4 accounting firms. Big 4 is an indicator variable that equals 1, if the listed CEs hire 
the big 4 as their external auditor, and 0, otherwise.  
Panel B the reports OLS results of the relation between excess board seats control and firm value in groups 
with and without foreign institutional shareholdings. Foreign_investor is an indicator variable that equals 1, if 
the listed CEs have foreign institutional investors and 0, otherwise. 
Excess_board_seats_control is measured by three alternative methods (the ratio of affiliated director ratio and 
cash-flow rights owned by the central government, the difference between the affiliated director ratio and 
cash-flow rights, and dummy variable).  
For a description of the other variables, please refer to Table 3-1. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 




Chapter 4 (Study 2) Independent Directors and Investment Efficiency 
4.1 Introduction 
The independent director is widely considered as being an effective corporate governance 
mechanism that improves firm performance and shareholder value in many countries. In 
China, many scholars (e.g. Lo et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2015; Zhu et al., 2016) have provided 
decisive evidence of the functions of independent directors on firm performance in publicly 
listed corporations, since the Chinese government set up a legal independent director 
system in 2001. CSRC regulates that the independent directors should protect the wealth of 
minority shareholders by monitoring operation activities and providing professional and 
valuable suggestions about the firm’s strategy decision-making (CSRC, August,2001, Article 
1.2). Investments are important economic activities that contribute to firm performance, 
which requires monitoring and professional advice from independent directors. The 
investment activity is profit oriented and is affected by other aspects, such as agency 
problems and information asymmetry (Stein, 2003)29. These factors may bring adverse 
effects to investment activities, which leads to inefficiency of firm investment. Based on the 
functions regulated by the government, the independent directors should have positive 
effects that mitigate the investment inefficiency of listed firms, such that they can improve 
firm value accordingly.  
However, only a few studies (e.g. Chen and Xie, 2011; Ke et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2013) 
have investigated the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency 
in the Chinese stock market. If the independent director system in China does not work as 
expected, then what is the appropriate reform direction for this governance mechanism? 
And if it does work, does it fit all types of Chinese firms? Hence, this study is about 
                                                                
29 See Stein (2003) for a comprehensive review. Agency conflicts occur between the managers and outside 
shareholders in a dispersed ownership structure, and between majority and minority shareholders in a 
concentrated ownership structure. One party (i.e., managers or majority shareholders) may expropriate the 
interests of another party (i.e., outside shareholders or minority shareholders) to achieve its private benefits. 
Information asymmetry provides an environment for the party with more or better information to fulfil the 
expropriation of the wealth of the other party. 
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investigating the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency 
among listed CEs in China. 
As one of the largest emerging markets, China is attracting more attention from the world. 
In China, the state shares still dominate the stock market even following with the state-
owned enterprise (SOE) reforms that were initiated in 1978.  Some researchers (e.g. Chen et 
al., 2011b; Ke et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014) distinguish SOEs and non-SOEs in their studies, 
but very few breakdown SOEs into delineated categories. The listed CEs are a unique form 
of SOE, whereby they are ultimately controlled by the central enterprises that are solely 
owned by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)30. 
SASAC is an institution under the management of the central government in China. Unlike 
listed local SOEs (ultimately owned by the local governments) that are distributed across 
multiple industries, the listed CEs are concentrated in several focused industries. Following 
the SOE reform, the majority of listed CEs are in the utilities, military and natural resource 
sectors.  
Moreover, these state sectors are generally monopolies and policy favouring, which makes 
it hard for private firms, even local SOEs, to participate in. Such a close connection with the 
central government makes the investment efficiency of listed CEs deviate from the optimal 
level (Chen and Chi, 2015)31. For instance, the strong political background provides the listed 
CEs easier access to external finance resources (e.g. bank loans), which is likely to result in 
excess investments. Alternatively, the listed CEs may take on poor investment projects to 
help the central government accomplish its social and political goals. Overall, the 
investment decisions made by listed CEs must consider the political complexion, which is 
not totally driven by maximizing firm value.  
                                                                
30 The central enterprises solely owned by SASAC are the ultimate controller of listed CEs, and therefore, 
SASAC is the ultimate owner of listed CEs. This is because the central enterprises represent SASAC to exercise 
the control and management on listed CEs, as SASAC is an official institution of the central government that 
could not participate in operating management and strategies decision-makings of every listed CEs. 
31 Chen and Chi (2015) examine the investment efficiency of listed CEs located in manufacturing sector, finding 
that over-investment is common in them, and suggest a state-owned capital operating budget system can 
mitigate over-investment activities of listed CEs. 
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Here, this study hypothesises that the independent director is an effective corporate 
governance mechanism that can help the listed CEs improve investment efficiency. 
Moreover, following the literature of Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Block (1999), who 
suggest the relationship between independent directors and firm performance is non-linear, 
this study hypothesises that the relationship between independent directors and 
investment efficiency is curvilinear as well. In order to examine this non-linear relationship, 
the main regression model involves the quadratic term of the proportion of independent 
directors. Additionally, if the independent directors have an impact on the investment 
efficiency of listed CEs, how do they work with different kinds of investment inefficiency 
(over- or under-investment)? Hence, there is also an examination of the relationship 
between independent directors and firm investment efficiency in two subsamples (over- 
and under-investment groups).  In order to investigate whether other aspects of 
independent directors, such as the performance and characteristics, affect the investment 
efficiency of listed CEs as well, this study conducts related additional tests. Last, this study 
investigates the effect of the extra control from the ultimate owner (i.e. the central 
enterprises on behalf of the central government) on the relationship between independent 
directors and investment efficiency. 
The sample of this study includes 979 firm-year observations comprising 229 unique listed 
non-financial A-share CEs in the period from 2012 to 2016. As the calculation of investment 
efficiency needs one-year lagged information, these listed firms should be ultimately owned 
by the central government in two consecutive years. Such information was checked 
manually through the annual reports. Other governance and finance related information 
was obtained from the Chinese Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). This 
study delivers the following main findings.  
First, the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency is a U-
shaped curve after controlling for other factors that may affect investment efficiency. The 
turning point of the independent director ratio is 0.473, suggesting that before this point, 
their proportion has a negative effect on investment efficiency. When the proportion 
exceeds the critical mass (the proportion of independent directors on the corporate board is 
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47.3%), the independent directors start to play a positive role in improving investment 
efficiency. Moreover, the empirical results are robust with several sensitivity tests (e.g. 
alternative investment variables and alternative regression models). Furthermore, one-year 
lagged independent variables and IV-GMM (instrument variables - generalised method of 
moments) are employed to address the potential endogeneity issue. The result of the PSM 
(propensity score matching) method shows that the U-shaped relation between 
independent directors and investment efficiency is a unique phenomenon in listed CEs, as 
there is no significant evidence in matched listed non-CEs that have similar firm and board 
characteristics as listed CEs.  
Second, there exists the U-shaped relationship between independent directors and 
investment efficiency in the over-investment group, but not in the under-investment group. 
This implies that independent directors are playing a more significant role in reducing excess 
investments. Overall, the independent directors have a positive effect on improving 
investment efficiency in listed CEs, when their proportion exceeds a certain level, especially 
for over-investment firms.  
Third, this study explores how the performance of independent directors affects the 
investment efficiency of listed CEs, in particular, regarding the frequency of independent 
directors delegating a representative to attend board meetings. As over half of the listed CEs 
do not have this phenomenon, the OLS estimation may lead to estimation bias. Hence, this 
study deploys the Heckman selection model, and the results show that a high frequency of 
independent directors delegating a representative to attend board meetings weakens 
investment efficiency in the full sample as well as for the over- and under-investment 
groups.  
Fourth, in the full sample and the over-investment group, the listed CEs with significant 
gender diversity (more women in the independent director team) have better investment 
efficiency, whereby the female independent directors are less likely to be overconfident and 
play a better role in monitoring. Meanwhile, in the over-investment group, the listed CEs 
with significant age diversity of the independent director team (i.e. the standard deviation 
 
77 
of independent director’s age scaled by the average age of independent directors on the 
corporate board) have better investment efficiency as well.  
Last, the listed CEs are divided into two groups based on whether they have extra control 
from the ultimate owner (i.e. the central enterprises on behalf of the central government) 
and examined with the main regression model. This is to find out whether extra control 
affects the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency. Extra 
control in this study refers to whether the separation of control and ownership owned by 
the central government (i.e. the ratio of the voting rights to cash-flow rights) is over one. If 
yes, then this listed CE is classified in the group with extra control from the central 
enterprises and if no, then this listed CE is in the group without it. The influence of extra 
control is significant, as there is no significant relationship between independent directors 
and investment efficiency in the group with extra control from central enterprises. This 
means extra control from the central enterprises blocks the function of independent 
directors no matter how many are on the corporate board. In the group without extra 
control from central enterprises, a consistent result emerges with the main regression, i.e. 
there is a U-shaped relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency. 
When this study extends the test to the over-and under-investment groups, a similar result 
is found in the over-investment group. It implies that this extra control hinders the function 
of independent directors from reducing excess investments. However, there is no significant 
effect of extra control on the relationship between independent directors and investment 
efficiency in the under-investment group.  
The outcomes of this study lead to theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, 
in particular, they enrich the existing literature on independent directors. In the literature, 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is employed to explain the potential positive 
function of independent directors, and stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) is drawn upon 
to explain the potential negative function of these directors. However, this study documents 
that the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency in listed CEs 
is not monotonously positive or negative, and it also depends on the proportion of 
independent directors on the corporate board. Inspired by the critical mass theory (Kanter, 
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1977), which is widely applied in analysing how women work in organisations, this study 
finds that before reaching the critical mass point, the proportion of independent directors 
has a negative effect on investment efficiency, which is also supported by stewardship 
theory. Also, when the proportion of independent directors exceeds the critical mass point, 
independent directors start to play a positive role in improving investment efficiency, which 
is in line with agency theory. This study also provides evidence for the literature on the 
investment that the independent director system can be an efficient mechanism for 
mitigating investment inefficiency issues, when there are enough independent directors on 
the corporate board. Second, this study provides empirical evidence that the relation 
between independent directors and investment efficiency is a U-shape, instead of the 
simple linear relationship shown in past studies. Moreover, only listed CEs have this kind of 
relationship, which, as explained previously, are a special kind of listed firms with a strong 
connection with the central government. Scant previous literature has focused on listed CEs. 
Hence, this study investigates the relationship between independent directors and 
investment efficiency in a complicated firm environment.  
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the related literature and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 4.3 provides the details of research methodology and data. 
Section 4.4 reports the main empirical findings and sensitivity tests. Section 4.5 presents the 
empirical results of extended tests.  Section 4.6 discusses this study.  
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4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Whether the independent director is an effective corporate governance mechanism is 
widely discussed, but there is no conclusive result. Bhagat and Black (1999) review previous 
studies and document that there is no empirical support for more independent directors on 
the corporate board improving firm performance. They highlight that a listed firm in the U.S. 
usually has a majority of independent directors on the board. This “supermajority 
independent board” does not enhance firm value as the participation by insiders is scarce. 
In contrast, most of Chinese listed firms have an insider-dominant board. Liu et al. (2015) 
make a comparison of independent directors between the U.S. and China for the period 
from 1999 to 2012 and report that the average fraction of independent directors on the 
corporate board in the U.S. is 71%, while that in China is 30%. So, in China, under an insider-
dominant environment, the question is whether adding more independent directors to the 
corporate board works well? The answer from Clarke (2006) is no, as he fails to find 
significant and positive evidence about the effect of independent directors on corporate 
performance in past empirical studies. For instance, Tian and Lau (2001) find no positive 
relationship between the independent director ratio and corporate performance, using 113 
firms listed in 1996. Gao and Ma (2002) use firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges in 2001 and compare the listed firms that appointed independent directors in the 
past three years with those that did not. They document that there is no significant 
difference in performance between these two kinds of firms, i.e. the independent directors 
have no impact on corporate performance. One potential reason that such directors do not 
seem to work well is the absence of a legal independent director system in China. That is, all 
the empirical evidence reviewed by Clarke was around 2001 or before, at a time when the 
independent director mechanism was still in its preliminary stages. 
Since CSRC announced the Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent 
Director System in Listed Companies in August 2001 and regulates that listed firms must 
have at least one-third independent directors on the corporate board before July 2003, 
more literature has provided strong empirical evidence of the positive function of 
independent directors in China. For instance, Lo et al. (2010) observe that listed firms with a 
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higher proportion of independent directors are less likely to engage in transfer pricing 
manipulations in related-party sales transactions. Liu et al. (2015) report independent 
directors have an overall positive role in improving firm operating performance and perform 
better in government-controlled firms. Wang et al. (2016) conducted a further study to 
examine the effect of the backgrounds of independent directors on corporate performance 
in SOEs. They find that the diversification of independent directors can improve the 
corporate performance of SOEs. Zhu et al. (2016) manually collected the independent-
director rankings32 from the annual reports. They document that the independent directors 
with a higher ranking are more powerful at improving firm value. Hu et al. (2017) examine 
the monitoring power of independent directors by building up an index33 and find that the 
combined independent director monitoring power index is positively related to the internal 
control quality. It confirms the effective monitoring function of independent directors. 
Cullinan et al. (2017) investigate the effect of independent directors on tunnelling activities, 
considering the power of shareholders. They find that independent directors are more 
effective at reducing tunnelling when relatively minority shareholder power is higher. Shan 
(2019) reports that the proportion of independent directors has a positive relationship with 
the extent of voluntary related-party transactions disclosure. 
In China, the independent director is playing an increasingly efficient role in corporate 
governance (Chen and Xie, 2011; Ke et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2013). Under agency theory, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that independent directors have the function of monitoring 
management behaviours and reducing agency costs. In Chinese regulations, CSRC regulates 
that the primary duty of independent directors is to protect the overall interest of the 
company and has set up the guidance on how to mitigate any agency conflicts among the 
stakeholders. Investment decision-making is one of the most likely potential reasons leading 
to such agency conflict. In firms with dispersed ownership, managers may waste the wealth 
                                                                
32 Zhu et al. (2016) find that in China, directors on the corporate board are listed in annual reports in a 
meaningful order. Such a board hierarchy reflects the power of each director on the board and the 
empowered directors can set the tone of the discussion. They mark the first listed director with highest value 
that equals the number of total directors on the board, and the value of the second listed director equals the 
board size minus 1. The value of the third director equals the board size minus 2, and so on. Based on the 
sequential order, the last listed director is marked as 1. Then they standardise the ranks by dividing by the 
board size. 
33 The combined independent director monitoring power consists of specialist expertise or competence, 
incentives, balancing power and diligence. 
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of shareholders and invest in relatively higher risk projects to fulfil personal benefits, if these 
projects provide higher ones to the management team (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
1986; Stein, 2003). In addition, in firms with concentrated ownership, the controlling 
shareholder may expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders by intervening in 
investment decision-making (Pindado and de la Torre, 2009; Chen et al., 2014b).  
Besides the monitoring role of independent director, CSRC regulates the advisory role of 
independent directors as well. These directors in listed firms are experts from various fields, 
such as industry, academia, and retired government bureaucrats. Their professional advice 
is valuable, in particular, for choosing the most appropriate investment strategies and 
investment decision-making. Hence, the effect of the independent director mechanism on 
investment efficiency is crucial. However, in China, the literature examining whether the 
function of independent directors in improving the investment efficiency of firms is limited. 
Chen and Xie (2011) employ the social network method to measure the location of 
independent directors in the network of directors on the board. They find that those 
directors with higher network centrality34 improve the efficiency of firm investments. Ke et 
al. (2012) document the positive effect of independent directors on investment efficiency 
with evidence from China’s non-financial A-share listed firms. The proportion of 
independent directors is positively related to investment efficiency, while their 
compensation does not have a significant effect. Zheng et al. (2013) examine the impact of 
the characteristics of independent directors on investment efficiency. They find that firms 
with more independent directors that are female, elders or that have an accounting related 
background have better investment efficiency. Liu et al. (2015) also confirm the critical role 
of independent directors in promoting the investment efficiency of listed firms by examining 
a sample of Chinese listed firms in a period from 1999 to 2012. 
Investment activities in a perfect world, as described by Modigliani and Miller (1958), are 
solely driven by a function of the investment opportunities set. However, in the real world, 
they are also affected by market friction, such as information asymmetry and agency 
problems (Stein, 2003). Moreover, the nature of listed firms’ ultimate owner or controlling 
                                                                
34 See Freeman (1978) for a detailed overview of network centrality. The concept of centrality refers to the 
locations of position or points in the network.  
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shareholders is regarded as friction affecting investment decision-making as well. For 
instance, the investment decision-making in SOEs may suffer the influence of governmental 
authorities. Chen et al. (2017) report that state ownership weakens investment efficiency 
with world-wide evidence covering 64 countries. Regarding studies in China, Chen et al. 
(2011b) examine the effect of state ownership on investment efficiency. They find that the 
investment efficiency of non-SOEs is better than that of SOEs and the political connected 
top executive is negatively related to investment efficiency in the state sector. Ding et al. 
(2016) document that corporate investment is more efficient in non-SOEs, according to a 
comprehensive dataset of more than 100,000 Chinese firms over the period 2000 to 2007. 
As the literature shows, SOEs have more severe investment efficiency problems compared 
with non-SOEs and whether independent directors can help the former mitigate investment 
inefficiency caused by significant government intervention is worth investigating. Ke et al. 
(2012) study the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency with 
evidence from China and consider the potential effect from the nature of property rights. 
They divide Chinese listed firms into SOEs and non-SOEs and find that the positive effect of 
independent directors on investment efficiency in the former is less significant than in the 
latter. They argue that this is probably because, the executives in SOEs prefer to 
recommend and select independent directors who are beneficial to their political 
promotions instead of having a real impact on the listed firm.  
However, the evidence in listed SOEs that are ultimately controlled by the local 
governments and the central government may not be consistent, because of the different 
political purposes and strategies of these two kinds of authorities (Chen et al., 2009). Hence, 
for this study, the focus is on examining the effect of independent directors on investment 
efficiency among listed CEs. As most of the recent related literature states that there is a 
direct positive linear relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency 
based on agency theory, here it is proposed that: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between independent directors and investment 
efficiency in listed CEs. 
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However, a simple linear relationship may not explain the whole story and hence, this study 
also involves examining whether the relationship between independent directors and 
investment efficiency is curvilinear. As mentioned before, most Chinese firms have an 
insider-dominant board, and not enough of independent directors on the caproate board 
may result in the insignificant effects of their monitoring power. Correspondingly, when 
there are sufficient independent directors on the corporate board, the monitoring 
mechanism from independent directors may start to play a positive role, which is as agency 
theory suggests. This is also supported by critical mass theory, under which it is held that 
the group interactions will change, once minority representation has reached a critical mass 
point (Kanter, 1977; Collins et al., 2010). In other words, when there are enough members 
in a group, it will become influential in the organisation.  
Whilst most listed firms follow the Guidance Opinion from CSRC and maintain at least one-
third of directors on the corporate board as independent, these directors are still the 
minority group. So, the independent director group has difficulties suppressing the voice 
from executive directors and affiliated directors representing the interest of the controlling 
shareholders. Also, these one-third independent directors may not have enough motivation 
and power to fulfil their regulated responsibilities, because the purpose of listed firms 
having just one-third independent directors on the corporate board is most likely to cater 
the related regulations and the power that they have acquired through the legislation is 
generally just nominal ( Wu et al., 2007). In this case, when listed firms decide to add more 
independent directors on the existing basis, but do not reach the critical mass, their effect 
may not be positive, and it may even be detrimental. This is because, if adding independent 
directors could not change the minority status of this group, it could lead to more agency 
costs for shareholders. Moreover, Tian and Lau (2001) suggest a negative relation, according 
to stewardship theory proposed by Davis et al. (1997). Under this perspective, they argue 
that the manager in the firm works as a steward, who seeks to maximise the wealth of 
shareholders, instead of diverting the firm’s resources due to personal benefits. Also, it is 
assumed that the recognition from the organisations is essential for top executives, such 
that they are trusted and hence, granted decision-making power, i.e. being motivated to 
enhance their performance. Therefore, adding extra independent directors may result in 
resistance from the management. Moreover, the lack of cooperation and trust between the 
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corporate board and the management will lead to passive corporate performance, 
especially when independent directors do not have strong power on the corporate board. 
For listed CEs, most existing directors and executives have a political background, thus 
maybe being more opinionated and unwilling to be challenged by the outsiders. Under this 
situation, adding more independent directors to the current mandatory one-third basis, but 
not reaching the critical mass, then the potential adverse reaction from the existing 
directors and executives may be more significant. This could, consequently, lead to worse 
investment efficiency among listed CEs. 
Accordingly, this study hypothesises that there is a non-linear relation between 
independent directors and investment efficiency in listed CEs. That is, before reaching the 
critical mass point, the independent directors have a negative relationship with investment 
efficiency and after the proportion of independent directors exceeds the critical mass point, 
they start to have a positive effect on this efficiency. The second hypothesis is specified as: 
H2: the effect of independent directors on investment efficiency has a U-shaped 
relationship in listed CEs. 
 
85 
4.3 Research design and data 
4.3.1 Methodology and variables 
(1) Investment efficiency 
This study utilises the extended cash flow investment model following Richardson (2006), 
Chen et al. (2011b), Shen et al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2016), among others. The regression 
used to estimate investment efficiency is specified in Equation (4.1): 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                       (4.1)                                   
where the dependent variable (INV) is the investment expenditure in the year, which is 
measured by the difference between the cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, 
and other long-term assets, and the cash receipts from selling those assets, scaled by the 
beginning total assets (Chen et al., 2011b). The independent variable, Investment 
opportunities, is represented by Tobin’s Q, which is commonly used in related studies (Opler 
et al., 1999; Richardson, 2006; Wan et al., 2015; Xie, 2015; Chen et al., 2017). In this study, 
Tobin’s Q is calculated from the market value of equity and net debt over total assets. 
Leverage is the proxy of the financing constraints of the firm, which is measured by total 
debt over total assets. CF is the net operating cash flow scaled by the beginning total assets 
and the information about the net cash flow is taken from the cash flow statement. Firmage 
is the number of years that the firm has been publicly listed on the stock market.  Firmsize is 
the natural logarithm of total assets, whilst Return is the annual individual stock return with 
cash bonus and all these independent variables are one-year lagged. The one-year lagged 
investment expenditure is also added to the regression model. In addition, the fixed effects 
from industry and year are controlled for by adding industry and year dummy variables in 
the regression model. As the listed CEs are concentrated in certain industries, this study 
follows the Guidance for Industry Classification of Listed Companies (1999) released by the 
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CSRC and divides them into four industries: Utilities, Conglomerates, Industrials, and 
Commerce. 
The error term (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) in Equation (4.1) shows the difference between the actual and 
expected investment level of listed CEs, which is used to represent investment efficiency. A 
positive value of residuals means that the actual investment level of listed CEs is over the 
optimal one. In contrast, a negative value means that the actual investment level is under 
the expected one. This study uses the absolute value of residuals as the dependent variable 
(Abs_INVEFF) in the following regression, which can reflect the overall investment efficiency 
of listed CEs. So, the higher the absolute value of residual means the more severe the 
inefficient investment level in the company. 
(2) The proportion of independent directors and investment efficiency 
This study examines the relation between the proportion of independent directors and 
investment efficiency among listed CEs. As with the hypothesis developed previously, this 
relation might be curvilinear. The independent directors come to work efficiently when their 
proportion reaches a certain level. Hence, this study adds a quadratic term into the 
regression followed by several control variables35: 
𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                           (4.2)                                                                                               
where Independent_direrctors is measured by the proportion of independent directors to 
the total number of directors on the corporate board. Ind_square is the quadratic term of 
the independent director ratio. As discussed before, if independent directors have a linear 
                                                                
35 Chen et al. (2018) argue that applying the residuals derived from an OLS regression as the dependent 
variable in the second regression may lead to estimation bias of coefficients in the second-step regression and 
suggest using the single-stage regression that includes all the model regressors into a single regression. 
However, this method is not applicable here, as this study also tries to identify over- and under-investments. 
Hence, this study conducts the standard two-stage regression model rather than the single-stage regression 
advocated by Chen et al. (2018). 
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relationship with the investment efficiency of listed CEs, a negative coefficient of 
Independent_direrctors is expected, as the lower value of Abs_INVEFF represents higher 
investment efficiency. Correspondingly, if there is a U-shaped relation between independent 
directors and investment efficiency in listed CEs, a positive coefficient of 
Independent_direrctors is anticipated and a negative coefficient of its quadratic term 
(Ind_square). Following the previous literature (Ang et al., 2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
Stein, 2003; Li and Wang, 2010; Ke et al., 2012), several other factors that may affect 
investment efficiency are included in the regression model as control variables.  
Fees represents the management fees ratio, measured by the total management cost over 
annual income. The sign of Fees is expected to be negative, as Yanxi et al. (2015) find that 
listed firms with a higher management fees ratio have better investment efficiency in China.  
Ceo_duality is a dummy variable that equals one, if the chairman holds the position of CEO 
at the same time and 0, otherwise. Terjesen et al. (2015) suggest that, if the CEO and 
chairman are the same person, she/he has higher power and may interfere with the 
monitoring function of independent directors. On the other hand, Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) argue that the chairman of the corporate board holding the position of CEO at the 
same time can improve the efficiency of decision-making.  
Boardsize is the number of directors on the corporate board. Some literature, such as Guest 
(2009) with evidence from the UK, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) with evidence from Singapore 
and Malaysia and Conyon and Peck (1998) with evidence from European countries, suggests 
a negative relation between board size and firm performance. This supports the argument 
that poor communication and decision-making reduce the effectiveness of a large board. 
Hence, the effect of board size on investment efficiency may be negative. 
Leverage, Firmage and Firmsize are defined the same as those variables in Equation (4.1). Ke 
et al. (2012) find that an appropriate increase in debt improves investment efficiency, which 
is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis raised by Jensen (1986). Large and mature 
firms may have more experience in management and hence, are more likely to keep their 
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investment around an optimal level. Listexg is used to identify the stock exchange which 
these listed CEs come under. It equals one, if a listed CE is on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and zero, if on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Equation (4.2) controls for the fixed effects of 
industry and year as well. The specific definitions of main variables in Equation (4.2) are 
summarised in Table 4-1. 
4.3.2 Data and sample selection 
This study collected related information of all listed CEs over the main research period from 
2012 to 2016, to examine the relation between the independent director mechanism and 
investment efficiency among listed CEs. This study also collected the data in 2011, as the 
estimation of investment efficiency needs one-year lagged information. The number of 
listed CEs changes in years, which is because the nature of the firm may change according to 
the change of its ultimate owner. To ensure that all observations during the research period 
were owned by the central government, the ultimate owner of observations was checked 
manually from annual reports. The financial and corporate governance related information 
was obtained from the Chinese Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
Database. This study dropped the listed CEs in finance and real estate industries, as well as 
observations with negative equity. The listed CEs that go public in the current year have 
been excluded, as CSMAR does not provide pre-IPO related financial information and 
investment efficiency calculation needs one-year lagged data. Also, Chen et al. (2011b) 
suggest that it can avoid the potential influence of large investments following IPOs. Finally, 
after calculating the dependent variable and dropping the missing values of main variables 
employed in the main regression, this study obtained a sample of 979 firm-year 
observations by 229 unique listed CEs.  
Panel A of Table 4-2 reports the regression results of the investment model. The sign of the 
coefficient of each independent variable is consistent with that in past studies (e.g. 
Richardson, 2006; Ke et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2016). The leverage ratio and age of listed CEs 
are negatively related to the investment expenditure, and the rest factors have a positive 
relationship with it. All independent variables are jointly significant at the level of 1%, as the 
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F-value of this regression model is 24.82. The R2 is 0.353, showing this regression model has 
good explanatory power. This study also calculates the mean VIF of this model, as it is the 
indicator of the multicollinearity problem. The value of that is 1.68, indicating that there is 
no related problem in this regression model. Then, the absolute value of the residuals of this 
reliable regression model is employed as the dependent variable (Abs_INVEFF) in the main 
regression. 
Panel B of Table 4-2 presents the distribution of over- and under-investment firms in years. 
During this 5-year research period from 2012 to 2016, 38.4% listed CEs have excess 
investment issues and the investment of 61.6% listed CEs is lower than the optimal 
investment size. This intuitive result is consistent with Chen et al. (2011a), who use a 
worldwide sample of private firms and Chen and Xie (2011), with a sample of Chinese listed 
firms, finding that under-investment is a more prevalent issue in capital markets. The 
proportion of over-investment firms floats in a small range of around 38%. The highest 
proportion of over-investment firms was 40.6% in 2015 and the lowest at 34.8%, in 2016. 
Overall, the total number of listed CEs decreased in this research period, because of the 
privatisation of small SOEs and corporatisation of larger ones, which has been a crucial part 
of the SOE reform promoted by the Chinese government in the last twenty years (Cao et al., 
1999; Lin and Zhu, 2001; Wang et al., 2004). 
Panel C of Table 4-2 displays the descriptive statistics for the measures of investment 
efficiency, independent directors and the main control variables used in the analysis. Whilst 
over-investment firms do not occupy the majority of the listed CEs, the investment 
inefficiency (Over_INVEFF) among them is severer than that in the under-investment group. 
Specifically, the actual investment level in the over-investment group is, on average, 0.0313 
over the optimal investment level, while that in the under-investment group (Under_INVEFF) 
is, on average, 0.0195 below this level. The average proportion of independent directors on 
the corporate board is 37.1%, which is similar to the policy regulated by CSRC that at least 
one-third board members on the corporate board should be independent. However, some 
listed CEs do not meet this requirement, with the minimum proportion of independent 
directors on the board being 23.1%. On average, the listed CEs have ten members on the 
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corporate board and the majority of them has a different person in the role of the chairman 
and CEO. For the financial related control variables, the average listed CE has 7.7% of total 
revenue used to cover the management fees and a leverage ratio of 53%, measured by total 
debt over total assets. The average listing years of listed CEs is 14. The age of the youngest 
listed CE is two years, as one-year lagged information is required to calculate the dependent 
variable, whilst the oldest listed CE has been in the capital market for 24 years. The firm size 
varies from 0.31 to 2405.38 billion RMB and Listexg shows that around 70% of the listed CEs 
are with the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
Table 4-3 provides Pearson correlations among the independent variable and control 
variables employed, which is an intuitive check for multicollinearity. In Table 4-3, the 
correlation coefficients among all the main variables do not have an absolute value higher 
than 0.7, which could indicate that the multicollinearity problem is a significant issue. Hence, 
there is no considerable multicollinearity interference that may affect the main regression.  
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4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 The impact of independent directors on investment efficiency 
Table 4-4 shows the regression results testing the hypotheses developed before. Column (1) 
reports those of the model involving the independent director ratio to examine the 
potential linear relationship between independent directors and overall investment 
efficiency. The coefficient of Independent_directors in Column (1) does not provide 
significant evidence that independent directors have a linear relationship with the overall 
investment efficiency of listed CEs.  
Next, the potential non-linear relationship between independent directors and investment 
efficiency is examined, by adding the quadratic term of the independent director ratio into 
the main regression model, with the empirical results being shown in Column (2). The model 
including the quadric term of the independent director ratio provides a higher R2, which 
shows better power for explaining the relation between independent directors and 
investment efficiency. The positive coefficient of Independent_directors in Column (2) is 
significant at the 5% level and the coefficient of Ind_square is significant at the 1% level, 
which indicates a curvilinear relationship between independent directors and investment 
efficiency. Specifically, the relation between the proportion of independent directors and 
investment efficiency is a U-shape, as the lower value of Abs_INVEFF means higher 
investment efficiency. In other words, the independent directors begin to play a positive 
role when their proportion on the corporate board exceeds the critical mass point. The 
turning point (critical mass) of the proportion of independent directors in Column (2) is 
0.473 (0.292/ (-(-0.309) ×2)). It suggests that if the listed CEs have met the rule of 
independent directors, as regulated by the Chinese government and then, add more such 
directors to the corporate board, this will improve the investment efficiency of the firm. 
However, this action could also lead to a negative effect on investment efficiency, if the 




For the control variables36, the coefficient of Ceo_duality in Column (2) is significantly 
negatively related to overall investment efficiency, which means the chairman of the 
corporate board taking the position of CEO at the same time can improve the investment 
efficiency of listed CEs. This supports the result documented by Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
that CEO duality leads to better and faster decisions, which then improves firm performance. 
The negative coefficient of Firmsize is significant at the 10% level, which means that the 
large listed CEs face fewer investment inefficiency issues than the small ones. Firmage in the 
main regression model provides significant evidence that mature firms perform better in 
controlling firm investments at an optimal level than do young firms, as indicated by the 
coefficient of Firmage being negative and significant at the level of 10%. This may be 
because the mature firms have more management experience. Chen et al. (2011b) contend 
that firms with longer listing years are more likely to be in the mature or declining stage of 
the business cycle, which leads to reduced investment activities. This elicits the potential 
alternative explanation that it is easier for mature firms to avoid excess investments, as they 
are not eager to expand the business compared with young firms that are in the growth 
stage. 
4.4.2 Sensitivity tests 
This subsection conducts three sensitivity tests related to the main regression. All listed CEs 
are perceived as having investment inefficiency problem, since all the regression residuals in 
Equation (4.1) are different from zero. However, the residual value of some listed CEs is very 
close to 0 (i.e. the maximum value of the negative residuals is -0.00000618). It means that, in 
fact, the difference between actual and expected investment is negligible. In other words, 
such a kind of listed CEs can be regarded as those without significant investment inefficiency 
problems. Following Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011a), this study sorts the 
observations into deciles for positive and negative residual groups separately. Next, this 
study drops the observations belonging to the decile that is closest to 0 (in both positive and 
negative residual groups), as these can be perceived as investment efficient firms. Then, the 
                                                                
36 As listed CEs suffer significant influence from the central enterprises, the potential effect of affiliated 
directors from the central enterprise or its affiliations on investment efficiency is controlled for. After doing so, 
a similar empirical result with that of the main regression in this study is obtained. 
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main regression with the remaining observations that are considered to have significant 
investment inefficiency problems is repeated.  
Second, this study utilises another investment model to robustly check the relationship 
between the independent director ratio and overall investment efficiency. This is a function 
of growth opportunities measured by annual revenue growth rate (RevGrowth). A dummy 
variable (NEG) is added into the regression, as Chen et al. (2011a) and Cutillas Gomariz and 
Sánchez Ballesta (2014) suggest that a positive or negative increase in revenue may have 
different effects on investments. The following regression specification derives the 
alternative optimal investment estimation: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (4.3) 
where the investment expenditure spent in year 𝑖 (INV) follows the same definition used in 
Equation (4.1). All independent variables take a one-year lagged term. The indicator dummy 
variable (NEG) equals 1 when the revenue growth is negative and 0, otherwise. Following 
Chen et al. (2011a), the alternative investment efficiency model is estimated cross-
sectionally with at least five observations in each industry by year. The absolute value of 
residuals derived from Equation (4.3) is the new investment efficiency. Then the main 
regression with new investment efficiency is repeated. 
Third, the piecewise linear regression is applied to detect the presence or not of a 
curvilinear relation between independent directors and investment efficiency. Follow Byrd 
and Hickman (1992), this study separates the proportion of independent directors into two 
piecewise variables based on the turning point (0.473) in the main regression. 
Independent_directors (under 0.473) equals the fraction of independent directors if it is 
under 0.473, and otherwise, it is 0.473. Independent_directors (above 0.473) equals 0 if it is 
under 0.473 and equals the fraction of independent directors minus 0.473 if it is over this 
figure. The segmented regression can prove the non-linear relation between independent 
directors and investment efficiency if Independent_directors (under 0.473) provides a 
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significant positive coefficient and Independent_directors (above 0.473) delivers a significant 
negative one. 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4-5 tabulate the results of these three robust tests. The first two 
columns provide consistent regression results with those obtained by the main regression 
specification. No matter the change of alternative estimation or the investment efficiency 
model, the U-shaped relation between independent directors and investment efficiency is 
significant at least at the 10% level. In Column (3), as expected, the coefficient of 
Independent_directors (under 0.473) is positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating a 
negative effect of adding more independent directors to the corporate board, but only if the 
new proportion of these directors does not exceed the critical mass point (0.473). While the 
significant negative coefficient of Independent_directors (above 0.473) provides evidence 
that the independent directors become valid on improving the overall investment efficiency 




4.4.3 Potential endogeneity 
There may be endogeneity problems between independent directors and investment 
efficiency, as the firm’s investment efficiency can affect both the incentive of someone 
joining the board as an independent director and the motivation of adding more such 
directors to the corporate board. In order to address such a potential endogeneity problem 
due to causality, first the contemporary independent variables are replaced with one-year 
lagged ones. This is because the function of independent directors needs time to reflect on 
investment efficiency. Column (1) of Table 4-6 shows the empirical result with the one-year 
lagged independent director ratio and the quadratic term of the lagged independent 
director ratio. The results provide a consistent conclusion with that of the main regression. 
That is, the evidence shows that the independent director ratio has a quadratic relation with 
overall investment efficiency. 
The alternative method is employing the instrument variables (IVs). The appropriate IVs 
must be exogenous and satisfy the conditions of instrument exogeneity and instrument 
relevance (Liu et al., 2014). Tan et al. (2007) and Liao et al. (2009) document that around 40% 
of independent directors in China are academics from the universities and most of them 
own the title of professor. Hence, the number of high education institutions (HEIs) in the 
same province with listed CEs and the number of employees in these HEIs with a senior 
professional title37 can affect the proportion of independent directors on the corporate 
board. That is, if a province has richer human resources, the listed CEs in that province will 
find it much easier to identify a qualified person to be the independent director on their 
corporate board. In addition, CSRC regulates that one of the independent directors must 
have an accounting background, so the number of accounting firms in the province where 
the listed CEs are will affect the proportion of such directors on the corporate board. Whilst 
these three factors have a close relation with independent directors on the corporate board, 
they do not have direct effects on the investment efficiency of any specific listed CE. 
Furthermore, HEIs may have a non-linear relationship with the independent director ratio of 
listed CEs. The quadratic term HEIs is put into the first stage estimation as well. Hence, these 
                                                                




four factors are utilised as instruments to estimate the independent variables in the main 
regression specification. HEIs is the number of HEIs in the same province as listed CEs, 
measured by the natural log of the number of HEIs in that province, whilst HEIs_square is 
the quadratic term of HEIs. Senior is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the number of 
people in the HEIs having a senior professional title in that province is above the national 
level, and 0, otherwise.38 Account is an indicator variable as well, which equals 1, if the 
province has more than three branches of the big-12 accounting firms39 and 0, otherwise. As 
with the main regression model, the standard errors are clustered by firm in each step of 
the estimations, which deals with both the heteroscedasticity and intra-group correlation 
problems. In addition, the number of excluded IVs exceeds the number of endogenous 
variables (the number of independent variables in this case), which are said to be over 
identified by the order condition for identification. In such a case of overidentification, 
Baum et al. (2007) suggest that IV-GMM (generalised method of moments) cluster-robust 
estimates will be more efficient than 2SLS (two-stage least squares) estimates and hence, 
the former method is adopted.  
Hansen’s J instrument test is conducted to examine whether these IVs (HEIs, HEIs_square, 
Senior, and Account) meet the exogeneity requirement. The value of the χ² statistic is 0.075, 
which is insignificant at the 10% level. In this case, the null hypothesis that the IVs are not 
correlated with regression errors cannot be rejected. Then, this study examines the 
relevance of these IVs through weak-instrument-robust inference. The values of χ² in the 
Anderson-Rubin Wald and Stock-Wright LM tests are 8.84 and 16.80, respectively. The result 
of these two tests leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
excluded IVs are jointly equal to zero, at least at the significant level of 10%. This confirms 
the sufficient correlation of the excluded IVs with the independent variables in the main 
regression model. In Table 4-6, Column (2) contains the first stage regression results of 
Independent_directors and Column (3), those of Ind_square, whilst Column (4) reports the 
                                                                
38 Data relating to HEIs and Senior is disclosed by the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China. 
As the province level data only started in 2013, the data for HEIs and Senior in 2012 is replaced with the 
relevant data for 2013. 
39 Big-12 accounting firms include the four worldwide largest accounting firms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PwC) 
and the eight local largest accounting firms (Dahua, Daxin, Lixin, Tianjian, Tianzhiguoji, Ruihua, 
Xinyongzhonghe, and Zhitong). The number of branches of these big accounting firms was manually collected 
from the website of the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  
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findings of the second stage of the GMM estimation. The positive coefficient of 
Independent_directors and the negative one of Ind_square are significant at the level of 5%. 
Overall, the IVs approach provides a consistent result with the finding in the main regression 
that the independent directors have a U-shaped relationship with overall investment 
efficiency in listed CEs. 
4.4.4 The relation between independent directors and investment efficiency for listed CEs vs. 
listed non-CEs 
Despite a U-shaped relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency 
among listed CEs having been elicited, whether the relation between these two factors is 
generalised among all Chinese listed firm remains uncertain. In order to avoid the potential 
effects from the special characteristics of listed non-CEs, this study conducts the PSM 
(propensity score matching) method. By so doing, it is possible to find out the listed non-CEs 
with similar firm characteristics to listed CEs and to identify whether the U-shaped relation 
between independent directors and investment efficiency is a unique phenomenon in listed 
CEs. The logit treatment model includes the independent director ratio and the control 
variables in the main regression specification, which ensures that the matched listed non-
CEs have similar firm characteristics as listed CEs. The matching method is the simple 
nearest-neighbour matching with one neighbour, according to the estimated propensity 
score. Finally, all 979 listed CEs get a one-to-one matched listed non-CE. 
Panel A of Table 4-7 shows the mean of the main variables in matched listed non-CE and CE 
groups, with the difference of the means in these two groups being examined by a T-test. 
There is no significant difference of basic firm characteristics between the matched listed 
non-CEs and CEs, but the difference in investment efficiency of these two kinds of listed 
firms is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the listed non-CEs did not perform well 
on investment efficiency as the listed CEs did during the study period.  
The main regressions are repeated in the matched listed non-CE group. This study finds a 
similar result for the listed CE group, whereby the proportion of independent directors does 
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not have a linear relationship with investment efficiency, as the coefficient of the 
independent director ratio is not significant at least at the level of 10%. Also, the empirical 
result displayed in Column (2), Panel B, shows that neither of coefficients of 
Independent_directors and Ind_square is significantly different from zero, which indicates 
that there is no significant quadratic relation between independent directors and 
investment efficiency in listed non-CEs that have similar firm characteristics as listed CEs. 
Overall, the independent directors do not affect investment efficiency among matched 
listed non-CEs.  
Having made this comparison, this study concludes that the U-shaped relation between 
independent directors and investment efficiency is a unique phenomenon in listed CEs. 
Hence, listed CEs should have more than 47.3% independent directors on the corporate 





4.5 Extended tests 
As the main regression shows, the proportion of independent directors has a significant U-
shaped relation with the overall investment efficiency of listed CEs. This section further 
investigates the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency in 
over- and under-investment groups, separately. Then, this section conducts additional tests 
about other factors of independent directors that may influence investment efficiency. Last, 
this section examines the effect of extra control from the ultimate owner on the 
relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency. 
4.5.1 The effect of independent directors on over- and under-investments 
The investment inefficiency problem of firms can be further classified into two kinds of 
scenarios: excess and insufficient investment. Both bring adverse effects to the 
development of firms. As the reasons leading to over- or under-investment are different, 
Biddle et al. (2009), Chen and Xie (2011), Ke et al. (2012), and Cutillas Gomariz and Sánchez 
Ballesta (2014) investigate the investment efficiency by separating investment inefficiency 
into these two groups. Chen and Xie (2011) find the network centrality of independent 
directors is positively related to investment efficiency in both over- and under-investment 
groups. They report that the higher network centrality of independent directors, not only 
reduces excess investments, for it also mitigates insufficient investment. That is, this 
centrality can improve the overall investment efficiency of listed firms. Hence, in this study, 
the effect of independent directors on these two kinds of investment inefficiency in listed 
CEs is investigated. In accordance with the above discussion about the effect of independent 
directors on the overall investment efficiency, this study examines the potential linear and 
non-linear relationship for each group as well.  
Table 4-8 displays the effect of independent directors on these two kinds of investment 
inefficiency. This study splits all listed CEs into over- or under-investment groups, according 
to their positive or negative residuals derived from the investment efficiency model 
(Equation (4.1)). Over_INVEFF is the dependent variable in the over-investment group, 
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showing the level of over-investment represented by the positive residuals from Equation 
(4.1), whilst Under_Abs_INVEFF is measured by the absolute value of negative residuals 
from the investment efficiency model, representing under-investment inefficiency. Columns 
(1) and (2) show the empirical results in the over-investment group. For listed CEs with over-
investment issues, the proportion of independent directors has a U-shaped relation with 
investment efficiency, which is consistent with the finding in the main regression. This is 
indicated by the insignificant coefficient of Independent_directors in Column (1) and the 
significant ones of Independent_directors and Ind_square in Column (2). Also, the turning 
point in the over-investment group is 0.466, which is similar to that in the full sample. It 
implies that independent directors start to play a decisive role in reducing excess 
investments when more than 46.6% of directors on the corporate board are independent. 
Columns (3) and (4) report the empirical result in the under-investment group. The 
coefficient of Independent_directors and Ind_square is not significant in this group. This 
shows that a sufficient proportion of independent directors has a more significant positive 
function of monitoring and an advisory role in reducing excess investments rather than 
mitigating insufficient ones. 
For the control variables in these two groups, it emerges that larger listed CEs have better 
investment efficiency in both the over- and under-investment groups, as the negative 
coefficient of Firmsize in all related models is significant at the level of 10%. This is 
consistent with the finding in the main regression. In addition, in the main regression, it is 
found that mature listed CEs have more experience in controlling their investments at the 
optimal level. The result relating to Firmage in Table 4-8 provides further evidence that 
mature listed CEs perform better in reducing excess investments, rather than mitigating 
insufficient investment, as the coefficient of Firmage is only significant in the over-
investment group. Furthermore, in the main regression, it was elicited that the chairman of 
the corporate board concurrently holding the position of CEO is positively related to 
investment efficiency. The same evidence is found in the under-investment group, as the 
negative coefficient of Ceo_duality in Column (4) is significant at the level of 10%. It means 
that the chairman of the board and CEO being the same person can mitigate insufficient 
investments of listed CEs caused by lesser efficiency in board decision-making.  
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4.5.2 Does the performance of independent directors affect investment efficiency? 
The main regression has proven that more independent directors on the corporate board 
lead to better investment efficiency. However, how they perform and whether their 
performance affects investment efficiency need more discussion. The performance of 
independent directors can be universally reflected by their attendance of board meetings 
(Harris and Shimizu, 2004). The main duty of the board of the directors is attending the 
board meetings and dealing with the major corporate strategies. In general, a Chinese listed 
firm has an average of eight board meetings per annum (Liao et al., 2009). A relatively good 
attendance record can guarantee independent directors gain sufficient financial and 
operating information about the firm they serve. Based on a better understanding of this 
essential information, the independent directors can fulfil their governance responsibilities. 
However, if they cannot attend the board meeting in person and delegate a representative 
to attend instead, access to such essential information may be blocked. Chou et al. (2013) 
document that the authorised board meeting attendance harms firm performance. Hence, 
the positive function of independent directors decreases in the presence of delegated 
representatives. Accordingly, this study proposes that the representative of independent 
directors weakens the effect of the latter on investment efficiency.  
Even though it is a common phenomenon that independent directors appoint a 
representative to attend the board meetings, it is not a universal phenomenon in all listed 
firms. In this study, over half of the focal listed CEs were found not to have the presence of 
the representatives of independent directors. Moreover, various reasons may lead to the 
behaviour of independent directors designating a representative. Hence, this study chooses 
the Heckman selection model to avoid estimation bias and to investigate the determinants 
of the presence of the proxy. The first step is to test the reasons that may lead to the 
delegating behaviour of independent directors. Then, this study examines the relationship 
between the frequency of delegating a proxy and investment efficiency. The model is 
estimated by the maximum likelihood estimator and the selection bias is examined by Wald 
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where Proxy1 in Equation (4.4) is the indicator variable for the presence of a proxy. It equals 
1, if the representative of independent directors exists, and 0, otherwise. Ind_number is the 
number of independent directors on the corporate board. Boardsize is the total number of 
board members. Workplace, a dummy variable, shows whether independent directors have 
the same base with the firm they serve. This variable is measured to ascertain whether an 
independent director with an accounting background is in the same place as the listed firm. 
It equals 1, if at least one of the independent directors with an accounting background is in 
the same place as the firm they serve, and 0, otherwise. Payment is the average annual 
allowance for independent directors on the corporate board. The fixed effects of industry 
and year are controlled for at this step as well. According to the literature, more 
independent directors on the corporate board, a large board, different workplace and high 
payment may lead to a high probability of the presence of the representative of 
independent directors. 
The independent variable (Proxy) in Equation (4.5) is an average figure of independent 
directors on the corporate board. It is measured by the number of times the independent 
directors delegated others to attend board meetings over the number they should have 
participated in during a year. For this part, the same control variables as for the main 
regression specification (Equation (4.2)) are applied as well as the controls for the industry 
and year fixed effects. 
Column (1) of Table 4-9 displays the probit results of the first-stage of the Heckman 
selection model using the full sample. As expected, the number of independent directors 
has a significant positive relationship with the presence of the representatives of 
independent directors. When there are more independent directors on the corporate board, 
 
103 
there may be a higher probability that they will delegate a representative to attend the 
board meetings. This is because they may be of the viewing that it does not matter whether 
he or she attends the board meeting in person, as there are many independent directors on 
the corporate board already. The positive coefficient of Boardsize is close to the significant 
marginal level, thus showing a larger corporate board leads to a higher probability of the 
presence of representatives of the independent directors.  Lin et al. (2013) provide support 
for the view that more people on the corporate board leads to lower attendance of board 
meetings. In addition, the payment of independent directors has a significant relationship 
with the presence of representatives of independent directors as well. The listed firms 
generally offer considerable remuneration to attract a person with a good social reputation, 
or rich experience, to be their independent directors. The average payment can indicate 
how professional and popular these directors are. As an independent director can serve 
more than one firm at the same time, the listed firm may share them with other firms. The 
“overboarded” directors result in weak corporate governance (Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Lei and Deng, 2014; Reguera-Alvarado and Bravo, 2017), 
through low board meeting attendance (Lin et al., 2013). Also, the annual allowance of 
independent directors in China is fixed instead of performance-related (Clarke, 2006). Tan et 
al. (2007) argue that this may bring adverse effects on the working motivation for 
independent directors. Last, Workplace does not provide significant effects on the presence 
of the representative of independent directors. 
For the full sample, the Wald test proves the selection bias, where the hypothesis (rho=0) is 
rejected at the 10% level (P-value is 0.069). Column (2) reports the regression of second-
stage analysis for the full sample. The coefficient of Proxy is 0.053, which is significant at the 
5% level. It is consistent with the prediction that the presence of the proxy weakens the 
investment efficiency of listed CEs. Also, it supports the result of the study taken by Lin et al. 
(2013) that higher board attendance can improve the performance of the firm.  
The Heckman selection model is conducted for over- and under-investment groups, 
respectively, as well. Table 4-9, from Column (3) to (6) reports the regression results. The 
effect in the over-investment group is significant at the 10% level, which means 
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independent directors could not fulfil their positive function of reducing excessive 
investment if they designated a proxy to attend the board meetings frequently. In addition, 
the P-value of the Wald test in the over-investment group is 0.023, indicating that there is 
selection bias issue if this study directly tests the relationship between board meeting 
attendance and investment efficiency. However, for the under-investment group, the P-
value of the Wald test outcome means that the hypothesis (rho=0) cannot be rejected. This 
implies that there is no selection bias issue in the under-investment group. Also, the 
coefficient of Proxy is significant at the 10% level as well, which provides evidence that the 
presence of the representative of independent directors affects the investment efficiency of 
listed CEs that have under-investment issues. 
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4.5.3 Do the characteristics of independent directors affect investment efficiency? 
Not only does the number of independent directors on the board influence investment 
efficiency, for their characteristics, such as gender and age, may impact on investment 
efficiency as well. That is, as Reguera-Alvarado and Bravo (2017) suggest, certain 
characteristics relating to the independent directors can influence their behaviours. Hence, 
this subsection investigates the effects of gender and age diversity on investment efficiency 
in listed CEs, respectively. 
Previous literature has found that women on the board have a positive function on financial 
decision-making (i.e. acquisitions and debt issuing), firm performance, voluntary corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and shareholder value maximisation. This is because 
they are relatively not overconfident and have better performance regarding the monitoring 
role than their male counterparts (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Levi 
et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014; Nekhili et al., 2017). Hence, this study predicts that the gender 
diversity of independent directors may bring about a positive effect on investment 
efficiency as well.  
Kim and Lim (2010) argue that age can be a proxy for either the activity level or the 
experience of directors. Younger directors are more active in fulfiling their duties, while 
elder ones are more experienced in dealing with all kinds of affairs in firms (Kim and Lim, 
2010; Tuggle et al., 2010). Moreover, Ali et al. (2013) discuss how age diversity may bring 
positive effects, whereby a firm can have wiser strategic decision-making by taking 
advantages of both younger and older directors. Meanwhile, age diversity may also bring 
negative effects, since there may be more dissatisfaction and conflict among directors of 
different ages. Hence, when independent directors vary in age (age diversity), it may have 
either a positive or negative association with investment efficiency. The regression 
employed to examine the effect of characteristics diversity of independent directors on 
investment efficiency is specified below: 
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𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                       (4.6)                                                                                                                                               
where Gender evaluates the proportion of female independent directors on the corporate 
board, which is measured by the number of female independent directors over their total 
number on the corporate board. Age is measured by the standard deviation of the age of 
independent directors on the board scaled by their mean age (Ali et al., 2013). For this 
regression, the same collection of control variables as with the main regression specification 
(Equation (4.2)) is applied as well as controlling for fixed effects of industry and year. This 
study also examines the impact between independent directors’ characteristic diversity and 
investment efficiency under different investment inefficiency groups. 
The test results of how the gender diversity of independent directors affects investment 
efficiency in listed CEs in the full sample as well as the over- and under-investment groups 
are tabulated in Table 4-10 from Columns (1) to (3), respectively. Moreover, the results for 
the effect of the age diversity of independent directors on investment efficiency are shown 
in Columns (4) to (6), respectively.  
Whilst Liu et al. (2014) find that having female directors on the board improves firm 
performance through the executive role (female executive directors) rather than the 
monitoring one (female independent directors), this study provides evidence that female 
independent directors can significantly improve investment efficiency, especially in the 
over-investment group. This implies that female independent directors enhance the quality 
of investment efficiency, in particular, in over-investment scenarios. Specifically, in Column 
(1), the coefficient of Gender (-0.0103) indicates a significant positive relationship between 
the fraction of female independent directors and investment efficiency at the 10% level, 
which means that they can improve the investment efficiency. The over-investment group 
provides more substantial evidence of this, as the coefficient of female director ratio is 
significant at the 1% level; however, no significant evidence is found for the under-
investment group.  
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The coefficient of Age is only significant in the over-investment group at the 10% level. This 
suggests that the age diversity of independent directors helps reduce excess investments, 
by taking advantage of advanced professional knowledge and a high activity level from 
younger independent directors and the valuable experience from the older ones. However, 
there is no significant evidence in the full sample and the under-investment group. 
4.5.4 Extra control by the ultimate owner and the effect of independent directors on 
investment efficiency 
The control power of the ultimate owner cannot be neglected, especially for listed CEs. As 
previously explained, the central government is the ultimate owner of listed CEs and 
authorises the management right to the central enterprises, which generally are the parent 
firm of listed CEs. In fact, as the ultimate owner, the central government and the central 
enterprises have a powerful influence over the major decision-making of listed CEs, no 
matter the size of the percentage of the equity owned by them. In general, the voting rights 
of the central government equal its cashflow rights. However, when these rights exceed the 
cash-flow rights held by the central government, the central enterprises exercise extra 
control on listed CEs. Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Shleifer et al. (1996), and Hart et al. (1997)  
argue that SOEs deviate from economic efficiency owing to the pursuit of political objectives 
by or lesser incentive for government agents. When the central enterprises have extra 
control over listed CEs, they are more likely to transfer resources from the latter to the 
parent firm or other affiliations in the group (Claessens et al., 2002), so that they can meet 
the political and financial targets set up by the superior governmental departments. In order 
to test whether this extra control from the central enterprises affects the relationship 
between independent directors and the investment efficiency of listed CEs, the main 
regression is repeated in groups, that is, with or without extra control. Moreover, this study 
extends the test to the groups of over- and under-investment. If the separation of voting 
and cash-flow rights from the central government is above 1, then this listed CE is classified 
into the group that has extra control from the central enterprises, whilst if the cash-flow 
rights equal the voting rights, then it is in the group without extra control. 
 
108 
Panel A of Table 4-11 reports the number and percentage of listed CEs experiencing extra 
control from the central enterprises in years and different investment inefficiency groups. 
Separating control and ownership is the common way that the central enterprises exercise 
excess control on their listed subsidiaries, with the proportion of listed CEs having this extra 
control being around 40%. Comparing the fraction of listed CEs with extra control in over- 
and under-investment groups, it is found that more listed CEs with over-investment issues 
have extra control from the central enterprises. When broken down into years, there is no 
significant difference among listed CEs of extra control regarding the number and 
percentage from 2012 to 2016. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Panel B, Table 4-11, show the regression results of the effect of 
excess control by the central enterprises on the full sample. Comparing the regression 
results with or without this extra control, it can be seen that, extra control from the central 
enterprises blocks the function of independent directors, as there is no significant relation 
between independent directors and investment efficiency in the extra control group, no 
matter whether or not these directors hold the majority of seats on the corporate board. 
However, the result for the group without extra control is a consistent result with that for 
the main regression. This result also supports the negative effect of the separation of voting 
and cash-flow rights (extra control through the ownership structure), which is widely 
considered as being proxy for the potential expropriation of minority shareholders 
(Claessens et al., 2000). Columns (3) and (4) in Panel B, Table 4-11, show the regression 
results for the effect of excess control from the central enterprises on the over-investment 
group. When the listed CE is subject to extra control, the independent director system 
becomes a non-effective mechanism for reducing excess investments, as there is no 
significant relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency. For the 
group without extra control, the result is consistent with the finding in the main regression, 
which provides a U-shaped relation between independent directors and investment 
efficiency as well. Columns (5) and (6) in Panel B, Table 4-11, show the regression results of 
the effect of excess control by the central enterprises in the under-investment group. In the 
previous section, there is no relation between independent directors and investment 
efficiency in listed CEs with insufficient investment issues. At the same time, no significant 




This study has shown evidence on the effect of the independent director system on 
investment efficiency in a sample of non-financial A-share listed CEs from 2012 to 2016. A U-
shaped relation has been found between independent directors and investment efficiency 
in listed CEs. This study also reports that it is a unique phenomenon for listed CEs, as no 
significant evidence has been found in listed non-CEs with similar characteristics to listed 
CEs. Having more independent directors on the board brings a negative effect on 
investment efficiency, especially when their proportion does not reach the critical mass 
point (47.3%). This is because firstly adding new faces to the corporate board may lead to a 
passive reaction from the existing executive directors and the affiliated directors from the 
controlling shareholder, as steward theory argues that, in this situation, the existing 
members on the corporate board think that they are not be trusted. Secondly, the voice of 
the independent director team is still too weak to against it. Overall, in this situation, the 
adverse effect of adding more independent directors on the corporate board exceeds the 
benefit of that, so investment efficiency is weakened correspondingly. However, when the 
proportion of independent directors exceeds the critical mass (47.3%), having more on the 
corporate board starts to play the positive role of improving the investment efficiency of 
listed CEs. For now, the independent director team is strong enough to diminish the other 
voices on the corporate board.  
In addition, this study extends the main regression to over- and under-investment groups. It 
has been elicited that there is a U-shaped relationship between independent directors and 
investment efficiency in listed CEs with over-investment issues, but no significant evidence 
has been found for those with insufficient investment issues. This means that the 
independent directors play a more substantial role in reducing excess investments in listed 
CEs. Furthermore, it has emerged that a high frequency of independent directors delegating 
a representative to attend the board meetings harms firm investment efficiency in all listed 
CEs. Moreover, the gender diversity of the independent director team has a positive relation 
with investment efficiency in the full sample and the over-investment group. In contrast, the 
age diversity of independent directors is only significantly positively related to investment 
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efficiency in over-investment firms. Extra control by the central enterprises has a negative 
effect on the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency. Overall, 
this study concludes that, the independent director system can improve the investment 
efficiency of listed CEs, especially in terms of mitigating the over-investment issue, when 
there are enough such directors on the corporate board. 
The findings of this study add new evidence to the literature on investment, by examining 
whether the independent director system is able to be an effective mechanism for avoiding 
deviation from the optimal investment level of listed firms. Also, the outcomes have shown 
that independent directors can improve investment efficiency when their proportion 
exceeds the critical mass. The focus has been on listed CEs due to their particularity (strong 
connection with the central government) and importance (monopoly and important 
industries). It is suggested that it is necessary for listed CEs to have an efficient corporate 
governance mechanism in relation to investment efficiency, thereby ensuring their healthy 
and rapid development. The findings also have political implications for the regulator. As 
noted, the empirical results report a turning point of the independent director ratio (0.473) 
that is higher than the current mandatory proportion of independent directors (one-third). 
This is evidence that should be considered by the government for improving the 
independent director system, such as regulating that at least half of the directors on the 
corporate board should be independent for listed CEs. The study findings, overall, have 
enhanced the understanding of the independent director system and investment efficiency 





Table 4-1 Summary of variable definitions 
 








 Independent_directors  The ratio of independent directors to the total number of 
directors on the board. 
 Ind_square  The quadratic term of the proportion of independent directors 
on the corporate board. 
Control variables 
 Fees  Management fees scaled by annual income 
 Ceo_duality  A dummy variable that equals 1, if the CEO also holds the 
position of the chairman of the board and 0, otherwise. 
 Boardsize  Total number of directors on the corporate board. 
 Leverage  The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 Firmsize  The natural logarithm of total assets. 
 Firmage  Number of years since the listed CE went on public. 
 Listexg  An indicator variable that equals 1, if the listed CE is on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and 0, if on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
This table shows the definition of the variables employed in the main regression. The data on governance and 




Table 4-2 Related descriptive statistics  
Panel A: regression result of the investment model  
 Dependent variable (INVt) 
VARIABLES (1) 
    

















Industry FE YES 
Year FE YES 
Observations 979 







Panel B: Summary statistics of over- and under-investment groups in years  
Year   2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total(N) 
Over-investment group 80 77 78 76 65 376 
% of sample firms (39.4%) (37.6%) (39.6%) (40.6%) (34.8%) (38.4%) 
Under-investment group 123 128 119 111 122 603 
% of sample firms (60.6%) (62.4%) (60.4%) (59.4%) (65.2%) (61.6%) 




Panel C: Descriptive statistics of variables    
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Median Max 
Abs_INVEFF 979 0.0240 0.0312 0.00000618 0.0162 0.500 
Over_INVEFF 376 0.0313 0.0435 0.000121 0.0198 0.500 
Under_INVEFF 603 -0.0195 0.0188 -0.178 -0.0153 -0.00000618 
Independent_directors 979 0.371 0.0606 0.231 0.333 0.714 
Fees 979 0.0772 0.0616 0.00223 0.0667 0.612 
Ceo_duality 979 0.0562 0.230 0 0 1 
Boardsize 979 9.377 1.942 4 9 16 
Leverage 979 0.531 0.196 0.0587 0.542 0.979 
Firmage 979 14.347 4.482 2 15 24 
Firmsize (billion/ RMB) 979 54.098 205.385 0.307 8.291 2405.38 
Listexg 979 0.696 0.460 0 1 1 
Panel A reports the regression results of the investment model, which are used to calculate the investment 
efficiency of listed CEs. INV is the investment expenditure in the year, which is measured by the difference 
between the cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets as well as the cash 
receipts from selling those assets, scaled by the beginning total assets. Investment opportunities is represented 
by Tobin’s Q, which is calculated from the market value of equity and net debt over total assets. Leverage is 
measured by total debt over total assets. CF is the net operating cash flow from the cash flow statement scaled 
by the beginning total assets. Firmage is the number of years that the firm is publicly listed on the stock 
market. Firmsize is the natural logarithm of total assets. Return is the annual individual stock return with cash 
bonus. 
The robust standard error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel B reports statistics on over- and under-investment firm in years.  
Panel C reports statistics of the main variables used in the study. Over_INVEFF and Under_INVEFF are the 
signed residual values of the over- and under-investment groups, respectively. For the specific definitions of 





Table 4-3 Correlation matrix 
         
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Independent_directors 1        
2 Fees 0.048 1       
3 Ceo_duality 0.167*** -0.035 1      
4 Boardsize -0.316*** -0.202*** -0.114*** 1     
5 Leverage -0.003 -0.212*** 0.006 0.194*** 1    
6 Firmsize 0.131*** -0.260*** -0.078** 0.312*** 0.421*** 1   
7 Firmage -0.144*** 0.065** 0.003 -0.124*** -0.021 -0.212*** 1  
8 Listexg -0.051 0.030 -0.051 0.171*** 0.060* 0.163*** -0.391*** 1 
  N 979               
Table 4-3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix among the independent variable and control variables employed in the study. The description of variables refers to Table 
4-1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4-4 The effect of the independent director ratio on overall investment efficiency 
 
  Dependent variable (Abs_INVEFF) 
 Linear relationship   Non-linear relationship 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) 
       
Independent_directors 0.021  0.292*** 
 (0.018)  (0.109) 
Ind_square   -0.309*** 
   (0.113) 
Fees -0.019  -0.021 
 (0.023)  (0.023) 
Ceo_duality -0.006*  -0.005* 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Boardsize 0.000339  0.000405 
 (0.000737)  (0.000730) 
Leverage -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.008)  (0.008) 
Firmsize -0.002*  -0.002* 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Firmage -0.000581*  -0.000577* 
 (0.000325)  (0.000322) 
Listexg 0.003  0.003 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant 0.033**  -0.024 
 (0.013)  (0.027) 
    
Industry FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Observations 979  979 
Adjusted R-squared 0.011  0.014 
Cluster Firm   Firm 
The table reports OLS regression results with fixed effects from industry and year. 
For the specific description of the variables, please refer to Table 4-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm.  
The robust standard error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. 





Table 4-5 Sensitivity tests 
 
  Dependent variable (Abs_INVEFF) 
 
Alternative 
 INVEFF measure   
Alternative 
 INVEFF model   
Piecewise 
 linear regression 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3) 
            
Independent_directors 0.294***  0.295*   
 (0.113)  (0.166)   
Ind_square -0.318***  -0.353**   
 (0.116)  (0.169)   
Independent_directors (under 0.473)     0.070** 
     (0.030) 
Independent_directors (above 0.473)     -0.092*** 
     (0.030) 
Fees -0.026  -0.023  -0.021 
 (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.023) 
Ceo_duality -0.005*  0.000647  -0.005* 
 (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
Boardsize 0.000289  -0.000663  0.000453 
 (0.000763)  (0.000740)  (0.000725) 
Leverage -0.004  0.002  -0.005 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Firmsize -0.002*  0.000634  -0.002* 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Firmage -0.000525  -0.0000215  -0.000590* 
 (0.000335)  (0.000426)  (0.000320) 
Listexg 0.002  0.002  0.002 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant -0.020  -0.022  0.016 
 (0.027)  (0.041)  (0.015)       
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES 
Observations 880  1,038  979 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010  0.020  0.016 
Cluster Firm  Firm  Firm 
The table reports the OLS results of sensitivity tests related to the main regression with three alternative 
methods. In Column (1), investment efficiency is computed by removing decile observations around the zero 
residual of Equation (4.1). In Column (2), investment efficiency is measured from an alternative investment 
model, which is a function of annual revenue growth rate, a dummy variable of controlling the positive or 
negative increase of revenue, and their interaction term. Column (3) employs the piecewise linear regression 
to test the U-shaped relation between independent directors and investment efficiency. 
Independent_directors (under 0.473) equals the proportion of independent directors, if it is under 0.473, and 
equals 0.473, otherwise. Independent_directors (above 0.473) equals 0 if it is under 0.473 and equals the 
proportion of independent directors minus 0.473 if it is over this figure. All regressions absorb the multiple 
fixed effects of industry and year. Same control variables are employed in all robust tests.  
For the specific description of variables, please refer to Table 4-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm, which is shown in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4-6 Regressions that address the potential endogeneity issue 
 
  
Lagged independent  
director variables  
IV-GMM 
  Abs_INVEFF  Independent_directors   Ind_square   Abs_INVEFF 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)   (3)  (4) 
           
Independent_directors 0.335**      3.420** 
 (0.150)      (1.617) 
Ind_square -0.358**      -3.618** 
 (0.158)      (1.799) 
        
HEIs   0.150**  0.132**   
   (0.060)  (0.053)   
HEIs_square   -0.024***  -0.021***   
   (0.009)  (0.008)   
Senior   0.015  0.014*   
   (0.010)  (0.009)   
Account   0.008  0.004   
   (0.018)  (0.017)   
Fees -0.044*  0.044  0.029  -0.063* 
 (0.026)  (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.036) 
Ceo_duality -0.007**  0.039  0.037  -0.0036 
 (0.003)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.012) 
Boardsize -0.00000366  -0.012***  -0.010***  0.004 
 (0.000827)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Leverage -0.002  -0.006  -0.003  0.000534 
 (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.011) 
Firmsize -0.003**  0.009***  0.007***  -0.005* 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Firmage -0.000608  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.0000476 
 (0.000392)  (0.000909)  (0.000817)  (0.000589) 
Listexg 0.003  -0.013*  -0.013*  0.002 
 (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Constant -0.025  0.261***  0.041  -0.746** 
 (0.035)  (0.086)  (0.075)  (0.361) 
        
Industry FE YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 741  979  979  979 
Cluster Firm  Firm  Firm  Firm 
The table reports the results of addressing the potential endogeneity issue in this study.  
Column (1) displays the OLS results of replacing independent variables with one-year lagged data. 
Independent_directors is the lagged independent director ratio, and Ind_square is the quadratic term of the 
lagged independent director ratio.  
Columns (2) to (4) report the regression results employing the IV-GMM approach. Specifically, Columns (2) and 
(3) are the regression results of the first stage. Independent_directors and Ind_square are estimated, 
respectively by the regression with excluded IVs (HEIs, HEIs_square, Senior, and Account) and control variables 
in the main regression specification. Column (4) reports the regression results of the second stage, where the 
independent variables are the estimated values derived from the first stage. 
For the excluded IVs, HEIs means the number of HEIs in the same province of listed CEs, measured by the 
natural log of the number of HEIs in each province. HEIs_square is the quadratic term of HEIs. Senior is an 
indicator variable, which equals 1, if the number of people in HEIs having a senior professional title in that 
province is over the nationwide level, and 0 if otherwise. Account is an indicator variable as well, where 1 
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means that the province has more than three branches of the big-12 accounting firms, 0 means not. 
For the specific description of the control variables, please refer to Table 4-1. 
All regressions control the multiple fixed effects of industry and year.  
R2 is not reported, as it has no statistical meaning in the case of 2SLS/IV estimation method. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 





Table 4-7 Propensity score matching method  





(listed CEs) MeanDiff 
Abs_INVEFF 0.038 0.024 0.014*** 
Independent_directors 0.37 0.371 -0.001 
Fees 0.08 0.077 0.003 
Ceo_duality 0.044 0.056 -0.012 
Boardsize 9.29 9.377 -0.087 
Leverage 0.516 0.531 -0.015 
Firmsize 4.686 4.66 0.026 
Firmage 14.592 14.347 0.245 
Listexg 0.706 0.696 0.01 
Observations 979 979  





Panel B: Independent directors and investment efficiency in matched listed non-CEs 
  Dependent variable (Abs_INVEFF) 
 Linear relationship   Non-linear relationship 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) 
       
Independent_directors 0.007  0.179 
 (0.032)  (0.363) 
Ind_square   -0.203 
   (0.404) 
Fees 0.025  0.025 
 (0.060)  (0.06) 
Ceo_duality -0.015***  -0.015*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
Boardsize 0.002  0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Leverage 0.036**  0.036** 
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
Firmsize -0.006***  -0.006*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Firmage 0.000140  0.000154 
 (0.000403)  (0.000398) 
Listexg -0.012*  -0.012* 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
Constant 0.032*  -0.005 
 (0.018)  (0.076) 
    
Industry FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Observations 979  979 
Adjusted R-squared 0.062  0.061 
Cluster Firm  Firm 
Panel A reports the mean of the main variables in the listed non-CE and CE groups as well as the difference of 
means in those two groups, as examined by a T-test. 
Panel B displays the OLS results of effects of independent directors and investment efficiency in matched listed 
non-CEs. The regression absorbs the multiple fixed effects of industry and year. Same control variables are 
employed in all related tests.  
For the specific description of variables, please refer to Table 4-1. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 





Table 4-8 The effect of independent directors on over- and under-investment 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Over_INVEFF  Under_Abs_INVEFF 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
Independent_directors 0.050 0.582**  0.016 0.129 
 (0.039) (0.227)  (0.014) (0.108) 
Ind_square  -0.628**   -0.127 
  (0.245)   (0.111) 
Fees -0.022 -0.032  -0.009 -0.00997 
 (0.067) (0.068)  (0.014) (0.0135) 
Ceo_duality -0.010 -0.007  -0.005* -0.00448* 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Boardsize 0.000754 0.000907  0.0000196 0.0000441 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000541) (0.000538) 
Leverage 0.006 0.006  -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Firmsize -0.004 -0.004*  -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000848) (0.000852) 
Firmage -0.001* -0.001*  -0.000360 -0.000355 
 (0.000689) (0.000680)  (0.000251) (0.000252) 
Listexg 0.003 0.002  0.003 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.038 -0.071  0.029*** 0.005 
 (0.028) (0.054)  (0.009) (0.027) 
      
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 376 376  603 603 
Adjusted R-squared -0.003 0.002  0.026 0.026 
Cluster Firm Firm  Firm Firm 
The table reports the OLS regression results with the multiple fixed effects from industry and year. 
The specific description of the variables, please refer to Table 4-1. The standard errors are clustered by firm. 
The robust standard error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. 





Table 4-9 The effect of independent director’s performance on investment efficiency 
 
 Proxy1 Abs_INVEFF  Proxy1 Over_INVEFF  Proxy1 Under_Abs_INVEFF 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
                  
Proxy  0.053**   0.084*   0.041* 
  (0.022)   (0.043)   (0.024) 
Control variables  YES   YES   YES 
         
Ind_number 0.195*   0.012   0.271**  
 (0.104)   (0.175)   (0.112)  
Boardsize 0.066   0.123*   0.046  
 (0.043)   (0.067)   (0.048)  
Workplace -0.004   0.022   -0.044  
 (0.103)   (0.169)   (0.129)  
Payment 0.017**   0.028**   0.011  
 (0.009)   (0.013)   (0.011)  
Constant -1.525*** 0.040***  -1.536*** 0.054**  -1.536*** 0.0356*** 
 (0.391) (0.010)  (0.562) (0.022)  (0.456) (0.0126) 
         
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 917   353   564  
Observations_selected  428   168   260 
Cluster Firm Firm  Firm Firm  Firm Firm 
ll  401.3   136.0   360.4 
Wald Test (rho=0) 3.710   5.173   0.052  
P_value 0.054   0.023   0.820  
The table reports the Heckman selection model (MLE) results of independent directors’ performance and investment efficiency. The dependent variable (Proxy1) in the probit model is the 
indicator variable for the presence of a proxy, where 1 means yes and 0, otherwise. Independent_directors means the number of independent directors on the corporate board. Boardsize is 
the total number of board members. Workplace is an indicator variable as to whether the independent director with an accounting background is in the same city as the firm that he/she 
serves. Payment is the average compensation of independent directors. Proxy in the second stage is an average figure measured by the number of times the independent directors delegate 
others to attend the board meetings scaled by the number of board meetings they should have participated in during a year. The specific description of the control variables in the second-
stage, please refer to Table 4-1. In both stages, the fixed effects from industry and year are controlled. The standard errors are clustered by firm. The robust standard error of each coefficient 
is shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4-10 The effect of characteristics diversity of independent directors on investment efficiency 
 
 Gender diversity  Age diversity 
 Abs_INVEFF Over_INVEFF Under_Abs_INVEFF   Abs_INVEFF Over_INVEFF Under_Abs_INVEFF 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Diversity -0.010* -0.027*** 0.001  -0.026 -0.073* 0.003 
(Gender/Age) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004)  (0.016) (0.040) (0.010) 
        
Control 
variables 
YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 967 369 598  969 368 601 
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.005 0.018  0.012 0.008 0.021 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm   Firm Firm Firm 
The table reports the OLS regression results absorbing the fixed effects of year and industry. Gender means 
how many independent directors on the board are female, which is measured by the number of female 
independent directors over their total number on the board. Age is age diversity, measured by the standard 
deviation of the age of independent directors on the board scaled by the mean age of a firm’s independent 
directors.  
The specific description of the control variables, please refer to Table 4-1.   
The standard errors are clustered by firm. 
The robust standard error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses.  




Table 4-11 Extra control by the ultimate owner and the effect of independent directors on investment efficiency 
Panel A: summary statistics of the extra control from the ultimate owner in years 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Listed CEs with the extra control (N)  80 82 78 77 78 395 
% of full sample  (39.4%) (40%) (39.6%) (41.2%) (41.7%) (40.4%) 
In over-investment group (N) 34 35 31 34 30 164 
% of over-investment group  (42.5%) (45.6%) (39.7%) (44.7%) (46.2%) (43.6%) 
In under-investment group (N) 46 47 47 43 48 231 
% of over-investment group  (37.4%) (36.7%) (39.5%) (38.7%) (39.3%) (38.3%) 
        
Panel B: Extra control by the ultimate owner and the effect of independent directors on investment efficiency 
 Abs_INVEFF  Over_INVEFF  Under_Abs_INVEFF 
 Extra_control=0 Extra_control=1  Extra_control=0 Extra_control=1  Extra_control=0 Extra_control=1 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
                  
Independent_directors 0.297** 0.182  0.730** 0.435  0.158 0.127 
 (0.137) (0.238)  (0.306) (0.392)  (0.135) (0.311) 
Ind_square -0.313** -0.172  -0.776** -0.428  -0.149 -0.151 
 (0.139) (0.272)  (0.326) (0.433)  (0.138) (0.380) 
         
Control variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 583 395  211 164  372 231 
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.029  0.048 0.020  0.028 0.038 
Cluster Firm Firm  Firm Firm  Firm Firm 
Panel A reports the statistics of extra control from the ultimate owners in years. 
Panel B reports the OLS regression results absorbing the multiple fixed effects of industry and year. Extra_control is an indicator variable of the presence of extra control 
from by the ultimate owner through the ownership structure, which is measured by whether or not the voting rights exceed the cash-flow rights owned by the ultimate 
owner. It equals 1, if the separation of voting rights and cash-flow rights is over 1 and 0, otherwise. The regression model has the same control variables as the main one, 




Chapter 5 (Study 3) The Supervisory Board and Financial Reporting Quality 
5.1 Introduction 
The current corporate governance structure in China is unique, being a mixture of the 
unitary board structure in the U.S. and the two-tier one in Germany. In the Chinese 
corporate governance system, shareholders of the company elect the board of directors 
(BOD) and the supervisory board (SB) during the shareholder’s general meeting. These two 
boards are parallel, which is different from the German two-tier board system, where the 
supervisory board is superior to the board of directors40. The primary duty of the 
supervisory board is the monitoring function (the Corporate Law 1993). The supervisory 
board monitors the behaviour of the corporate board and the executives as well as 
monitoring the financial affairs of the company on behalf of the shareholders. In addition, 
similar to the U.S. unitary board system, the Chinese government implemented the 
independent director system on the corporate board in 2001. The independent directors on 
the board are authorised to monitor firm activities as well, so that they can protect the 
wealth of the firm and the interests of minority shareholders.  
Given there are two monitoring systems (i.e. the independent directors on the corporate 
board and the supervisory board) in the Chinese corporate governance structure, the 
internal control of Chinese listed firms should be effective. However, the supervisory board 
in China is widely discussed as being dysfunctional or ineffective (e.g. Tam, 2000; Dahya et 
al., 2003). Also, this makes scholars, such as, Tam (1995), Tian (2001), and Chen and Al-
Najjar (2012), argue that the corporate governance structure in China seems closer to the 
Anglo-American unitary board system. In the Chinese corporate governance system, it is 
essential to find out the mechanisms of the supervisory board to strengthen its monitoring 
function. Ran et al. (2015) employ a sample of Chinese non-financial listed firms (17,698 
firm-year observations) from 1999 to 2012 to examine the relationship between the 
                                                                
40 For instance, in the German corporate governance system, the shareholders’ general meeting elects the 
board of supervisors, then, the supervisory board takes the role of appointing or removing the members of the 




characteristics of supervisors and financial reporting quality. They document that 
supervisors with an accounting or academic background, higher compensation, and more 
females can improve financial reporting quality in Chinese listed firms. For this study, the 
supervisory board is investigated from a different angle, that is, by seeking understanding of 
the effectiveness of the supervisory board in improving financial reporting quality in a 
specific type of state-owned enterprise (SOE), namely, the listed central enterprises (listed 
CEs) in China.  
As one of the largest emerging markets, China is attracting more attention from the world. 
In China, state-owned shares still dominate the stock market even following the SOE 
reforms in 1978. It is clear that SOEs play an important role in the Chinese economy. 
Therefore, it is necessary to make sure that the corporate governance system in SOEs is 
healthy and effective. However, Li (2005) argues that the weak monitoring function of the 
supervisory board system in SOEs results in the loss of state assets. The executives falsify 
the financial statements, which leads to a lower quality of accounting information in SOEs. 
This problem turns out to be severer in listed CEs. This is because they have great influences 
on the safety and security of the country, as they are concentrated in industries such as 
defence, utilities, and natural resource. The potential loss of state assets in these fields 
caused by the malfunction of supervisory boards in listed CEs is harmful to the interest of 
the state.  
This study involves examining the effect of the supervisory board on financial reporting 
quality in listed CEs from four aspects: supervisory board size, board composition, board 
characteristics and board incentives. A sample of 1,050 firm-year observations from 236 
non-financial listed CEs from 2012 to 2016 is employed. As the change in the nature of listed 
CEs’ ultimate owner has led to their number being different each year, this study has 
manually checked the status of listed CEs in the research period from the annual reports. In 
this study, a supervisor is defined as an affiliated supervisor, if he/she concurrently holds a 
position with the ultimate owner (i.e. the central enterprises on behalf of the central 
government) or its affiliations. The number of affiliated supervisors has been manually 
collected from the annual reports. Other supervisory board, corporate governance and 
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related financial information has been obtained from the Chinese Securities Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR). The major findings of this study are as follows. 
First, supervisory board size has a positive relationship with financial reporting quality in 
listed CEs. That is, having more supervisors on the board can improve the financial reporting 
quality of listed CEs. Second, affiliated supervisors from the central enterprise or its 
affiliations harm the informativeness of earnings in listed CEs, because they suffer much 
severer political influences from the central government. The central enterprises may 
transfer resources from listed CEs to other non-listed and less profitable affiliations in the 
business group to meet the financial and political targets required by the central 
government. Moreover, the affiliated supervisors must be compliant with the parent firm 
(i.e. the central enterprise) and help it to conceal these potential expropriation behaviours. 
However, employee representatives on the supervisory board have no relation with 
financial reporting quality in listed CEs. Third, if a supervisory board contains supervisors 
that are older and/or at a similar age, the listed CEs have better financial reporting quality. 
This is indicated by the positive effect from average supervisory team age and the negative 
one from the age diversity of the supervisory board. The proportion of female supervisors 
on the board and financial reporting quality in listed CEs are in a U-shaped relationship. 
Specifically, a proportion of female supervisors exceeding 44.2% has a positive effect on 
improving financial reporting quality in listed CEs and before reaching this turning point, 
their proportion weakens financial reporting quality. Finally, the compensation of the 
supervisory board has no relationship with financial reporting quality. The main results from 
this study are robust, as shown by sensitivity testing consisting of different measurements 
of financial reporting quality as well as after controlling for potential endogeneity issues.  
This study conducts two additional tests relating to this topic. First, there is an examination 
of the effect of extra control from the central enterprises41 on the relationship between 
board composition and financial reporting quality. However, extra control from the central 
enterprises does not affect the relation between affiliated supervisors (employee 
representatives) and financial reporting quality in listed CEs, as the interaction term for the 
                                                                
41 Extra control from the central enterprises means that the voting rights exceed the cash-flow rights owned by 
the central government. 
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two is insignificant. The second extended test examines whether firm size affects the impact 
of affiliated supervisors and employee representatives on financial reporting quality. It is 
elicited that larger firms can constrain the negative effect of affiliated supervisors on 
financial reporting quality in listed CEs. This is possible because the large listed firms are less 
likely to conduct earnings management due to better corporate governance, fewer 
information asymmetries, and more reliable monitoring from the external auditor as well as 
the financial analyst (Meek et al., 2007). Moreover, there is no influence of the size effect on 
the relationship between employee representatives and financial reporting quality in listed 
CEs. 
The outcomes of this study lead to empirical and political contributions to the literature. 
They enrich the literature on the supervisory board in SOEs. Compared to Ran et al. (2015), 
who use a sample covering most non-financial listed firms in China, this study focuses on the 
characteristics of supervisory boards among listed CEs and obtains some novel results. For 
instance, this study finds a U-shaped relationship between female supervisors and financial 
reporting quality. This would appear to be a unique phenomenon to listed CEs, for Ran et al. 
(2015) state that there is a positive linear relationship between the two factors. This study 
outcomes also provide new evidence for the literature of financial accounting quality. 
Notably, some supervisory board factors can improve financial reporting quality in listed CEs, 
such as larger supervisory board size, a smaller proportion of affiliated supervisors, as well 
as when the supervisory team comprises lower ages and lower age diversity. Hence, this 
work has political implications in identifying ways to enhance the effectiveness of the 
supervisory board system in listed CEs. 
The rest of the study proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the related literature and 
develops hypotheses. Section 5.3 provides the details of research methodology and data. 
Section 5.4 reports the main empirical findings and sensitivity tests. Section 5.5 presents the 
empirical results of extended tests. Section 5.6 concludes the results.  
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5.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
The current corporate governance system in Chinese firms is a combination of the German 
two-tier board system and the Anglo-American unitary board one. In China, the Corporate 
Law (1993) requires that all firms should adopt a two-tier board structure that includes a 
corporate management board (board of directors: BOD) and a supervisory board (SB). This 
resembles the governance structure in Germany. Meanwhile, the firms are regulated to 
have independent directors on the board, which follows the governance structure in the 
U.S.. Xi (2006) claims that the role of the supervisory board in Chinese firms is not the same 
as that in Germany. It is less powerful, as it does not have the right to appoint the executive 
directors and evaluate their performance (Schipani and Liu, 2002; Xiao et al., 2004; Ding et 
al., 2010). Moreover, the supervisory board in China does not have a hierarchical 
relationship with the board of directors. Shareholders elect both boards during the 
shareholders’ general meeting (Chen and Al-Najjar, 2012). In the case of the two-tier board 
structure ( the supervisory board is less powerful) and the weak legal system in China, the 
supervisory board is generally seen as being dysfunctional or ineffective (Tam, 2000; Dahya 
et al., 2003; Xiao et al., 2004). Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board 
makes the reform of China’s corporate governance structure closer to the Anglo-Saxon 
unitary board system (Tam, 1995; Tian, 2001; Chen and Al-Najjar, 2012).  
Dahya et al. (2002) conduct interviews with the directors, supervisors and senior executives 
in 16 Chinese listed firms, and summarise six main reasons leading to the ineffectiveness of 
supervisory boards in China: (1) lack of legal power and clearly defined legal responsibilities 
for the supervisory board; (2) lack of independence; (3) lack of technical expertise; (4) 
relatively lower status than the BOD and the senior executive officers; (5) limited access to 
information; and (6) lack of incentives. 42 Xiao et al. (2004) adopt the grounded theory 
methodology and put forward four types of roles played by the supervisory board in China: 
an honoured guest, a friendly advisor, a censored watchdog, and an independent 
watchdog43. They find that the supervisory board in most Chinese listed firms performs one 
                                                                
42 See Dahya et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion. 
43 See Xiao et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion. Honoured guest means that the supervisory board pretends 
to comply with basic legal requirements, but in reality, it does little besides maintaining a mere physical 
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of the first three types, but very few, the last. Lin (2004) analyses the overall corporate 
governance in China and documents a consistent result that the monitoring role of the 
supervisory board in China is weak, in particular, because its functions are not clearly 
defined. In October 2005, the government amended Corporate Law, and the power of the 
supervisory board increased. For instance, the revised Corporate Law (2005) regulates that 
the supervisory board can propose the dismissal of directors or executives, has the right to 
sue the directors and executives, and can call external experts to assist it in undertaking the 
investigation and at the expense of the firm.  
The above qualitative studies all agree that the Chinese supervisory board is not as effective 
as expected. Some empirical studies also document this argument. For instance, Wei (2007) 
fails to find evidence that the supervisory board has significant effects on firm performance, 
by using a sample of 276 Chinese non-financial listed firms from 1999 to 2002. Shan and 
McIver (2011) elicit that the proportion of experts with professional knowledge or a 
background in accounting or law on the supervisory board has no impact on corporate 
financial performance, as indicated by the evidence of Chinese non-financial listed firms 
from 2001 to 2005. Also, Shan and Xu (2012) find similar ineffectiveness and even adverse 
effects of the supervisory board in the Chinese financial sector. They state that the number 
of supervisory board meetings is negatively related to firm performance and supervisory 
board size does not affect it, by using a sample of listed financial sector firms in China from 
1999 to 2009. Ding et al. (2010) investigate whether the amended Corporate Law (2005) has 
improved the monitoring role of the supervisory board on executive compensation. They 
find that the effect of supervisory board size and meeting frequency became significant on 
executive compensation in 2006 (the year that the revised Corporate Law was 
implemented). In 2006, when the number of supervisory board meetings was in the proper 
range (3 to 6 times per year)44, more supervisory meetings helped to curb total executive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
presence. Friendly advisor means that the supervisory team only provides consultancy and advices without 
confronting the directors on the corporate board and the executives, even when problems exist. Censored 
watchdog means that, the monitoring function of supervisory board is prevented from disseminating 
information in fear of reprisal from either a powerful corporate board or the executives. Independent 
watchdog means that the supervisory team can fulfil its monitoring duties “largely” independently. 
44 Ding et al. (2010) split Chinese listed firms in groups based on the number of supervisory board meetings 
they have in a year. They argue that, if the supervisory board has too few meetings in a year (e.g. two or less) 
so as just to meet the mandatory requirement from the regulation, it is ineffective and malfunctions. However, 
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compensation. In addition, large supervisory board size leads to high total executive 
compensation, but it lowers the pay-performance sensitivity. Overall, Ding et al. (2010) 
confirm the positive function of the amendments in the Corporate Law (2005), whereby it 
has strengthened the monitoring effects of the supervisory board.   
One of the specific duties of the supervisory board defined by the Corporate Law (1993) is to 
review firm’s financial affairs in order to monitor financial reports. The supervisory board 
has the responsibility to maintain the financial reporting quality of the firm, which is 
important for both existing shareholders and potential investors. This is because financial 
statements are the key channel for them to achieve a full understanding of the firm they are 
investing in and the target firm they potentially will invest in. Also, good financial reporting 
quality can reduce information asymmetry, which leads to a more transparent investment 
environment. Hence, it is necessary to examine the monitoring function of the supervisory 
board on financial reporting quality. The results in the existing literature on this topic with 
evidence from China are inconsistent. Firth et al. (2007) investigate whether the supervisory 
board affects the informativeness of earnings, using a sample of Chinese non-financial listed 
firms from 1999 to 2003. They find that larger and more active supervisory boards can 
improve the earnings-returns association, reduce absolute discretionary accruals, and have 
higher quality financial statements based on the auditor’s opinion. Their results confirm the 
positive effect of supervisory boards on improving financial reporting quality. Jia et al. (2009) 
argue that supervisory boards do react and attempt to deal with the enforcement actions45 
caused by financial information fraud. To be specific, they find that listed firms with a large 
supervisory board are more likely to have more stringent sanctions from the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)46 and they have more supervisory meetings when 
they face more severe enforcement actions. This study uses a sample of 362 fraud and 327 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
when there are too many (over six) meetings in a year, the monitoring costs of having them may outweigh the 
positive aspects. 
45 There are various available types of enforcement action imposed by CSRC caused by the fraudulent 
behaviours of listed firms, including an official warning, a monetary fine, the return of illegally raised proceeds, 
the confiscation of illegal income, the termination of share issuance, and the suspension or termination of 
securities trading qualifications. 
46 The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and CSRC take the role of punishing the listed firm with 
financial fraud. Specifically, the two stock exchanges sanction listed firms with minor fraudulent activities, and 
CSRC deals with listed firm with more severe violations. Jia et al. (2009) argue that the agency that imposes 
sanctions is an accurate proxy for the severity level of the punishments. 
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matched non-fraud firm-year observations from 2001 to 2006. In contrast, Habbash et al. 
(2014) do not find significant evidence by examining the effect of the monitoring 
mechanisms (i.e. independent directors and supervisory board) in the corporate governance 
system on earnings management for Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2010. Their results 
show that both independent directors and the supervisory board fail to constrain earnings 
management. As earnings management is a crucial determinant of financial reporting 
quality, the empirical evidence from Habbash et al. (2014) partially reflects the 
ineffectiveness of the supervisory board on financial reporting quality. Ran et al. (2015) 
comprehensively investigate the relationship between the supervisory board and 
accounting information quality, with their study involving different characteristics of the 
supervisory board. They suggest that the background of supervisors (especially with 
accounting or academic backgrounds), supervisor compensation and female supervisors are 
drivers of improvements in accounting information quality in Chinese listed firms.  
Habbash et al. (2014) not only state that the monitoring mechanisms (i.e. independent 
directors on the corporate board and supervisors on the supervisory board) in Chinese listed 
firms fail to mitigate earnings management, but also, that SOEs are more likely to 
manipulate earnings than private firms. Wang and Wu (2011) find that SOEs tend to report 
poor quality financial reports and restate them later, with a sample of Chinese listed firms 
from 1999 to 2005. In contrast, Ding et al. (2007) investigate earnings management in SOEs 
and non-SOEs, documenting that the managers in the later have more pressure to 
manipulate earnings to stabilise their stock price in the capital market. Wang and Yung 
(2011) find similar evidence that SOEs are less likely to manage earnings and that they get 
robust results even after considering the potential effect of tunnelling activities taken by 
controlling shareholders (i.e. the government), which is widely regarded as a driver of 
earnings management in Chinese SOEs (Chen and Yuan, 2004; Aharony et al., 2010). As the 
evidence about the financial reporting quality of SOEs in the existing literature is 
inconsistent, it is necessary to examine whether the supervisory board is effective in 
improving the level of financial reporting quality in SOEs. Moreover, Firth et al. (2011) find 
that listed CEs have more financial reports restatements and they argue that the major 
reason is the lack of oversight taken by the government bureaucrats, and/or their efforts to 
show better-than-real financial statements to satisfy the requirements of the government. 
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Hence, for this study, the focus is on Chinese listed CEs and the effect of the supervisory 
board on financial reporting quality.  
In line with Ran et al. (2015), this study investigates the supervisory board from multiple 
dimensions47, in terms of the characteristics of the supervisory board that can mitigate its 
ineffectiveness and improve financial reporting quality in listed CEs. 
5.2.1 Supervisory board size  
The size of the supervisory board is the most common measure of its quality employed in 
the existing literature. Firth et al. (2007) report that it has a positive effect on improving the 
quality of accounting information in Chinese firms, in that a larger board can increase the 
earnings response coefficients in the earnings-returns relation model48, reduce absolute 
discretionary accruals as well as the frequency of modified audit opinions. They argue that 
larger supervisory boards are more likely to have more members with an accounting 
background or related work experience, who can enhance the quality of the financial 
statements. Also, if there are more supervisors on the board, the supervisory board has 
stronger power to judge the executives’ decisions and correct their potential earnings 
management behaviours efficiently. In China, the average number of members on the 
supervisory board is four (Firth et al., 2007; Ran et al., 2015), which is smaller than the 
threshold of board size that may result in board inefficiency in the unitary board system. 
Jensen (1993) suggests that the board cannot perform well when there are more than nine 
members on the board. In which case, the current supervisory board in China does not have 
an inefficient problem driven by it being too big. Hence, this study expects a positive 
function of a large supervisory board, and thus, the hypothesis proposed is: 
                                                                
47  Frequency of supervisory board meetings, professional background of supervisors, and supervisor’s 
ownership are popular variables when measuring the supervisory board as well. However, they are not 
included in this study due to the lack of the relevant information.  
48 Firth et al. (2007) argue that the informative earnings numbers derived from the accounting system should 
be reflected in stock returns. Their empirical results show that earnings are positively associated with stock 
returns, and the interaction term of earnings and the size of the supervisory board is positive and significant 
that the level of 5%. This implies that a larger supervisory board can enhance the informativeness of earnings 
numbers, such that it reflects in more stock returns. 
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H1: A larger size of the supervisory board can improve the financial reporting quality of 
listed CEs.  
5.2.2 Supervisory board composition 
Shareholder representatives are an essential component of the supervisory board. As widely 
discussed, Chinese firms are characterised by a highly concentrated ownership structure 
(Wei and Geng, 2008; Gul et al., 2010; Yu, 2013), with most shareholder supervisors being 
generally from the large shareholders or even the ultimate owner of the firm. The 
performance of those supervisors is affected by the purpose of this ultimate owner. In a 
concentrated ownership structure, the main conflict of interests is between the controlling 
and minority shareholders. Claessens et al. (2002) argue that the large shareholders of listed 
firms may have the incentive to align their profit to firm performance or to expropriate the 
resources from minority shareholders according to their ownership rights and the control 
rights. Claessens et al. (2002) use the evidence of eight East Asian economies and find that 
listed firms with higher cash-flow rights owned by the ultimate owner have higher 
valuations, while the difference between control and ownership (i.e. the difference between 
the voting rights and the cash-flow rights) reduces the corporate value of such firms. In this 
case, if the ultimate owner has higher cash-flow rights, the supervisors appointed by it are 
more likely to play a decisive role by avoiding falsified accounting information conducted by 
the executives to protect the interest of the ultimate owner. When the cash-flow rights 
significantly deviate away from the voting rights, the ultimate owner may divert resources 
away from listed firms, as the cost of tunneling activities that expropriate the wealth from 
the minority shareholders is relatively low. Under this circumstance, the affiliated 
supervisors may have no significant or negative effect on the firm’s financial reporting 
quality, as they assist the ultimate owner in masking the accounting information relating to 
those tunneling activities. Another possibility is that the ultimate owner may prop up the 
listed firms (i.e. the ultimate owner transfers resources probably from other affiliations to 
the listed firms) to help them meet the equity issuance requirement or avoid delisting (Jian 
and Wong, 2008; Ying and Wang, 2013). Even though the propping up activities benefit the 
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minority shareholders, these activities result in earnings management as well, and lower 
overall financial reporting quality.  
For listed CEs, the ultimate owner is the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). SASAC authorises the central enterprises to practise the management 
right on these listed CEs. The central enterprise groups are generally regarded as “state 
units”, since they are wholly owned by the central government, and totally represents the 
interest of the government (Yeo, 2013). Hence, tunneling or propping up activities 
conducted by the ultimate owner on the listed CEs are generally politically oriented. For 
example, the central enterprises may transfer resources from listed CEs to non-listed 
affiliations in the business group in order to meet the overall financial target set up by the 
superior governmental institutions. Hence, the affiliated supervisors from the central 
enterprises bring political influence to listed CEs as well. It is necessary to examine how the 
affiliated supervisors from the central enterprises affect the informativeness of earnings in 
listed CEs. According to the literature, the affiliated directors from the ultimate owner are 
more likely to have negative impacts on financial reporting quality rather than positive. 
Hence, the first hypothesis of supervisory board composition is: 
H2a: the affiliated supervisors from the central enterprises weaken the financial reporting 
quality of listed CEs. 
Fauver and Fuerst (2006) use evidence from German supervisory boards and find that 
employee representatives play a positive role in monitoring the management and reducing 
agency costs in corporations. Moreover, they argue that such representatives on the board 
are the connection between the employees and the management team. With more credible 
information about a firm’s strategies and profits delivered by the labour representatives on 
the supervisory board, the employees are more positive and confident about fulfiling the 
firm’s mission. In China, as aforementioned, the revised Corporate Law (2005) regulates the 
basic composition of the supervisory board. To be specific, at least one-third of supervisory 
board members should be employee representatives. Ideally, this amendment empowers 
employees and provides them with more participating opportunities for corporate oversight.  
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However, the empirical evidence of the function of employee representatives in China is not 
significant. For instance, Ran et al. (2015) fail to find that the employee members on the 
supervisory board can improve the informativeness of earnings. Yang et al. (2017) focus on 
listed CEs from 2005 to 2014, investigating the function of employee representatives on the 
supervisory board on employees’ compensation. They document that the employee 
representatives fail to increase the employees’ income or to constrain the self-interest 
behaviour of the executives effectively. They also conduct a quasi-experimental approach, 
employing the regulation49 carried out by SASAC in 2009 as the exogenous event and 
compare the performance of employee representatives on mitigating the difference in 
income between the junior employees and the top executives in the period before and after 
the regulation launched. Their results indicate that the change of labour seats on the 
supervisory board is just to meet the mandatory requirement of the regulation and the 
employee representation on the supervisory board in listed CEs is more likely to be for 
decoration only, with just nominal rights. Considering the current corporate governance 
environment in China, this study predicts that it is difficult for the employee representatives 
on the supervisory board to play a significant role in monitoring the management in order to 
improve financial reporting quality. Hence, the second hypothesis of supervisory board 
composition is that: 
H2b: employee representatives on the supervisory board do not have significant effects on 
improving the quality of financial reporting in listed CEs.  
5.2.3 Supervisory board characteristics 
The age of members on the supervisory board is one of the characteristics that may affect 
its performance. In general, the older represents rich experience, whilst the younger has an 
open mind and energetic participation (Kim and Lim, 2010; Tuggle et al., 2010; Ran et al., 
2015). As the primary role of the supervisory board is monitoring the financial affairs and 
operation of listed firms, which needs more related working experience, this study proposes 
that the older supervisors have a positive effect on the improvement of accounting 
                                                                
49 Provisions on Central State-owned Enterprises’ Support to the Supervisory Board for Monitoring in the 
Current Period (Trial), launched by SASAC in 2009. 
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information quality. To test for this, the average age of members on the supervisory board is 
measured and the hypothesis proposed regarding the average age of the supervisory team, 
is that: 
H3a: the average age of the supervisory board is positively related to the financial reporting 
quality of listed CEs. 
Supervisors on the supervisory board generally are at different ages. This age diversity may 
lead to either positive or negative effects. Regarding which, Ali et al. (2013) argue that 
boards with age diversity may have wiser strategic decision-making by taking advantage of 
both younger and older directors’ different capabilities. However, there may be more 
dissatisfaction and conflict of interest among directors in the board with significant age 
diversity. The effect of age diversity on the informativeness of earnings may be significant, 
but the results are mixed. Hence, the hypothesis put forward is: 
H3b: the age diversity of the supervisory board has significant effects on the financial 
reporting quality of listed CEs. 
The function of female directors in corporate governance is widely discussed, but the 
studies about female supervisors are limited. Joecks et al. (2012) examine the function of 
female supervisors under the German two-tier board system, finding that the impact of 
gender diversity (i.e. more females on the supervisory board) of the supervisory board on 
corporate performance becomes positive when there are more than three women on the 
supervisory board. This result supports the magic number of three women on the board in 
recent studies (e.g. Konrad and Kramer, 2006; Kristie, 2011; Torchia et al., 2011). Dienes and 
Velte (2016) confirm the positive function of women in the German corporate governance 
system and document that gender diversity has a positive effect on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting. Similar evidence is found in China, such as, Ran et al. (2015) 
finding that more female supervisors on the board can play a positive monitoring role in 
improving financial reporting quality. Also, they suggest that women are more suitable for 
positions with the monitoring function, for example, being a supervisor on the supervisory 
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board, as they are more careful and risk averse compared to men. Based on the existing 
literature, it is contended here that, female supervisors are positively related to a firm’s 
financial reporting quality. Hence, the hypothesis regarding gender diversity of the 
supervisory board is that: 
H3c: more female supervisors on the board can improve the financial reporting quality of 
listed CEs. 
5.2.4 Supervisory board incentives 
As noted above, the lack of incentives leads to inefficient supervision of the supervisory 
board. Tian (2009) suggests that an assessment and incentive mechanism for the 
supervisory board is required, which could motivate the supervisors to fulfil their 
responsibilities. To be specific, compensation is a kind of economic incentive. Ran et al. 
(2015) find that supervisors with considerable compensation are more likely to fulfil the 
monitoring role and to improve the quality of financial statements. Thus, this study predicts 
that there is a positive impact of supervisory compensation on accounting information 
quality and, accordingly, the next hypothesis is that: 





5.3 Research design and data 
5.3.1 Methodology and variables 
(1) Financial reporting quality 
There are several proxies for financial reporting quality. Chen et al. (2011a) suggest that a 
single proxy could not cover all drivers of financial reporting quality and may have potential 
measurement errors. Hence, an index (FRQ_index) consisting of three different methods of 
measuring financial reporting quality is employed.  
The first method is performance matched discretionary accruals developed by Kothari et al. 
(2005). This study estimates the following regression model by year and for each industry, 
which includes at least 20 observations: 
𝑇𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(1 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) + 𝛽2∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                   (5.1)                          
where TAccr is the total accruals, measured as the difference of the annual change in non-
cash current assets and the annual change in current non-interest-bearing liabilities, minus 
the depreciation and amortisation expense, scaled by the lagged total assets (Assets); ∆Rev 
is the annual change in revenues scaled by lagged total assets; PPE is the property, plant, 
and equipment, scaled by lagged total assets; ROA is the return on assets, measured by the 
net profit over total assets. The discretionary accruals are the residuals from Equation (5.1). 
The absolute values of discretionary accruals (DAC) are utilised as a component of the FRQ 
index. Higher values of DAC lead to lower financial reporting quality.  
The second method employed in this study is the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, as 
improved by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). The following regression model is 




𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽4∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
(5.2) 
where TCAccr is the total current accruals, measured as the difference between the annual 
change in non-cash current assets and the annual change in current non-interest-bearing 
liabilities, scaled by the lagged total assets; OCF is the lagged (year t-1), current (year t), and 
lead (year t+1) operating cash flow, scaled by the lagged total assets; ∆Rev is the annual 
change in revenues scaled by lagged total assets; PPE is the property, plant, and equipment, 
scaled by lagged total assets. A firm’s current accruals are determined by the cash flows 
from operations, the growth in revenues and the level of PPE, whilst the difference between 
the real and expected current accruals of a firm (the residuals in Equation (5.2)) represents 
the quality of accruals and earnings. The absolute residuals (DD) are employed as a 
component of the aggregate index for financial reporting quality (FRQ_index). Higher values 
of DD lead to lower financial reporting quality. 
The third method is squared abnormal accruals, as proposed by Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (2011). This study estimates the following regression model for each 
industry with at least five observations in the specific year t: 
𝑇𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                             (5.3)                                                                    
where TAccr is the total accruals, measured as the difference of the annual change in non-
cash current assets and the annual change in current non-interest-bearing liabilities, minus 
the depreciation and amortisation expense, scaled by the lagged total assets; ∆Rev is the 
annual change in revenues scaled by lagged total assets; ∆AR is the change in account 
receivable, scaled by lagged total assets; PPE is the property, plant, and equipment, scaled 
by lagged total assets; and ROA is the return on assets. The residuals of Equation (5.3) are 
the abnormal accruals and the squared term of abnormal accruals (ABACC2) is the last 




As discussed above, an aggregate score is employed to present the quality of a firm’s 
financial reporting. Follow Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011a), the aggregate 
financial reporting quality index (FRQ_index) is derived from the average of normalised 
values of these three measures. Hence, this study can provide evidence based on an overall 
financial reporting metric.  
(2) The supervisory board and financial reporting quality 
This study investigates the relationship between the supervisory board and financial 
reporting quality among listed CEs. In accordance with the hypotheses developed in section 
5.2, the main regression is constructed below with several control variables: 
𝐹𝑅𝑄_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦_𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑒𝑜_𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                           (5.4)                                                                                                                                                      
where Supervisory_board is denoted as a series of supervisory board related variables. 
Follow the developed hypotheses. These include the size, composition, characteristics, and 
incentive variables of the supervisory board. Supervisory_size is measured by the total 
number of members on the supervisory board. As most supervisory boards generally 
comprise shareholder and employee representatives, the proportion of supervisors from 
the central enterprise or its affiliations (Affiliated_ratio) and the proportion of employee 
representatives on the supervisory board (Employee_ratio) are employed to measure the 
composition of the supervisory board. For the characteristics of the supervisory board, Age 
is the average age of the supervisors on the board. Age_diversity is calculated as the 
standard deviation of the age of supervisors on the board scaled by the average age of the 
firm’s supervisors (Ali et al., 2013). Gender diversity is measured, using the proportion of 
female supervisors on the board (Female_ratio). Last, the effect of board economic 
incentives is investigated, represented by the natural logarithm of the average total 
compensation of supervisors (Compensation). 
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In addition to the supervisory board related variables, other factors (i.e. corporate board 
characteristics, a firm’s financial characteristics, and its specific characteristics) that may 
influence financial reporting quality are included in the regression model as well.  
In the Chinese corporate governance system, the corporate board deals with a firm’s 
decision-making and operational issues. To a varying extent, the board of directors is 
involved in making financial statements. Hence, the board of directors may influence the 
financial reporting quality of listed firms. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) argue that having 
more directors on the corporate board enhances its knowledge base. However, the board 
with too many directors turns into being less flexible and less efficient. The authors also 
point out that the second effect seems to dominate the first, as Yermack (1996) reports that 
the corporate board in most listed firms has already been relatively large. This is consistent 
with the argument put forward by Jensen (1993) that larger boards are not as effective as 
smaller ones. Hence, this study controls for the potential effect of the size of the board of 
directors (Boardsize) and predicts that it has a negative effect of large boards on financial 
reporting quality. 
Independent directors on the corporate board are another major monitoring mechanism in 
the Chinese corporate governance system. CSRC regulates that at least one of independent 
directors should have an accounting background. The independent directors with an 
accounting background are more confident in monitoring financial reporting quality. Hence, 
it is necessary to control for the potential effect of independent directors on financial 
reporting quality. The independent directors are measured as their proportion on the 
corporate board (Independent_directors). However, existing empirical evidence is mixed. For 
instance, Firth et al. (2007) find a positive effect of independent directors on constraining 
earnings management, whilst in contrast, Habbash et al. (2014) document that the 
independent directors fail to mitigate earnings management. Hence, the sign of 
Independent_directors is uncertain in this study.  
CEO duality is another board characteristic that is widely discussed in the literature. 
Ceo_duality is, thus, an indicator variable that equals one if the chairman holds the position 
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of CEO at the same time and zero, otherwise. Donaldson and Davis (1991) suggest that the 
chairman of the corporate board also holding the position of CEO can improve the efficiency 
of a firm’s decision-making. However, Brickley et al. (1997) argue a person with a lot of 
power has more ability to falsify the financial statements if he/she wants to do so. Hence, 
this study predicts there that CEO duality affects the informativeness of earnings. 
In accordance with the existing literature, the potential effects of financial related variables 
are investigated. Leverage captures the impact of debt contracting on the informativeness 
of earnings, measured by total debt over total assets. ROA is the return on assets, widely 
adopted as the prime performance indicator. Wang and Wu (2011) document that firms 
with poor corporate profitability are more likely to have restatements of financial reporting. 
Firth et al. (2007) argue that listed firms with more growth opportunities may have 
incentives to engage in earnings management, as they require a lot of funding to support 
expansion. Hence, the main regression includes the firm’s growth opportunities. In line with 
Firth et al. (2007), Balakrishnan et al. (2011), and Cao et al. (2012), this study uses the ratio 
of the market value to the book value of assets (MB) as the proxy for growth opportunities.  
The last group of control variables relates to a firm’s characteristics. Huang et al. (2012) 
argue that the number of years of a firm listing on the stock exchange (Firmage) is likely to 
be associated with the strength of its internal control system and consequently, affects its 
financial reporting quality. Beneish (1999) contends that the internal control system in 
younger firms is relatively weaker and may fall behind its development of business 
operations. Moreover, younger firms in the growth stage are prone to engage in earnings 
management because of their strong financing needs (Habbash et al., 2014). Big4 is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the big four accounting companies provide the auditing 
service, and zero, otherwise. This variable can reflect the audit quality, for Frankel et al. 
(2002) suggest, auditors from the big four accounting companies are less likely to allow 
earnings management. The stock exchange that listed CEs come under is also distinguished. 
Listexg equals one, if the listed CEs are on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and equals zero, if 
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The main regression (Equation (5.4)) controls for the fixed 
effect from the industry and year as well. As the listed CEs are concentrated in certain 
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industries, this study follows the Guidance for Industry Classification of Listed Companies 
(1999) released by the CSRC and divides the listed CEs into four industries: Utilities, 
Conglomerates, Industrials, and Commerce. Table 5-1 summarises the detailed definitions of 




5.3.2 Data and sample selection 
To examine the relationship between the supervisory board and financial reporting quality 
among listed CEs, this study collected related information of all listed CEs over the main 
research period from 2012 to 2016. In this study, the supervisors are defined as affiliated, if 
they concurrently have a position in the central enterprise or its affiliations.50 This study 
manually collected the information about the affiliated supervisors from the central 
enterprise groups from the annual reports. The financial and other corporate governance 
related information was obtained from the Chinese Securities Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) Database. This study excluded the listed CEs in the finance and real 
estate industries as well as observations with negative equity. A sample of 1,050 firm-years 
observations on 236 unique listed firms was obtained before conducting the main 
regressions. Sample size may vary due to the multiple calculation methods of the dependent 
variable.  
Table 5-2 reports the summary statistics of the experimental variables before conducting 
the main regressions. For the supervisory board-related information, in listed CEs, it 
contains an average of five members, which just meets the regulation of the State-owned 
Assets Law of The People’s Republic of China (2008). It requires that the supervisory board 
of SOEs (either solely-owned or simply controlled by the government) should have no fewer 
than five members. For board composition, 41.9% of supervisors come from the central 
enterprise or its affiliations, and 37.5% of supervisors are employees from listed CEs. Even 
though the listed firms are mandated to have at least one-third employee representatives 
on the supervisory board, some still fail to meet this requirement, as the minimum value of 
the employee representative ratio is 14.3%. The average age of supervisors on the board is 
around 49 years old, and the average diversity of each supervisory team is 0.12. It means 
that, in the average supervisory team, supervisors’ ages span from 43 to 55 years old. The 
average proportion of female supervisors on the supervisory board is 20.8%. For the board 
of directors related information, on average, the listed CEs have ten members on the board, 
                                                                
50 For instance, Sinopec Limited (a listed CE) is ultimately controlled by China Petrochemical Corporation Group 
(a CE). Sinopec Group has 71.32% ownership of its listed subsidiary. In 2016, two members on the supervisory 
board of Sinopec Limited concurrently have a position in Sinopec Group, therefore those two supervisors are 
named “affiliated supervisors”. For the detailed information, please see Appendix 3.  
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and 37% of them are independent, which illustrates that most listed CEs follow the 
minimum requirement of one-third of corporate board members should be independent. 
Moreover, the majority of listed CEs has different chairmen and CEOs. For the financial 
related control variables, the listed CEs have an average leverage ratio of 53.4%, measured 
by total debt over total assets, 2.32% of return on total assets and 2.03 of market-to-book 
ratio. The average number of years since the listed CEs went public is 14 and their size varies 
from 0.31 to 2,405.27 billion RMB. Listexg shows that around 69% of the listed CEs are on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
Table 5-3 provides Pearson correlations among the main variables employed in this study, 
which provides initial insights into the relationship between the supervisory board and 
financial reporting quality in listed CEs. As predicted, the size of the supervisory board is 
significantly negatively correlated with the FRQ index and the proportion of affiliated 
supervisors is significantly positively correlated with this index, which provides preliminary 
empirical evidence to support H1 and H2a. For the characteristics of the supervisory board, 
the average age is significantly negatively correlated with the FRQ index. In contrast, the age 
diversity of the supervisory team is significantly positively correlated with the index. These 
results support H3a and H3b, respectively. Last, the board incentive (the average 
compensation of supervisors) is significantly negatively correlated with the FRQ index, which 
is consistent with H4. Overall, most supervisory board related variables have significant 
influences on financial reporting quality. The more reliable results of multivariate tests, 
controlling for differences in industry or year characteristics, are reported in the next 
section. The correlation matrix also intuitively checks the presence of potential 
multicollinearity problem. In Table 5-3, the correlation coefficients among the main 
independent variables and control variables do not have an absolute value higher than 0.7, 
which could indicate there is no multicollinearity problem among the variables. 
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5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 The impact of the supervisory board on financial reporting quality 
Table 5-4 shows the empirical results examining the hypotheses developed before. Columns 
(1) to (8) report the results that test each hypothesis separately, and Column (9) shows the 
results for all hypotheses being examined together in one regression model.  
Column (1) indicates whether the size of the supervisory board has effects on financial 
reporting quality. As shown in Column (1), the coefficient of Supervisory_size is negative and 
significant at the 10% level. Since a lower value of FRQ_index represents higher financial 
reporting quality, the negative coefficient of Supervisory_size indicates a positive 
relationship between the size of the supervisory board and financial reporting quality 
among listed CEs. This result supports H1, and is in line with a study conducted by Firth et al. 
(2007), which reported that the size of the supervisory board has a positive effect on 
improving financial reporting quality. 
Column (2) and (3) report the effect of supervisory board composition on financial reporting 
quality. Board composition is measured through two aspects: the proportion of affiliated 
supervisors (Affiliated_ratio) and the proportion of employee representatives 
(Employee_ratio). In Column (2), the coefficient of Affiliated_ratio is 0.273, and it is 
significant at the level of 5%, indicating that more supervisors from the central enterprise or 
its affiliations weaken the financial reporting quality of listed CEs. This supports H2a that the 
affiliated supervisors from the central enterprises have a negative effect on the quality of 
accounting information among listed CEs. In Column (3), the coefficient of Employee_ratio is 
not significant, thus illustrating that employee representation on the board has no 
significant impact on financial reporting quality in listed CEs. This insignificant result 
supports H2b and is consistent with Ran et al. (2015), who also failed to find a positive effect 
of labour supervisors on improving financial reporting quality, with a sample of all Chinese 
non-financial listed firms from 1999 to 2012. The government has issued related regulations 
to enhance the function of employees. Such as, the aforementioned revised Company Law 
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(2005), which requires all listed firms to have at least one-third employee representatives 
on the supervisory board. However, the insignificant effect of employee representatives 
found in recent studies suggests that further regulations should be carried out by the 
government in order to guarantee the rights of employees and to make the employee 
representatives effective. In short, neither affiliated supervisors nor employee 
representatives can improve financial reporting quality in listed CEs. Hence, it is essential to 
identify a better structure for the supervisory board in listed CEs. 
Columns (4) to (6) show whether the characteristics of the supervisory board affect financial 
reporting quality. To be specific, in Column (4), the coefficient of Age is -0.0279, which is 
significant at the level of 5%. This means that a supervisory team with older average age can 
improve financial reporting quality, as monitoring financial activities needs more experience. 
This linear result is consistent with Ran et al. (2015). Moreover, in Column (5), Age_diversity 
is significantly positively correlated with FRQ_index at the level of 10%. This shows that in 
listed CEs, the age diversity of the supervisory board brings negative effects to financial 
reporting quality. This suggests that supervisors on the board in listed CEs should be older 
and of a similar age, as the supervisory board can take advantage of their rich experience. 
Moreover, the supervisory board is more likely to get unanimous decisions. Subsequently, a 
more efficient supervisory board can promote financial reporting quality in listed CEs. 
Column (6) shows the potential effect of female supervisors. However, this study fails to find 
a significant linear relationship between female supervisors and financial reporting quality in 
listed CEs, as the coefficient of Female_ratio is insignificant. 
Last but not least, the effect of board incentive is examined by using the average total 
compensation of supervisors. In Column (8), the coefficient of Compensation is negative, but 
not significant, which shows that the compensation of supervisors does not affect the 
financial reporting quality of listed CEs. This implies that the compensation package offered 
to the supervisors does not motivate them effectively and hence, will not lead to the 
improvement in financial reporting quality in listed CEs. 
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In case there are potential non-linear relations between the supervisory board related 
independent variables and financial reporting quality (FRQ_index), the quadratic term of 
each independent variable is added into the regression model separately. As only female 
supervisors and financial reporting quality have a curvilinear relationship, Table 5-4 does not 
report the insignificant non-linear relation results between other independent variables and 
financial reporting quality. Column (7) shows that there is a U-shaped relation between 
female supervisors and financial reporting quality, indicated by the positive coefficient of 
Female_ratio and the negative coefficient of Female_square, which are significant at the 5% 
and 10% level respectively. The turning point is 0.442 (0.647/(-(-0.731×2)), which means 
when the proportion of female supervisors exceeds 44.2%, this has a positive effect on 
improving financial reporting quality. However, before this point, the increase of female 
supervisors on the board weakens financial reporting quality. The result shows that the 
proportion of female supervisors should exceed 44.2%, for this will can improve the 
monitoring function of the supervisory board. However, most listed CEs still put up female 
supervisors as a minority. A plausible reason is that the listed CEs just want to deliver a 
positive signal to the public in order to conceal the potential earnings management 
behaviour better, rather than allowing for effective monitoring from the female supervisors. 
In this circumstance, not enough females on the supervisory board may lead to worse 
financial reporting quality. Also, transferring the turning point from the percentage to the 
number of female supervisors, it emerges that the turning point of female supervisors is 
three51. It means when there are three or more women on the supervisory board, this group 
becomes more powerful and has a positive effect on the improvement of financial reporting 
quality in listed CEs. Hence, this study provides new evidence on the critical mass theory 
(Kanter, 1977) and the magic number of three women (Kristie, 2011). Given Ran et al. (2015) 
document a positive linear relation between female supervisors and financial reporting 
quality for a full sample of Chinese non-financial listed firms, the U-shaped relationship 
between the two in listed CEs is a novel finding.  
Regarding the control variables, Firmsize is significantly negatively related to FRQ_index in 
most of the regressions in Table 5-4. It shows that large listed CEs have better financial 
                                                                
51 The average number of supervisors in listed CEs is five, which is shown in Table 5-1. Therefore, the turning 
point of female supervisors in units is derived from 5 × 0.442.  
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reporting quality, which is in line with the argument of Meek et al. (2007) that large firms 
are less likely to engage in earnings management. The other control variables are not 
significant.  
5.4.2 Sensitivity tests 
This subsection carries out several robustness tests in support of the analysis on the main 
regressions. First, this study repeats the main regressions with alternative measures of 
financial reporting quality, including components of the FRQ index: the DAC model, DD 
model, and ABACC2 model. The detailed estimation of three methods pertains to Equations 
(5.1) to (5.3).  
Panels A to C in Table 5-5 tabulate the empirical results of the regressions with the 
dependent variable estimated by DAC model, DD model and ABACC2 model, respectively. In 
Table 5-5, it shows that the positive effect of supervisory board size is significant in all 
alternative measures of financial reporting quality, as indicated by the significant negative 
coefficient of Supervisory_size in all panels. 
For the composition of the supervisory board, the coefficient of Affiliated_ratio in the 
regressions with the dependent variable estimated by these three different specifications is 
significant at least at the 10% level. Hence, H2a is valid, that more affiliated supervisors on 
the board weaken the financial reporting quality of listed CEs. However, all components of 
the financial reporting quality index fail to find significant evidence that employee 
representatives on the supervisory board affect financial reporting quality. Thus, H2b is 
accepted by all these three alternative methods and consequently, this study concludes that 
labour representation on the supervisory board does not affect financial reporting quality in 
listed CEs.  
For the characteristics of the supervisory board, Columns (4) and (5) in Panels A to C show 
that the average age of the supervisory team is positively related to financial reporting 
quality, as indicated by the significant negative coefficient of Age in Table 5-5. Also, the 
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finding of the age diversity of the supervisory board that has a negative effect on financial 
reporting quality is valid for these three alternative methods of reporting it, as the 
coefficient of Age_diverstiy is significant at least at the level of 10% in all the panels of Table 
5-5. Since the positive coefficient of Female_ratio and the negative coefficient of 
Female_square in Table 5-5 are significant at least the level of 10%, the U-shaped relation 
between female supervisors and financial reporting quality is robust. Moreover, the average 
turning point is 0.434, which is similar to that (0.442) found for the main regression with the 
dependent variable measured by the financial reporting quality index (FRQ_index). This 
study, thus, concludes that the proportion of female supervisors on the board has a U-
shaped relationship with financial reporting quality in listed CEs, whereby the female 
supervisors show the ability to monitor effectively when they hold close to half the seats on 
the supervisory board.  
Last, this study has failed to find significant evidence on the relationship between supervisor 
compensation and financial reporting quality among different measures of financial 
reporting quality. Hence, this study documents that the total average compensation of the 
supervisory board has no effect on financial reporting quality among listed CEs. 
There may be an endogeneity issue between the supervisory board and financial reporting 
quality, as a firm’s financial reporting quality can affect both the incentive of someone 
joining the board as a supervisor and the motivation of adding more qualified ones to the 
board. In order to address such a potential endogeneity problem caused by causality, this 
study replaces the contemporary independent variables with one-year lagged ones. This is 
because the function of the supervisory board may need time to reflect on a firm’s financial 
reporting quality. Table 5-6 reports the empirical results with one-year lagged supervisory 
board related variables. They provide consistent outcomes with those of the main 
regressions reported in Table 5-4.   
Furthermore, the strict exogeneity test suggested by Wooldridge (2010, p. 285) is employed 
to address the potential endogeneity issue again. The main regression includes the first 
order leading term Supervisory_board t+1 as additional regressors. Under the null hypothesis 
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of strict exogeneity, the coefficient of Supervisory_boardt+1 would be equal to zero. It means 
that the independent variables (i.e. Supervisory_board) are strictly exogenous, as their first 
order leading terms are not associated with 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Table 5-7 reports the empirical result. All 
leading variables related to the supervisory board are insignificant, which means that they 
are not endogenous to financial reporting quality. In sum, these tests show that the financial 
reporting quality of listed CEs does not lead to the observed supervisory board structure nor 
attract people with certain characteristics to be the supervisor. 
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5.5 Extended tests 
Based on models discussed in section 5.3 and results reported in section 5.4, this study finds 
that the size of the supervisory board has a positive effect in improving the financial 
reporting quality of listed CEs. The composition of the supervisory board has a mixed 
relationship with financial reporting quality, whereby affiliated supervisors from the central 
enterprise groups weaken financial reporting quality, while employee representatives have 
no impact on it. Regarding the characteristics of the supervisory board, supervisors with 
older and similar ages can improve financial reporting quality. The relation between female 
representatives on the supervisory board and financial reporting quality is a U-shape with a 
critical mass point at 0.442 (turning point). Last, this study has failed to find that the board 
incentive (average compensation of supervisory board) works in improving financial 
reporting quality. This section carries out extended tests to examine the other factors that 
potentially affect the relationship between the supervisory board and financial reporting 
quality among listed CEs. 
5.5.1 Extra control from the ultimate owner and the effect of the supervisory board on financial 
reporting quality 
As noted, the listed CEs have a strong connection with the central government and are 
subject to more significant political influence. The Chinese government has conducted four 
rounds of mixed-ownership reforms that have brought non-state capital into SOEs, in order 
to make them more competitive in the capital market. Also, it has been separating its 
government function from enterprise management. However, the central government still 
exercises extra control power on some listed CEs by deviating the cash-flow rights from the 
voting rights through the pyramid structure. Claessens et al. (2002) document that the 
divergence of control and ownership from the ultimate controlling shareholders leads to 
lower firm value, as the willingness of the ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate 
the wealth of minority shareholders is less restrained by their cash-flow rights. In this case, 
as the practical ultimate owner of listed CEs, the central enterprises may transfer resources 
from listed CEs to the other affiliations in the business group to fulfil the political and profit 
 
154 
targets set by the superior governmental institutions. Since these are tunnelling activities 
against the interest of minority shareholders and not accepted by the public, the listed CEs 
will seek to engage in earnings management to conceal them on the financial statement. 
Hence, the quality of financial reporting will deteriorate under this circumstance.  
There is a further examination as to whether extra control from the central enterprises 
affects the monitoring function of the supervisory board on financial reporting quality in 
listed CEs. To be specific, this study tests the performance of two different types of 
supervisors (affiliated supervisors and employee representatives) on financial reporting 
quality under extra control from the central enterprises. For which, a dummy variable 
measures the presence of extra control from the central enterprises (Extra_control). It 
equals 1 if the voting rights exceed the cash-flow rights owned by the central government 
and 0, if the voting rights just equal the cash-flow rights owned by the central government. 
To examine the influence of extra control, this study adds the interaction term of 
Extra_control and Affiliated_ratio (Employee_ratio) into the main regression. As most 
studies (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Yeh, 2005; Chou et al., 2018) agree that the divergence 
of control and ownership leads to an entrenchment effect, this study expects that extra 
control from the central enterprises strengthens the negative effect of affiliated supervisors 
on financial reporting quality and weakens the potential effect of employee representatives 
on it.   
Panel A, Table 5-8 displays the statistics of listed CEs with extra control from the central 
enterprises from 2012 to 2016. The average number of listed CEs with extra control from 
the central enterprises is 73, which is around 40%. That is about 40% of the observations 
experience extra control power from the central enterprises due to the deviation of cash-
flow rights from voting rights.  
Panel B, Table 5-8, shows the results from examining the influence of extra control by the 
central enterprises on the relationship between these two different types of supervisors and 
financial reporting quality. In Column (1), the coefficient of the interaction term of 
Extra_control and Affiliated_ratio is not significant. This means that extra control from the 
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central enterprises does not have a substantial influence on the relation between affiliated 
supervisors and financial reporting quality. In Column (2), the insignificant coefficient of the 
interaction term of Extra_control and Employee_ratio shows that extra control from the 
central enterprises does not have a significant influence on the relationship between 
employee representatives and financial reporting quality either. Overall, extra control from 
the central enterprises does not influence the relationship between these two types of 




5.5.2 The size effect and the effect of the supervisory board on financial reporting quality 
In the main regressions, this study finds that large listed CEs have better financial reporting 
quality. This result is consistent with the evidence found by Lang and Lundholm (1993) that 
firm size is positively related to disclosure policy decisions. Cohen (2008) also documents 
that the larger the firm, the higher quality of its financial reporting, with a sample of 18,264 
firm-year observations in a period from 1987 to 2003. There are several possible reasons 
why large firms are not likely to engage in earnings management. Meek et al. (2007) argue 
that firm size is a good proxy for information asymmetry and strength of governance. The 
existing literature (e.g., Collins et al., 1987; Haw and Kim, 1991) shows that large firms 
generally have lower information asymmetry, which effectively constrains the potential 
earnings management behaviours. Large firms are also found to experience strong internal 
and external monitoring. Kesner (1988) documents that larger firms have more reliable 
boards, as they have a larger proportion of independent directors. Also, such firms are 
generally the clients of large accounting companies with higher quality audits (DeAngelo, 
1981). Meek et al. (2007) also argue that large firms are more in the public eye and the 
sanctions due to manipulating earnings are likely to be more severe for them than small 
ones. The larger listed CEs are important and usually concentrated in monopoly industries, 
which leads to more political sensitivity than with smaller firms and more scrutiny from the 
government. For instance, PetroChina Company Limited had around 2.4 trillion RMB assets 
in the period from 2012 to 2016 and, is one of the largest listed CEs. The information in such 
listed CEs (e.g. the appointment and removal of top executives) generally attracts more 
attention from the public. It is important for large listed CEs to make information 
transparent, in order to maintain their reputation.  
Accordingly, whether the supervisors in large listed CEs have different performance on 
financial reporting quality is examined. A dummy variable is used to distinguish the large 
listed CEs (Large_firmsize). It equals 1 if the firm size is over the average value of Firmsize in 
the sample and 0, otherwise. Then, this variable and its interaction term with 
Affiliated_ratio (Employee_ratio) are added to the main regression. As the large firms are 
generally discussed as having better informativeness of earnings, this study predicts that 
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large firm size can constrain the negative effect of affiliated supervisors and promotes the 
potential effect of employ representatives on the supervisory board. 
Table 5-9 shows the empirical results. For affiliated supervisors, the coefficient of the 
interaction term of Large_firmsize and Affiliated_ratio is negative and significant at the level 
of 10%. It indicates that large firms can mitigate the negative effect of affiliated supervisors 
on financial reporting quality in listed CEs. For employee representatives on the supervisory 
board, the coefficient of Employee_ratio and its interaction term with Large_firmsize fails to 
be significant, which shows that firm size does not have a significant influence on the 
relationship between employee representatives and financial reporting quality. Also, the 
median of firm size is utilised as the cut-off point to distinguish the large listed CEs, and this 




This study has involved investigating the effect of the supervisory board on financial 
reporting quality among listed CEs. Different to existing studies that argue the supervisory 
board in most Chinese listed firms are ineffective, this study does provide some empirical 
evidence on the positive function of supervisory boards in listed CEs. For instance, this study 
finds that a large supervisory board has a positive effect on improving the quality of 
financial information in listed CEs. Moreover, a supervisory board with older members is 
significantly positively related to the financial reporting quality of listed CEs, being explained 
as older supervisors having more experience and hence, they can play a better role in 
monitoring and dealing with financial affairs in listed CEs. Also, this study reports a U-shaped 
relation between the proportion of female supervisors and financial reporting quality. That 
is when there are three or more women on the supervisory board, the monitoring role of 
female supervisors becomes effective in improving financial reporting quality in listed CEs. 
Hence, this work provides new empirical evidence on the critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977) 
and the magic number of three women on the board (Kristie, 2011).  
Also, this study identifies some characteristics of the supervisory board in listed CEs that 
bring adverse effects on financial reporting quality. The affiliated supervisors from the 
central enterprises weaken the informativeness of earnings in listed CEs, since the target of 
the central enterprise groups is politically oriented instead of profit oriented. The age 
diversity of the supervisory team has a significant negative effect on financial reporting 
quality as well. Lastly, this study finds that the employee representatives on the supervisory 
board and board incentives (average compensation of supervisors) have no relation with 
financial reporting quality in listed CEs.  
In addition, this study has conducted extended tests in relation to this topic. First, this study 
examines whether extra control from the central enterprises affects the performance of two 
different kinds of supervisors on financial reporting quality. No significant evidence was 
found that extra control from the central enterprises affects the relationship between the 
affiliated supervisors (employee representatives) and financial reporting quality. Second, 
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this study tests whether firm size affects the performance of the affiliated supervisors and 
employee representatives on financial reporting quality. It emerges that listed CEs with a 
large size can mitigate the negative effect of affiliated supervisors on financial reporting 
quality, while this does not influence the relation between employee representatives and 
financial reporting quality in listed CEs. 
The empirical results of this study provide political implications for regulators. The rights of 
employees should be further enhanced, as the employee representatives on the supervisory 
board are ineffective. Additionally, the supervisory board should be balanced with 
representatives from different interest groups. In particular, the government should limit 
the proportion of affiliated supervisors from the central enterprises and recommend the 
listed CEs to have more independent supervisors. Furthermore, the outcomes of this study 
suggest that listed CEs should have close to half female members on the supervisory board. 
Overall, the findings confirm that the presence of certain characteristics of the supervisory 
board in listed CEs can lead to the improvement of financial reporting quality. Having 
identified these characteristics, this sheds light on the appropriate future direction of the 





Table 5-1 Summary of variable definitions 
 
  Variables  Variable description 
FRQ variable 
 DAC  The absolute residual values from the performance matched 
discretionary accruals model, referring to Equation (5.1). 
 DD  The absolute residual values from the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model measuring the earnings quality, referring to 
Equation (5.2). 
 ABACC2  The absolute residual values from the squared abnormal 
accruals model, referring to Equation (5.3). 




 Supervisory_size  Total number of supervisors. 
 Affiliated_ratio  The ratio of supervisors affiliated with the central enterprise or 
its affiliations to the total number of supervisors. 
 Employee_ratio  The ratio of employee representatives on the supervisory board 
to the total number of supervisors. 
 Age  The average of the supervisory board team. 
 Age_diversity  The standard deviation of age of the supervisors on the board 
scaled by the average age of the firm’s supervisors. 
 Female_ratio  The ratio of female supervisors to the total number of 
supervisors. 




 Boardsize  Total number of directors on the corporate board. 
 Independent_directors  The ratio of independent directors to the total number of 
directors on the board. 
 Ceo_duality  A dummy variable that equals 1, if the CEO also holds the 
position of chairman of the board and equals 0, otherwise. 
Firm characteristics 
variables 
 Leverage  The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 ROA  Return on assets; the ratio of net income to the total value of 
assets. 
 MB  The ratio of the market value to the book value of assets. 
 Firmage  The number of years since the listed CE went on public. 
 Firmsize  The natural logarithm of total assets. 
 Big4  An indicator variable that equals one, if the auditing service is 
provided by the big four accounting companies and zero, 
otherwise. 
This table shows the definitions of the variables employed in the main regressions. The data on affiliated 
supervisors is manually collected from the annual reports of listed CEs, whilst other governance, ownership 





Table 5-2 Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Median Max 
Financial reporting quality 
DAC 952 0.0657 0.0703 0.0000266 0.0478 0.739 
DD 940 0.0559 0.0526 0.00017 0.0412 0.295 
ABACC2 1044 0.00866 0.0284 3.6×10-11 0.00197 0.594 
FRQ_index 905 -0.0245 0.757 -0.746 -0.243 6.679 
       
Supervisory board       
Supervisory_size 1050 4.245 1.422 2 4 12 
Affiliated_ratio 1050 0.419 0.238 0 0.4 1 
Employee_ratio 1026 0.375 0.0890 0.143 0.333 1 
Age 1050 49.455 3.757 37.667 49.6 61 
Age_diversity 1050 0.121 0.0506 0.00973 0.117 0.295 
Female_ratio 1050 0.208 0.222 0 0.2 1 
Compensation (10K/RMB) 1047 18.640 15.685 0 14.675 168.921 
       
Board of directors       
Boardsize 1050 9.361905 1.926801 5 9 16 
Independent_directors 1050 0.370 0.0596 0.231 0.333 0.714 
Ceo_duality 1050 0.06 0.238 0 0 1 
       
Financial performance 
Leverage 1050 0.534 0.197 0.0188 0.549 0.979 
ROA 1050 0.0232 0.0593 -0.586 0.0245 0.298 
MB 1050 2.026 1.268 0.219 1.599 9.707 
       
Firm characteristics       
Firmage 1050 14.237 4.709 0 15 24 
Firmsize (billion/RMB) 1050 52.592 199.419 0.307 8.195 2405.265 
Big4 1050 0.167 0.373 0 0 1 
Listexg 1050 0.692 0.462 0 1 1 





Table 5-3 Correlation matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 FRQ_index 1                  
2 Supervisory_size -0.096*** 1                 
3 Affiliated_ratio 0.076** -0.171*** 1                
4 Employee_ratio -0.006 0.143*** -0.162*** 1               
5 Age -0.168*** 0.097*** -0.050 0.026 1              
6 Age_diversity 0.088*** -0.012 0.0133 0.015 -0.366*** 1             
7 Female_ratio 0.083** -0.145*** 0.0216 0.010 -0.263*** 0.074** 1            
8 Compensation -0.058* 0.149*** -0.156*** 0.086*** 0.066** -0.060* -0.051 1           
9 Boardsize -0.070** 0.372*** -0.066** -0.026 0.107*** -0.023 -0.099*** 0.059* 1          
10 Independent_directors 0.016 -0.105*** 0.009 0.105*** 0.024 -0.038 0.008 -0.009 -0.322*** 1         
11 Ceo_duality 0.035 -0.023 -0.046 -0.002 -0.064** -0.020 -0.036 -0.006 -0.091*** 0.137*** 1        
12 Leverage -0.096*** 0.022 0.024 -0.006 0.061* -0.012 -0.116*** 0.028 0.174*** -0.003 0.015 1       
13 ROA 0.077** -0.099*** -0.024 -0.086*** -0.177*** 0.111*** 0.143*** -0.113*** -0.165*** -0.061** -0.036 -0.409*** 1      
14 MB -0.029 0.054* -0.024 0.007 -0.031 0.013 0.071** 0.033 -0.003 -0.067** -0.042 -0.314*** 0.086*** 1     
15 Firmage 0.062* -0.119*** 0.072** 0.060* -0.048 0.012 0.026 -0.029 -0.141*** -0.117*** -0.023 -0.011 0.118*** -0.032 1    
16 Firmsize -0.153*** 0.270*** 0.079** 0.013 0.378*** -0.176*** -0.149*** 0.191*** 0.306*** 0.129*** -0.073** 0.415*** -0.566*** 0.011 -0.182*** 1   
17 Big4 -0.090*** 0.101*** 0.002 -0.008 0.157*** -0.159*** -0.041 0.116*** 0.126*** 0.069** -0.005 -0.004 -0.196*** 0.129*** -0.110*** 0.459*** 1  
18 Listexg -0.084** 0.096*** 0.010 -0.065** 0.082*** -0.028 -0.037 -0.036 0.172*** -0.045 -0.032 0.051* 0.011 -0.001 -0.395*** 0.152*** 0.077** 1 
  N 1,050                                   
This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix among the independent and control variables employed in the study. The description of variables refers to Table 5-1. 







Table 5-4 The effect of the supervisory board on financial reporting quality (FRQ_index) 
 
  Dependent variable (FRQ_index)  
 Board Size   Board Composition   Board Characteristics   Board Incentives   All 
VARIABLES (1)   (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7)   (8)   (9) 
                          
Supervisory_size -0.031*            -0.023 
 (0.018)            (0.017) 
Affiliated_ratio   0.273**          0.146 
   (0.127)          (0.117) 
Employee_ratio    -0.135         0.028 
    (0.238)         (0.244) 
Age      -0.028**       -0.020* 
      (0.011)       (0.011) 
Age_diversity       1.071*      0.626 
       (0.546)      (0.559) 
Female_ratio        0.183 0.647**    0.443 
        (0.123) (0.286)    (0.272) 
Female_square         -0.731*    -0.681* 
         (0.377)    (0.360) 
Compensation           -0.016  -0.010 
           (0.019)  (0.023) 
Boardsize 0.009  0.004 -0.002  -0.000342 0.000517 0.003 0.001  0.003  0.005 
 (0.015)  (0.014) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Independent_directors 0.252  0.320 0.276  0.165 0.269 0.268 0.306  0.206  0.166 
 (0.437)  (0.434) (0.438)  (0.448) (0.430) (0.438) (0.433)  (0.430)  (0.427) 
Ceo_duality 0.068  0.069 0.0577  0.054 0.071 0.071 0.057  0.072  0.057 
 (0.097)  (0.098) (0.100)  (0.097) (0.102) (0.100) (0.105)  (0.097)  (0.105) 
Leverage -0.286  -0.237 -0.164  -0.321 -0.261 -0.244 -0.246  -0.242  -0.225 
 (0.212)  (0.207) (0.211)  (0.213) (0.208) (0.209) (0.211)  (0.207)  (0.212) 
ROA -0.561  -0.490 -0.423  -0.759 -0.634 -0.612 -0.679  -0.624  -0.624 
 (0.492)  (0.486) (0.499)  (0.505) (0.502) (0.495) (0.499)  (0.493)  (0.507) 
MB -0.006  -0.013 -0.009  -0.006 -0.009 -0.011 -0.011  -0.011  -0.008 
 (0.0297)  (0.031) (0.031)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
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Firmage 0.000728  -0.000471 -0.002  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002  0.000964  -0.003 
 (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Firmsize -0.050*  -0.068** -0.062**  -0.029 -0.055* -0.056** -0.054*  -0.055**  -0.033 
 (0.029)  (0.030) (0.029)  (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.032) 
Big4 -0.063  -0.046 -0.047  -0.069 -0.042 -0.060 -0.067  -0.083  -0.066 
 (0.073)  (0.074) (0.073)  (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074)  (0.067)  (0.070) 
Listexg -0.102  -0.109 -0.114  -0.092 -0.103 -0.100 -0.093  -0.116  -0.115 
 (0.081)  (0.083) (0.083)  (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080)  (0.081)  (0.080) 
Constant 0.419  0.271 0.454  1.677** 0.227 0.301 0.256  0.550  1.325* 
 (0.357)  (0.335) (0.378)  (0.717) (0.334) (0.342) (0.341)  (0.383)  (0.725) 
              
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Observations 905  905 886  905 905 905 905  902  883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026  0.030 0.022  0.039 0.028 0.026 0.029  0.027  0.039 
Cluster Firm   Firm Firm   Firm Firm Firm Firm   Firm   Firm 
The table reports the OLS regression results absorbing the multiple fixed effects from industry and year. Female_square is the quadratic term of the proportion of female 
supervisors on the board.  The description of variables refers to Table 5-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 








Table 5-5 Financial reporting quality measured by DAC model/DD model/ABACC2 model 
Panel A: Financial reporting quality measured by the DAC model 
  Dependent variable (DAC) 
 Board size   Board Composition   Board Characteristics   Board Incentives   All 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)   (8) 
                        
Supervisory_size -0.003*           -0.003 
 (0.002)           (0.002) 
Affiliated_ratio   0.024**         0.012 
   (0.011)         (0.010) 
Employee_ratio    -0.001        0.016 
    (0.019)        (0.019) 
Age      -0.003***      -0.002** 
      (0.001)      (0.001) 
Age_diversity       0.079*     0.041 
       (0.045)     (0.044) 
Female_ratio        0.055**    0.037 
        (0.023)    (0.023) 
Female_square        -0.052*    -0.050 
        (0.031)    (0.030) 
Compensation          -0.002  -0.002 
          (0.002)  (0.002)              
Control variables YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Observations 952  952 928  952 952 952  949  925 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020  0.023 0.017  0.033 0.020 0.023  0.020  0.034 
Cluster Firm   Firm Firm   Firm Firm Firm   Firm   Firm 
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Panel B: Financial reporting quality measured by the DD model 
  Dependent variable (DD) 
 Board size   Board Composition   Board Characteristics   Board Incentives   All 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)   (8) 
                        
Supervisory_size -0.002*           -0.002 
 (0.001)           (0.001) 
Affiliated_ratio   0.015*         0.008 
   (0.008)         (0.008) 
Employee_ratio    -0.021        -0.013 
    (0.020)        (0.021) 
Age      -0.001**      -0.001 
      (0.000595)      (0.000658) 
Age_diversity       0.074*     0.048 
       (0.042)     (0.045) 
Female_ratio        0.039*    0.026 
        (0.021)    (0.020) 
Female_square        -0.053**    -0.049* 
        (0.027)    (0.026) 
Compensation          -0.000386  0.000207 
          (0.001)  (0.001) 
             
Control variables YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Observations 940  940 921  940 940 940  937  918 
Adjusted R-squared 0.047  0.049 0.044  0.054 0.049 0.048  0.047  0.053 
Cluster Firm   Firm Firm   Firm Firm Firm   Firm   Firm 
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Panel C: Financial reporting quality measured by the ABACC2 model 
  Dependent variable (ABACC2) 
 Board size   Board Composition   Board Characteristics   Board Incentives   All 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)   (8) 
                        
Supervisory_size -0.001**           -0.001* 
 (0.000648)           (0.0006) 
Affiliated_ratio   0.012***         0.008** 
   (0.004)         (0.004) 
Employee_ratio    -0.008        -0.001 
    (0.006)        (0.005) 
Age      -0.000673**      -0.000416 
      (0.000317)      (0.000331) 
Age_diversity       0.036**     0.0279* 
       (0.015)     (0.015) 
Female_ratio        0.018**    0.015* 
        (0.008)    (0.008) 
Female_square        -0.022**    -0.024** 
        (0.010)    (0.011) 
Compensation          -0.000530  -0.000310 
          (0.000587)  (0.000705)              
Control variables YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Observations 1,044  1,044 1,020  1,044 1,044 1,044  1,041  1,017 
Adjusted R-squared 0.014  0.018 0.011  0.016 0.013 0.012  0.012  0.023 
Cluster Firm   Firm Firm   Firm Firm Firm   Firm   Firm 
Panels A, B, and C display the results of the main regressions with alternative dependent variable measurements. DAC in Panel A is derived from the performance matched 
discretionary accruals model, which refers to Equation (5.1). DD in Panel B is calculated from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, referring to Equation (5.2). In Panel C, 
ABACC2 is from the square abnormal accruals, which refers to Equation (5.3). The description of other variables refers to Table 5-1. The standard errors are clustered by 





Table 5-6 Replacement of the independent variables with lagged supervisory board variables 
 
  Dependent variable (FRQ_index) 
 Board size   Board Composition   Board Characteristics   Board Incentives   All 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)   (8) 
                        
Supervisory_size -0.037*           -0.038* 
 (0.021) 
          (0.021) 
Affiliated_ratio   0.076         -0.030 
 
  (0.126)         (0.119) 
Employee_ratio    -0.181        -0.059 
 
   (0.374)        (0.378) 
Age      -0.020      -0.016 
 
     (0.012)      (0.012) 
Age_diversity       1.464*     1.342* 
 
      (0.753)     (0.698) 
Female_ratio        0.564*    0.466 
 
       (0.314)    (0.306) 
Female_square        -0.670*    -0.633* 
 
       (0.389)    (0.379) 
Compensation          -0.007  -0.004 
 
         (0.013)  (0.014) 
             
Control variables YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Observations 712  712 694  712 712 712  710  692 
Adjusted R-squared 0.052  0.048 0.046  0.056 0.057 0.053  0.048  0.071 
Cluster Firm   Firm Firm   Firm Firm Firm   Firm   Firm 
The table reports the OLS results when replacing the independent variables with one-year lagged data. Supervisory_size is lagged number of supervisors on the board. 
Affiliated_ratio is lagged affiliated supervisor ratio. Employee_ratio is lagged proportion of employee representatives on the supervisory board. Age is lagged average age 
of the   supervisory board. Age_diversity is lagged age diversity of the supervisory board. Female_ratio is lagged female supervisor ratio. Female_square is the quadratic 
term of lagged female supervisor ratio. Compensation is lagged average total compensation of the supervisory board. The description of other variables is that of those 





Table 5-7 The strict exogeneity test for supervisory board variables 
 
  Dependent variable (FRQ_index) 
 Board size   Board Composition   Board Characteristics   Board Incentives   All 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)   (8) 
                        
Supervisory_size t+1 -0.024           -0.035 
 (0.036) 
          (0.040) 
Affiliated_ratio t+1  
 0.071  
       -0.028 
  
 (0.148)  
       (0.147) 
Employee_ratio t+1  
 
 0.405 




       (0.403) 
Age t+1  
 
  
 -0.014   




 (0.022)   
   (0.022) 




 -1.408  





 (1.266)  
   (1.299) 




  -0.011 





  (0.543) 
   (0.525) 




  0.097 





  (0.668) 
   (0.618) 




   





   
 (0.023)  (0.013) 
Supervisory_size -0.007    
 




 (0.038)           (0.041) 
Affiliated_ratio   0.339**         0.300** 
   (0.140)         (0.134) 
Employee_ratio    -0.461        -0.440 
    (0.322)        (0.347) 
Age      -0.024      -0.017 
      (0.021)      (0.020) 
Age_diversity       1.993     1.603 
       (1.228)     (1.093) 
Female_ratio        0.420    0.299 
        (0.536)    (0.525) 
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Female_square        -0.553    -0.185 
        (0.614)    (0.589) 
Compensation          0.001  0.007 
          (0.009)  (0.011) 
             
Control variables YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Observations 726  726 702  726 726 726  722  698 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045  0.057 0.043  0.070 0.049 0.045  0.046  0.087 
Cluster Firm   Firm Firm   Firm Firm Firm   Firm   Firm 
The table reports the OLS results of strict exogeneity tests. Supervisory_size t+1 is the number of supervisors on the board in year t+1. Affiliated_ratio t+1 is the affiliated 
supervisor ratio in year t+1. Employee_ratio t+1 is the proportion of employee representatives on the supervisory board in year t+1. Age t+1 is the average age of the 
supervisory board in year t+1. Age_diversity t+1 is the age diversity of the supervisory board in year t+1. Female_ratio t+1 is the female supervisor ratio in year t+1. 
Female_square t+1 is the quadratic term of female supervisor ratio in year t+1. Compensation t+1 is the average total compensation of the supervisory board in year t+1.  
For the description of the other variables, please refer to Table 5-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 




Table 5-8 Extra control by the ultimate owner and the effect of supervisors on financial reporting 
quality 
Panel A: Summary statistics of extra control from the ultimate owner in years 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Listed CEs with extra control (N) 77 75 75 76 63 366 
Total listed CEs in years (N) 191 193 187 180 154 905 
Listed CEs with extra control (%) 40.3% 38.9% 40.1% 42.2% 40.9% 40.4% 
       
Panel B: Extra control from the ultimate owner and the effect of supervisors on financial reporting quality  
 Dependent variable (FRQ_index) 
 Affiliated supervisors  employee representatives 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) 
       
Affiliated_ratio 0.333*   
 (0.177)   
Affiliated_ ratio × Extra_control -0.145   
 (0.251)   
Employee_ratio   -0.196 
   (0.325) 
Employee_ratio × Extra_control   0.155 
   (0.427) 
Extra_control 0.052  -0.067 
 (0.099)  (0.184) 
    
Control variables YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Observations 905  886 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028  0.019 
Cluster Firm  Firm 
Panel A reports the statistics of extra control from the ultimate owner in years. 
Panel B reports the OLS regression results of the effect of supervisors on financial reporting quality under extra 
control from the ultimate owner. Extra_control is an indicator variable of the presence of extra control from 
the central enterprises. When the voting rights exceed the cash-flow rights owned by the central government, 
Extra_control takes 1 and 0, otherwise. The regression model has the same control variables with the main 
one, and the description of the variables is that of those shown in Table 5-1. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5-9 Large listed CEs and the effect of supervisors on financial reporting quality 
 
 Dependent variable (FRQ_index) 
 Affiliated supervisors  employee representatives 
VARIABLES (1)  (2) 
       
Affiliated_ratio 0.471**   
 (0.220)   
Affiliated_ ratio × Large_firmsize -0.441*   
 (0.253)   
Employee_ratio   -0.144 
   (0.305) 
Employee_ratio × Large_firmsize   0.065 
   (0.479) 
Large_firmsize 0.109  -0.101 
 (0.114)  (0.204) 
    
Control variables YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Observations 905  886 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028  0.016 
Cluster Firm  Firm 
The table reports the OLS regression results of size effect and the effect of supervisors on financial reporting 
quality. 
Large_firmsize is an indicator variable that equals 1, if the firm size exceeds the mean and 0, otherwise. The 
regression model has the same control variables with the main one, and the description of the variables is that 
of those shown in Table 5-1.  
The standard errors are clustered by firm and shown in parentheses. 




Chapter 6 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis was to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms in listed CEs. This thesis carried out three independent studies relating to this 
topic. The first was set out to identify the determinants of affiliated directors from the 
central enterprise or its affiliations and to examine their effects on firm value. The second 
study discussed the relationship between independent directors and investment efficiency. 
The third study examined the impact of the supervisory board on improving firm’s financial 
reporting quality.   
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 summarises and concludes the 
results for the three main studies. Section 6.3 highlights the implications of the research 
results. Section 6.4 discusses the limitations of this research. The suggestions for further 
research are shown in Section 6.5. 
6.2 Summary of the results 
6.2.1 Determinants of affiliated directors and their economic effects on firm value 
This study first, investigated whether the cash-flow rights and the deviation of voting rights 
and cash-flow rights motivate central enterprises (on behalf of the central government) to 
appoint more affiliated directors onto the corporate board of listed CEs. The empirical 
results show that the high cash-flow rights owned by the central government have no 
relation with the appointment of affiliated directors. Yet the significant divergence of voting 
and cash-flow rights motivates the central enterprises to place more affiliated directors on 
the corporate board to enhance their control power on listed CEs.  
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Then, this study examined the effect of affiliated directors from the central enterprises on 
the firm value of listed CEs. It has been elicited that the affiliated directors from the central 
enterprises have an inverse U-shaped relationship with subsequent firm value. This implies 
that there is a balanced board structure (measured by the proportion of affiliated directors 
from the central enterprises), which leads to the highest firm value. This means that a 
moderate proportion of affiliated directors increases firm value. However, they reduce the 
firm value, when the representatives from the central enterprises on the corporate board 
exceed the turning point. Combining the main results found in this study that a higher 
entrenchment effect from the central enterprises leads to more affiliated directors on the 
corporate board, and that too many can reduce the firm value of listed CEs, this study finds 
that the corporate board is a main channel for the ultimate owner to enhance control 
power. 
The results of additional tests show that the external audit is an effective external 
mechanism that can constrain the negative effect of too many affiliated directors on the 
corporate board, while foreign institutional investors are not an effective mechanism. 
Excess board seats control was employed as the proxy for the divergence of control and 
ownership, with the results showing that, excess board seats control from the central 
enterprises is harmful to the firm value of listed CEs. Additionally, this study finds that both 
the external audit and the foreign institutional shareholdings can eliminate the negative 
effect of excess board seats control from the central enterprises on firm value. 
6.2.2 Independent directors and investment efficiency 
Secondly, it has been elicited that the relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and investment efficiency in listed CEs is non-linear. The turning point of the 
proportion of such directors is 47.3%. This suggests that before reaching this point, 
independent directors are negatively associated with investment efficiency. However, when 
more than this proportion are independent, then they have a positive effect on improving 
investment efficiency in listed CEs. Also, the U-shaped relationship between independent 
directors and investment efficiency is quite distinct among listed CEs through the PSM 
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approach. After separating the full sample into the over- and under-investment groups, this 
study finds a consistent result in the over-investment group, but no significant evidence 
among firms with insufficient investment issues emerged. The evidence shows that the 
independent directors can improve investment efficiency in listed CEs, when their 
proportion exceeds a certain level, and this evidence is more prominent in over-investment 
firms.  
In addition, this study examined the attendance behaviour of independent directors 
measured by the average frequency of independent directors appointing a representative to 
attend board meetings. The empirical result shows that high frequency of independent 
directors delegating a representative to attend meetings leads to lower investment 
efficiency in listed CEs. Also, this evidence is valid in both the over- and under-investment 
groups. Moreover, more female independent directors on the corporate board improve 
investment efficiency in the full sample as well as the over-investment group. This study 
only finds a significant positive relationship between the age diversity of independent 
directors and investment efficiency in the over-investment group. Last, it has been 
documented that extra control from the central enterprises hinders the function of 
independent directors, with a similar result emerging in the over-investment group, but not 
the under-investment one. 
6.2.3 The supervisory board and financial reporting quality  
Study 3 examined the relationship between the supervisory board and financial reporting 
quality according to four aspects: supervisory board size, board composition, board 
characteristics, and board incentives. It has been found that a large supervisory board 
improves the financial reporting quality of listed CEs. The effects of supervisory board 
composition on the informativeness of earnings are mixed. The proportion of affiliated 
supervisors from the central enterprises is negatively associated with financial reporting 
quality. In contrast, the proportion of employee representatives has no effect on financial 
reporting quality in listed CEs. Regarding the characteristics of the supervisory board, it 
emerged that a supervisory team of older and/or similar age has a positive impact on the 
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financial reporting quality of listed CEs. The gender diversity of the supervisory board 
measured by the proportion of female supervisors has a U-shaped relation, with financial 
reporting quality with a turning point of three in number. When there are more than three 
female supervisors on the supervisory board, the supervisory board becomes effective in 
improving the financial reporting quality of listed CEs. 
This study also conducted two extended tests. These involved examining whether extra 
control from the central enterprises and firm size affect the performance of affiliated 
supervisors and employee representatives on the supervisory board. The results show that 
extra control from the central enterprises does not affect the relationship between these 
two kinds of supervisors and financial reporting quality. Also, large firm size can mitigate the 
negative effect of affiliated supervisors on financial reporting quality but does not influence 
the relationship between employee representatives and financial reporting quality. 
6.3 Implications of the results 
The findings from the three studies suggest that modern corporate governance mechanisms 
do bring positive effects to listed CEs, which confirms the achievements of the central 
enterprise reform. For instance, Study 2 posits that independent directors improve 
investment efficiency in listed CEs, when they constitute more than 47.3% of directors on 
the corporate board. This relation is more evident among listed CEs with over-investment 
issues. Study 3 documents that larger and more independent supervisory board enhances 
the financial reporting quality of listed CEs. However, through this thesis, the deficiencies of 
the current corporate governance mechanisms in listed CEs have been identified as well, 
thus showing the direction for further central enterprise reform. A significant corporate 
governance problem uncovered in this research is in about the board members from the 
central enterprises. Specifically, it has been that too many representatives from the central 
enterprises on both the corporate board and the supervisory board have a negative effect 
on listed CEs. It provides the central government robust evidence on how to manage listed 
CEs in an appropriate way, which will involve further separating its role as the owner of 
state-owned assets and the regulator. 
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The reliable empirical evidence from this thesis provides political implications for the 
direction of the central enterprise reform aimed at idealising the modern enterprise system 
among listed CEs. The outcomes of this research suggest that the corporate board of listed 
CEs should have more than half of independent directors as members to make them more 
influential and powerful. Also, the corporate board in listed CEs should limit the proportion 
of affiliated directors from the central enterprises, which mitigates the potential 
entrenchment effect exerted by these central enterprises. It is informed that the balanced 
combination of the board structure of affiliated directors and independent directors can 
enhance the firm value of listed CEs. Similar to the corporate board, the supervisory board 
in listed CEs should control the proportion of supervisors affiliated with the central 
enterprises as well. Additionally, the government should amend related regulations to 
enhance the rights and the function of employee representatives on the supervisory board.  
6.4 Limitations of the study 
China is not the only economy that has SOEs, so the single country-specific analysis leads to 
limitations. As the concentrated ownership structure and government intervention are also 
common in other emerging markets, the findings in this thesis may provide the basis for the 
comparative research including this market. Also, the implications identified in this research 
for the central enterprises may not be suitable for other types of listed firms on the capital 
market, even though they share some similarities with these enterprises.  
The proxy variable issue is a common problem to all empirical studies, which causes another 
limitation in this thesis. Those employed in this work have been theoretically and empirically 
defended, with alternative proxies being used as robustness checks. However, 
measurement error between the proxies and the theoretical propositions cannot be 




6.5 Suggestions for further research 
The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative52 encourages Chinese enterprises to go abroad and 
promotes their overseas expansion with a range of new supporting government policies. Du 
and Zhang (2018) argue that SOEs are a strong force to fulfil political goals. Hence, the 
outward direct investment of listed CEs is an attractive topic for further study. The analysis 
between the corporate governance mechanisms and the outward direct investment of listed 
CEs could provide new insights into the effectiveness of the corporate board in alternative 
investment decision-making among listed CEs. 
Another natural extension of this research would be to investigate further the 
characteristics of these affiliated directors, such as the educational background, work 
experience, gender diversity, early-life career and age. This would reveal what kind of 
affiliated members are usually chosen by the central enterprises. Whether the 
characteristics of affiliated directors have a more significant impact on the firm value or 
other indicators of a firm’s corporate governance level is another potential research avenue. 
A clear understanding of the characteristics of affiliated directors can further inform the 
governance reform and provide more precise regulation recommendations. 
Whilst this study focuses on listed CEs, it is also meaningful to investigate such corporate 
governance related issues among listed local SOEs (the listed firms ultimately controlled by 
local governments). Hence, the subsequent research should extend this governance topic to 
listed local SOEs and ascertain whether the central and local governments have different 
motivations, thus leading to different phenomena in these two kinds of listed SOEs. Such 
comparative research could provide more specific implications for the reform of both listed 
CEs and listed local SOEs.  
                                                                
52 The initiative is a grand plan for China’s economic integration with various parts of the world (particularly 
the countries located on the Silk Economic Belt and New Maritime Silk Road, such as Central and West Asia, 
Western Europe and Russia). This initiative encourages Chinese enterprises to increase their direct overseas 
investments in various sectors in related countries. In particular, China mainly integrates the trading partners 
by developing their infrastructure in order to implement Beijing’s own interests. Most infrastructure projects 
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2. Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies Guiding Opinion --- 
Issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on 16 August 2001 
3. Independent Directors Must Be Independent 
The following persons may not hold the position of Independent Director: 
(1) Persons holding a position in the listed company or a subsidiary thereof and their lineal 
relatives and major social relations (the term "lineal relatives" meaning spouses, parents, 
children, etc.; and the term "major social relations" involving siblings, parents-in-law, 
children-in-law, siblings' spouses, spouse's siblings, etc.); 
(2) Natural person shareholders who directly or indirectly hold not less than 1% of the 
issued shares of the listed company or who rank in the top ten shareholders of the listed 
company, and their lineal relatives; 
(3) Persons who hold positions in entities that directly or indirectly hold not less than 5% of 
the issued shares of the listed company or that rank in the top five shareholders of the listed 
company, and their lineal relatives;  
(4) Persons who, at some time in the previous year, have fallen into one of the three 
categories listed above; 
(5) Persons who provide financial, legal, consultancy or other such services to the listed 
company or its subsidiaries; 
(6) Other persons specified in the company's articles of association; 




3. Example of affiliated directors and affiliated supervisors in listed CEs 
Sinopec Limited (stock code = 600028) is a Chinese oil and gas enterprise. It is a listed CE, as 
SASAC solely owns its ultimate controller (China Petrochemical Corporation Group) for the 
State Council of the People's Republic of China. Sinopec Group has 71.32% ownership of its 
listed subsidiary. The translated excerpt from the 2016 Annual Report of Sinopec Limited 
and the ultimate control framework are shown below. In 2016, four directors on the 
corporate board of Sinopec Limited concurrently had a position in Sinopec Group. Therefore, 
those four directors are named as “affiliated directors”. Also, two members on the 
supervisory board of Sinopec Limited concurrently had a position in Sinopec Group. 
Therefore, those two supervisors are named as “affiliated supervisors”. 
Board of directors Position in Sinopec Limited Position in Sinopec Group 
Yupu Wang Chairman Chairman 
Houliang Dai Vice chairman, CEO  
Zhigang Wang Director, Senior vice president (SVP)  
Haichao Zhang Director, SVP Vice CEO 
Fangzheng Jiao Director, SVP Vice CEO 
Yongsheng Ma Director, SVP Vice CEO 
Xiaoming Jiang Independent director  
Yi Yan Independent director  
Min Tang Independent director  
Gang Fan Independent director  
   
Supervisory board Position in Sinopec Limited Position in Sinopec Group 
Yun Liu Chairman  
Zhongyun Liu Supervisor Assistant CEO, Head of HR  
Hengyou Zhong Supervisor Office director of BOD 
Huiping Zou Supervisor  
Zhenying Jiang Employee representative  
Renming Yu Employee representative  










4. Example of the separation of voting and cash-flow rights 
Yunnan Copper Company Limited (stock code = 000878) is the third largest copper producer 
in China. It is a listed CE, as SASAC solely owns its ultimate controller (Aluminium 
Corporation of China) for the State Council of the People's Republic of China. The ultimate 
control framework from the 2016 Annual Report of Yunnan Copper Company Limited is 
shown below. In 2016, SASAC held 26.11% (58%×45.01%×100%) cash-flow rights and 45.01% 
voting rights of Yunnan Copper Company Limited, which shows that its cash-flow rights and 
voting rights diverge. The separation of voting and cash-flow rights is 1.72, when it is 






Aluminium Corporation of China
China Copper Group
Yunnan Copper Group
Yunnan Copper Limited
58% 
45.01% 
100% 
100% 
